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INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages constitute an award to an injured party
above what is necessary to compensate for actual loss.' The
making of exemplary awards is common to many cultures; ex-
I See Note, Insurance for Punitive Damages: A Reevahuation, 28 HASTINGS L.J.
431, 432 (1976-77).
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amples can be found in the legal systems of ancient Babylonia, 2
Israel,' Rome, 4 Indias and medieval England.
6
The modern concept of punitive damages originated in Eng-
land during the eighteenth century7 and has been accepted in the
2 Provisions allowing the recovery of some multiple of actual damages appear in
the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, which dates from about 2000 B.C. See G. DRIVER
& J. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWs 500-01 (1952). The Babylonian Code allowed the
owner of stolen property to recover from two to thirty times its value from the thief.
See Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day
Society, 29 UMKC L. REV. 1, 2 (1980-81).
The Mosaic law of the ancient Hebrews also permitted multiple recovery of
compensatory damages. Thus, according to the Book of Exodus, "If a man steal an ox,
or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it; he shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep
for a sheep." Exodus 22:1. See also B. JACKSON, TnaFr IN EARLY JEWISH LAW 41-48
(1972); Peters, Punitive Damages in Oregon, 18 WIn.LAmTT L.J. 369, 371-72 (1982).
4 See Note, After the Hyatt Tragedy: Rethinking Punitive Damages in Mass
Disaster Litigation, 23 VASHBURN L.J. 64, 66 (1983). For example, under the Law of
the Twelve Tables, the victim of a theft in some instances was able to recover twice the
value of the stolen property. See W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTooK OF RomAN LAW 577-79
(1921); H. JOLONVICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO T=E STUDY OF ROmAN LAW 288-89
(2d ed. 1952).
, The Hindu Code of Manu, dating from about 200 B.C., contained at least one
provision for multiple damages. See M. BELLI, MODERN DAMAGEs 84 (1959); Igoe,
Punitive Damages: An Analytical Perspective, 14 TRIAL 48, 50 (1978); Sales & Cole,
Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. RaV. 1117, 1119
(1984).
6 Provisions for double, treble or quadruple damages were also common in
medieval legislation. As early as 1236 the Statute of Merton declared that an heir who
married without his lord's consent would be liable to him for twice the value of the
marriage. Stat. of Merton, 29 Hen. 3, ch. 6 (1236). See also T. PLUCKNETT, THE
LEGISLATION OF EDWARD 1 116 (1949). The first Statute of Westminster, dating from the
year 1275, stated that "trespassers against religious persons shall yield double damages,"
3 Edw. 1, ch. 11 (1275), and contained a number of similar provisions for double and
treble damages. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, TiE HISTORY OF THE ENGLSH LAW
522 n. 1 (2d ed. 1911). Finally, the Statute of Gloucester, promulgated in 1278, authorized
an award of treble damages to a party injured by waste. 6 Edw. 1, ch. 5 (1278).
7 English judges developed the modern concept of punitive damages in the eight-
eenth century to explain jury verdicts that greatly exceeded any tangible harm to the
plaintiff. See Borowsky, Punitive Damages in California: The Integrity of Jury Verdicts,
17 U.S.F.L. REV. 147, 152 (1982-83); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts,
70 HARv. L. REv. 517, 518-19 (1956-57) [hereinafter cited as Exemplary Damages].
According to these English jurists, large damage awards were meant to compensate for
mental suffering, wounded dignity and similar injuries not then recoverable as compen-
satory damages. See Tullidge v. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (P.C. 1769); Benson v.
Frederick, 97 Eng. Rep. 1130 (K.B. 1766); Beardmore v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 790
(K.B. 1764); Note, Pretrial Discovery of Net Worth in Punitive Damages Cases, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1142-43 (1980-81) [hereinafter cited as Pretrial Discovery]; Comment,
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United States for more than 150 years." Presently, all but five
states recognize the practice of awarding punitive damages in
civil cases. 9
Over the years legal scholars have offered a variety of jus-
tifications for the doctrine of punitive damages. Punishment is
Punitive Damages, An Appeal for Deterrence, 61 NEB. L. REV. 651, 652 (1982).
The English courts of the time also acknowledged the retributive and deterrent
functions of punitive damages. See Anderson, Indemnity Against Punitive Damages: An
Examination of Punitive Damages, Their Purpose, Public Policy, and the Coverage
Provisions of the Texas Standard Automobile Liability Insurance Policy, 27 Sw. L.J.
593, 594 (1973). For example, in Wilkes v. Wood, 95 Eng. Rep. 766, 98 Eng. Rep. 489
(P.C. 1763), John Wilkes, the publisher of an anti-government newpaper, brought a
trespass action against government agents who searched his house under an illegal
warrant. At trial, Wilkes asked for "large and exemplary damages" since a trifling
award would not be sufficient to deter this type of conduct in the future. 98 Eng. Rep.
at 490. The court upheld a jury verdict of 1000 pounds declaring:
I still continue of the same mind, that a jury have it in their power
to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages are designed
not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punish-
ment to the guilty, to deter them from any such proceeding for the future,
and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself...
98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99, See also Huckle v, Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768-69 (K.B. 1763).
This principle was quickly accepted in England, and by the late eighteenth century the
jury's right to award punitive damages was firmly established. See Rice, Exemplary
Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IowA L, REV. 307, 309 (1969-70).
The first reported case involving punitive damages in America was Genay v.
Norris, I S.C. 3 (1784). Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 HAsTINGS
CoN ST. L. Q. 241, 259 (1985). Note, Punitive Damages in Products Liability: A Layman's
Guide for the Manufacturer's Protection, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 435, 438 (1984). In Genay,
the defendant added a dose of Spanish fly to the plaintiff's wine, causing him to become
ill, See also Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791). By the middle of the nineteenth
century the United States Supreme Court was compelled to admit that the doctrine of
punitive damages had become so well embedded in American law that "to question the
awarding of punitive damages will not admit of argument." Day v. Woodworth, 54
U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851). See also Comment, supra note 7, at 657.
Louisiana, Nebraska and Puerto Rico prohibit punitive damages entirely. See
Ganapolsky v. Park Gardens Dev. Corp., 439 F.2d 844, 846 (1st Cir. 1971) (applying
Puerto Rican law); Ricard v. State, 390 So. 2d 882, 884 (La. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd, 446
So. 2d 901 (La. 1984); Boutte v. Hargrove, 277 So. 2d 757, 760 (La. Ct. App. 1973),
aff'd, 290 So. 2d 319 (La. 1974); Prather v. Eisenmann, 261 N.W.2d 766, 772 (Neb.
1978); Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Neb. 1960). Massachusetts and Wash-
ington also prohibit punitive damages except when specifically allowed by statute. See
Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968);
City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (Mass. 1943);
Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods., 436 P.2d 186, 187 (Wash. 1968). Indiana allows
punitive damages, but only if the defendant's conduct is not also punishable as a crime.
See Moore v. Waitt, 298 N.E.2d 456, 460 (Ind. App. 1973).
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one popularly accepted rationale. 0 According to proponents of
this theory, wrongdoers deserve punishment beyond that which
results from the imposition of compensatory damages," and
punitive damages fulfill this retributive function.
Punitive awards also help preserve public order by providing
aggrieved parties with an attractive substitute for revenge 2 and
the more violent forms of self-help. 3 As such, punitive awards
are especially useful when adequate criminal sanctions are not
readily available to the plaintiff.'4 In addition, punitive damages
act as a "law enforcement" mechanism by encouraging private
individuals to uphold legal norms, 5 In particular, punitive dam-
ages help offset the expense of prosecuting meritorious claims
when compensatory damages alone are likely to be modest. 6
Punitive damages also provide additional compensation to
victims of wrongdoing, 7 Early English common law did not
compensate plaintiffs for nonpecuniary injuries such as pain and
suffering or emotional distress. 8 Nevertheless, the courts often
upheld awards which reflected more than economic loss by char-
acterizing them as "exemplary,'" 9 Today, plaintiffs may recover
"I See 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851); Hays v, Houston G.N.R.R., 46 Tex.
272, 280 (1876); Igoe, supra note 5, at 50; Note, supra note 1, at 433; Note, supra note
4, at 66-67.
See Exemplary Damages, supra note 7, at 522.
" See Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553, 554 (1872); Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep.
761 (C.P. 1814); Grey v. Grant, 95 Eng. Rep. 794, 795 (C.P. 1764); Nelson, Punishment
for Profit: An Examination of the Punitive Damage Award in Strict Liability, I FORUM
377, 380 (1982-83); Peters, supra note 3, at 382.
'1 See Levit, Punitive Damages: Yesterday, Today pnd Tomorrow, 1980 Iws. L.J.
257, 258-59; Pretrial Discovery, supra note 7, at 1146.
"4 See Kink v. Combs, 135 N.W,2d, 789, 798 (Wis, 1965); Freifield, The Rationale
of Punitive Damages, I OHIO ST. L.J. 5, 6-8 (1935).
" See Robinson & Kane, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases, 6 PEPPER-
DINE L. REV, 139, 142 (1978-79); Note, In Defense of Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 303, 330-31 (1980).
11 See Missouri Pac. Ry, Co. v, Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 523 (1885); McCormick,
Some Phases of the Doctrine of Exemplary Damages, 8 N.C.L. REV. 129, 130 (1929-
30); Comment, The Relationship of Punitive Damages and Compensatory Damages in
Tort Actions, 75 DICK. L. REV. 585, 590 (1970-71).
" See Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 234 A.2d 825, 831-32 (Conn. 1967);
Westview Cemetery, Inc. v, Blanchard, 216 S.E.2d 776, 780-81 (Ga. 1975); Kewin v.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N,W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980).
' See Note, supra note 1, at 432; Pretrial Discovery, supra note 7, at 1142.
See 95 Eng. Rep. at 909; 95 Eng. Rep. at 792-93. See also Hink v. Sherman,
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for these sorts of intangible injuries, but attorneys' fees and
other litigation expenses generally still are not included as part
of the compensatory damage award.20 Consequently, some com-
mentators maintain that punitive damages continue to serve a
compensatory function by defraying these costs.2' A final ra-
tionale for the doctrine of punitive damages is deterrence. Pro-
ponents of punitive damages claim that civil sanctions discourage
tortfeasors and other potential wrongdoers from engaging in
similar misconduct in the future.
22
Although punitive damages have been accepted for more
than two centuries, some courts2 and commentators 24 have voiced
serious doubts about the continuing usefulness of this concept
in American jurisprudence. For example, critics have charged
that punitive damages are inconsistent with accepted damages
principles25 and amount to an undeserved windfall to the plain-
tiff.26 In addition, some scholars have questioned whether pun-
129 N.W. 732, 734 (Mich. 1911); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 380 (1873); Stuart v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351, 353 (Tex. 1885); Flanagan v. Womack & Perry,
54 Tex. 45, 47 (1880); Ellis, Punitive Damages in Iowa Law: A Critical Assessment, 66
IOWA L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1980-81); Formby, Insurability Against Punitive Damages: A
Call for Reform, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 443, 445-46 (1982).
1, Note, supra note 8, at 439.
21 See J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMIAGES-LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.11
(1984); Haskell, The Aircraft Manufacturer's Liability for Design and Punitive Dam-
ages-The Insurance Policy and The Public Policy, 40 J. Am L. & CoM. 595, 609
(1974); Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kink v. Combs, 49
MARQ. L. REv. 369, 371 (1965-66); Note, Class Actions for Punitive Damages, 81 MiCH.
L. REv. 1787, 1790 (1982-83).
2 See Note, supra note 8, at 438; Note, Allowance of Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. REv. 613, 627-28 (1971-72). See also Comment,
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 895, 899 (1975-
76).
. See, e.g., Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119 (Colo. 1884); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H.
342, 382; Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1073 (Wash. 1891); Bass
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654, 672-74 (1877).
", See Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should be Abolished, reprinted
in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAI.IAGES (D. Hirsch &
J. Pouros eds. 1969); Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages be Abolished?-A Statement
for the Affirmative, 1965 A.B.A. SEC. INS., NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW 282;
Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 870, 888-89 (1975-
76); Peters, supra note 3, at 429-32.
11 See 53 N.H. 342, 382; Hodel, The Doctrine of Exemplary Damages in Oregon,
44 OR. L. REv. 175, 180-81 (1964-65).
26 See Riewe v. McCormick, 9 N.W. 88, 89 (Neb. 1881); Note, Punitive Damages
in Mass-Marketed Product Litigation, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 405, 429 (1980-81).
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ishment is a proper function of the civil system. 27 They also have
expressed concern that many of the safeguards available to a
criminal defendant are not available to a civil defendant, includ-
ing the requirements of a higher standard of proof and a unan-
imous verdict. 2s Moreover, they point out that punitive damages
create the risk of subjecting the defendant to a form of double
jeopardy when criminal prosecution also is available for the same
act of misconduct.29
Until recently, courts usually have limited the imposition of
punitive damages to situations where the defendent has commit-
ted an intentional tort0 or engaged in criminal behavior, such
as driving while intoxicated.3 In the past decade, however, an
increasing number of jurisdictions have permitted imposition of
punitive damages against sellers of defective products where the
basis of the underlying claim for compensatory damages is neg-
ligence or strict liability in tort.32 Although many commentators
have applauded this development,3 3 others have questioned the
wisdom of introducing the concept of punitive damages into
such a rapidly growing area of the law.
3 4
27 See 25 P. at 1073-74; Duffy, supra note 24, at 9; Note, Punitive Damages and
Their Possible Application in Automobile Accident Litigation, 46 VA. L. REV. 1036,
1042 (1960).
" See Ghiardi, supra note 24, at 287-88; Note, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort
Litigation-Froud v. Celotex Corp., 32 DE PAuL L. REv. 457, 468 (1983).
2" See Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 124-26 (Colo. 1884); Ellis, supra note 19, at
1011; Pretrial Discovery, supra note 7, at 1143. See also Comment, Criminal Safeguards
and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 408, 413-17 (1966-67).
- See, e.g., Maxa v. Neidlein, 163 A. 202, 204 (Md. 1932) (assault and battery);
Bull v. McCuskey, 615 P.2d 957, 961 (Nev. 1980) (malicious prosecution); Jones v.
Fisher, 166 N.W.2d 175, 180 (Wis. 1969) (assault and battery).
" See, e.g., Brooks v. Wootton, 355 F.2d 177, 178 (2d Cir. 1966); Sebastian v.
Wood, 66 N.W.2d 841, 846 (Iowa 1954); Dorn v. Wilmarth, 458 P.2d 942, 945 (Ore.
1969). See generally Annot., 65 A.L.R. 3d 656 (1975).
" See Meyers & Barrus, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases: A Survey,
51 INs. CouNs. J. 212, 213-16 (1984).
" See generally Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MicH.
L. REV. 1257 (1975-76); Robinson & Kane, supra note 15, at 139; Note, Punitive
Damages in Strict Products Liability Litigation, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 333 (1981-
82); Comment, Punitive Damages Awards in Strict Products Liability Litigation: the
Doctrine, the Debate, the Defenses, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 771 (1981).
See generally Ghiardi & Kircher, Punitive Damage Recovery in Products Liability
Cases, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1981-82); Sales, The Emergence of Punitive Damages in
Product Liability Actions: A Further Assault on the Citadel, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351
(1982-83).
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Critics of this new development maintain that the nature of
the plaintiff's underlying compensatory claim35 and the likeli-
hood of numerous injuries arising from a single tortious act3
6
make punitive damages inappropriate in products liability liti-
gation. Of particular concern is the injection of punitive meas-
ures into an area of law that traditionally has eschewed the
concept of fault. According to these commentators, if punish-
ment goals are to justify exemplary damages, questions of fair-
ness and desert must also be addressed.37
For example, the punishment of shareholders and other in-
nocent parties for the wrongdoing of corporate employees ap-
pears both pointless and unjust.38 In addition, the liability
standard for punitive damages arguably fails to provide product
manufacturers with a clear idea of the proscribed conduct. This
is because the liability standard, typically stated in terms of
''malice" or "recklessness," focuses on the mental state of the
individual wrongdoer 39 and, therefore, has little relevance to the
collective decision making involved in product design cases.4
For the same reason, juries are seldom given adequate guidance
when called upon to evaluate whether the defendant's conduct
warrants imposition of punitive damages. Moreover, since there
are no specific criteria to determine the proper amount of pu-
nitive damages, the product manufacturer runs the risk that the
jury will make an excessive award.42
11 Product manufacturers contend that joinder of a fault-based punitive damages
claim along with a compensatory claim grounded in strict liability is conceptually
inconsistent and also confuses the jury. See Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 553 F.
Supp. 482, 485 (D.N.J. 1982); Walbrun v. Berkel, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 384, 385 (E.D.
Wis. 1976); Nelson, supra note 12, at 382-83.
316 See Putz & Astiz, Punitive Damage Claims of Class Members Who Opt Out:
Should They Survive?, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 1, 6 (1981-82); Sales, supra note 34, at 370.
" See Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1982-83); Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of
Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 143-47 (1982-83).
3' DuBois, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury, Products Liability and Profes-
sional Malpractice Cases: Bonanza or Disaster, 43 INS. COUNS. J. 344, 349 (1976); Note,
supra note 4, at 68-69.
19 See K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 3.1(A) (1980).
40 See Sales, supra note 34, at 393-94.
4, See Ellis, supra note 37, at 38.
41 See Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 44-49 (1982).
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Another concern is that, if punitive damages are allowed in
design defect cases, the punishment imposed upon the manufac-
turer may be disproportionate to the degree of wrongdoing.
Unlike manufacturing defects, a generic design defect can injure
hundreds and perhaps even thousands of consumers.4" Since
many punitive damage awards may result against a manufacturer
for a single design decision, 44 the cumulative effect of multiple
punitive damage awards could bankrupt a product manufac-
turer.45
Opponents of punitive damages also question whether as-
sessment of these awards against product manufacturers has any
deterrent effect. If compensatory damages46 and criminal
sanctions47 are sufficient to protect the public against injuries
11 A manufacturing defect is a one-of-a-kind flaw in a product caused by a
deficiency in the manufacturing process. It is readily identifiable because the product
differs from the manufacturer's intended result. Wade, On Product "Design Defects"
and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. Rv. 551, 551-52 (1980). A design defect, on the
other hand, is a generic condition appearing in every item in the particular product line.
Davis, Strict Liability or Liability Based Upon Fault? Another Look, 10 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 5, 26 (1984); Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV.
339, 343 (1974); Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1542-44 (1973). Because of the
inadvertant nature of most manufacturing defects, punitive damages are seldom sought
or recovered in such cases. See, e.g., Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828 (3d
Cir. 1983); Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Wisniewski, 437 A.2d 700 (Md. App. 1981).
A punitive damage award was upheld in Willis v. Floyd Brace Co., 309 S.E.2d 295
(S.C. App. 1983), a case involving a defective leg brace, but liability was imposed on
the manufacturer for its repeated failure to repair the product, rather than for the
original defect. Id. at 298-99.
- See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1967);
Putz & Astiz, supra note 36, at 6.
"' See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 526-27 (5th Cir.
1984); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F.
Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983); Coccia & Morrissey, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases
Should Not Be Allowed, 22 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 46, 59 (1978-79); Sales & Cole, supra
note 5, at 1141-42; Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social and Political Issues
Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 573, 690-91 (1983); Comment, Leich-
tamer v. American Motors Corp.: Extending Punitive Damages and the Consumer
Expectation Test in Products Liability, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 363, 370-72 (1981-82).
1" See 378 F.2d 832, 841; Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 FORUM
411, 418 (1972-73); Nelson, supra note 12, at 387.
"' See Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products Liability, 39 INs. COUNS. J. 300,
304 (1972). See also Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Ap-
proach, 31 HASTINGs L.J. 639, 655-58 (1979-80) (arguing that punitive damages should
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
from defectively designed products, then punitive damages are
unnecessary as a deterrent. Even if additional deterrence is needed,
critics of punitive damages believe that other measures are better
suited to the task.48
This Article considers whether punitive damages are an effective
means of promoting the goals of products liability law. Section
I traces the use of punitive damages in products liability litigation
from the early 1960's to the present time. Section II examines
the traditional rationales for punitive damages and considers
whether they are appropriate in the products liability context.
Finally, Section III evaluates some of the measures that com-
mentators have proposed to adapt more fully the concept of
punitive damages to products liability litigation. Particular em-
phasis is given to the use of punitive damage class actions in
design defect cases.
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ACTIONS: AN OVERVIEW
A. The First-Generation Cases
The trend toward punitive damages in the products liability
area began slowly at first. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.49
and Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,SO decided in 1967,
were the first cases to consider the issue. The result was a split
decision: Toole upheld an award of punitive damages, while
Roginsky denied recovery. Both cases involved triparanol, a drug
developed and marketed by Richardson-Merrell under the trade
name MER/29 for use in the treatment of arteriosclerosis. More
than 400,000 persons had taken the drug over a two-year period
and thousands of them suffered severe eye injuries.5'
According to the plaintiffs in Roginsky and Toole, Richard-
son-Merrell disregarded test results revealing that laboratory an-
not be allowed in cases where adequate criminal sanctions have already been imposed
on the defendant).
41 See Schwartz, supra note 37, at 137-43.
49 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
- 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
11 See Owen, supra note 33, at 1330.
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imals exposed to triparanol had developed cataracts.5 2
Furthermore, the company falsified its reports to the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA),53 ignored increasing evidence of
harmful side effects among MER/29 users,5 4 and misrepresented
the drug's safety in its promotional literature.
55
'2 The Toole court described these tests in detail. The defendant began animal
testing of MER/29 in 1957. In the first test, all female rats on a high dosage died. All
were found to have suffered abnormal blood changes, an event regarded as a major
danger signal. A second experiment using a lower dosage of MER/29 also resulted in
abnormal blood changes in rats. Abnormal blood changes also occurred in a third test
involving monkeys that was completed in March, 1959. In January, 1960, Richardson-
Merrell completed another study with rats. In this case, ninety percent of the laboratory
animals developed eye opacities. In February, 1960, one dog in a test group developed
eye opacities and blindness after being given MER/29. In the same month, the defendant
completed a long-term test of the drug used in rats; twenty-five of the thirty-six rats in
this test group developed eye opacities. 60 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05.
" For example, the company reported that only four out of eight rats died in the
first experiment when, in fact, all but one died. In addition, fictitious body and organ
weights and blood tests were fabricated for the rats that died. Furthermore, none of the
abnormal blood changes encountered in the tests was disclosed. Test results from the
monkey experiments were also falsified by recording false body weights for the test
animals, by creating fictitious data for monkeys that had been killed, by adding data
for an imaginary monkey that had been killed, and by adding data for an imaginary
monkey that had never been in the test group at all. The defendant also declared that
eight of twenty rats in another study had merely developed mild eye inflamations when,
in fact, ninety percent of them developed eye opacities. Finally, Richardson-Merrell
failed to inform the FDA of the results of tests completed in February, 1960, in which
one dog and twenty-five of thirty-six rats in the respective test groups developed eye
opacities. Id.
' In June, 1960, a researcher in Florida informed the defendant of an experiment
she conducted in which a number of rats exposed to MER/29 had developed lenticular
and corneal eye opacities. Later, in January of the following year, Merck, Sharp &
Dohme, another drug company, advised Richardson-Merrell that its long-term testing of
MER/29 on rats and dogs showed that many of the test animals had developed cataracts.
The defendant did not reveal Merck's findings to the FDA, but in April, 1961, Rich-
ardson-Merrell began its own long-term study of the effect of MER/29 on rats and
dogs. By August, thirty-five of the forty-six rats had developed opacities, and by October,
five of the seven dogs had also developed eye opacities. By this time the company had
also begun to receive reports of eye problems and hair loss from doctors and even its
own salesmen. Id. at 405-06.
" Not only did Richardson-Merrell resist the FDA's attempts to have MER/29
taken off the market, but continued to claim that it was "a proven drug, remarkably
free from side effects, virtually non-toxic ... and completely safe." Id. at 416. More-
over, the defendant told doctors whose patients suffered hair loss or eye problems that
it was not aware of similar complaints from other users of its product. Rheingold, The
MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAnF. L. Rav.
116, 119 (1968).
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In Roginsky, a patient who developed cataracts from using
MER/29 6 brought a diversity action in federal district court,
seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. The jury re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding $17,500 in compen-
satory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.5 7 On appeal,
the federal court of appeals affirmed the compensatory damages
award5 8 but held that the trial court should not have submitted
the punitive damages claim to the jury. 9
Judge Friendly, writing for the majority, concluded punitive
damages were inappropriate because the corporate officers of
Richardson-Merrell had not participated in or ratified the wrong-
ful acts of lower-level employees.60 Nevertheless, he continued
with a lengthy criticism of the practice of awarding punitive
damages in products liability actions. Judge Friendly maintained
that compensatory damage awards and criminal sanctions were
sufficient to discourage manufacturers from marketing defective
products, and that punitive damages, therefore, were unneces-
sary. 6' Furthermore, Judge Friendly expressed concern that the
cost of multiple punitive damage awards ultimately would fall
16 The plaintiff, who was then sixty years old, began using MER/29 in February,
1961. Several months later he began to experience scaling, rashes, and hair loss. These
conditions persisted despite treatment. By the end of the year, disturbing eye symptoms
appeared and Roginsky stopped taking the drug. The skin and hair problems disappeared
within six months, but the eye problems became worse. The plaintiff's eye problems
were later diagnosed as cataracts. 378 F.2d at 836.
57 Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 430, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
11 378 F.2d at 838. The court agreed with the defendant that fraud and misrepre-
sentation with respect to test reports submitted to the FDA would not give rise to any
cause of action on behalf of the plaintiff. Id. at 837. Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the jury's finding of negligence on the part of Richardson-Merrell was sufficient to
support an award of compensatory damages. Id.
19 Id. at 844.
60 Judge Friendly concluded that New York followed the "complicity rule," which
imposes liability for punitive damages on a corporation only when "superior officers
either order, participate in, or ratify outrageous conduct." See Morris, Punitive Damages
in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216, 221 (1960). According to Judge Friendly,
Richardson-Merrell's superior corporate officers failed to exercise proper supervision
over their subordinates and were unreasonably slow to acknowledge the risks associated
with MER/29; however, he concluded that there was "no proof from which a jury
could properly conclude that the defendant's officers manifested deliberate disregard for
human welfare." 378 F.2d at 850.
61 Id. at 838-841.
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on the public in the form of higher prices or on innocent
corporate shareholders.
Nevertheless, a California appellate court reached a different
conclusion in Toole. 62 The plaintiff in Toole also developed
cataracts as a result of taking MER/29. 63 Suit was brought
against the drug manufacturer based on negligence, express war-
ranty and implied warranty, seeking both compensatory and
punitive damages. Finding for the plaintiff, the jury awarded
$175,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive
damages. On appeal, the award of compensatory damages was
upheld because the plaintiff had shown that the defendant's
testing and marketing procedures were negligent. 64 As in Rogin-
sky, the dispute centered around the propriety of awarding pu-
nitive damages.
The court in Toole, like the Roginsky court, held that the
complicity rule was applicable, but concluded that high level
corporate officers were guilty of wrongdoing. 6s Richardson- Mer-
rell argued that punitive damages were improper because no
evidence of malice had been presented. 6 To recover punitive
damages, according to the defendant, the court should require
the plaintiff to prove that the company deliberately intended to
injure him. The court, however, declared the plaintiff could
2 60 Cal. Rptr. 398.
" The plaintiff, a forty-three-year-old male, began using MER/29 in July, 1960.
"He developed a condition known as ichthyosis, characterized by dry, flaky, red and
inflamed skin. He also suffered hair loss over his entire body." After he discontinued
using the drug his hair and skin problems disappeared, but cataracts developed and it
became necessary to remove the lenses of both eyes. Id. at 403.
' Id. at 408. The court also upheld the trial court's refusal to grant a directed
verdict for the defendant on the express warranty and implied warranty counts. Id. at
410-14.
" According to the court, Dr. Van Maanen, the associate director of research,
directed employees in the toxicology department to falsify test results. Id. at 404. The
court concluded that Dr. Van Maanen was "high enough on the executive scale of
responsibility" to hold the corporation liable in punitive damages for his wrongful acts.
Id. at 415. Furthermore, the company's vice president admitted that "the full body of
company knowledge" had not accompanied Richardson-Merrell's application to the
FDA. Id.
'- Under California law punitive damages could be awarded only when the defend-
ant has been found guilty of "oppression, fraud, or malice." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294
(vest Supp. 1985). The trial court gave no instructions on the circumstances under
which punitive damages could be awarded for oppression or fraud, but limited itself to
malice as a basis for exemplary damages. 60 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
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establish malice by showing that the defendant's wrongful con-
duct was willful, intentional, or done with reckless disregard of
its possible results. The court found that Richardson-Merrell had
acted recklessly and in wanton disregard of possible harm to
others in "promoting, selling, and maintaining MER/29 on the
market in view of its knowledge of the toxic effect of the drug."
'67
This conduct, in the court's view, sufficiently supported a find-
ing of malice.
B. The Second-Generation Cases
In the decade following Roginsky and Toole, the punitive
damages issue arose sporadically. Although there were some
dissenters, 68 most courts accepted the reasoning of the Toole
decision.6 9 Beginning with Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 70 decided
by the Alaska Supreme Court in 1979, the practice of awarding
punitive damages in defective product cases gained increasing
momentum.
7'
Sturm was the first case since Roginsky and Toole to give
serious attention to the policies involved in awarding punitive
6, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416. The court's attention was called to the Roginsky case.
Nevertheless, the court expressly declined to accept the Roginsky court's conclusion that
wrongdoing on the part of corporate officers was not serious enough to impute the existence
of malice to Richardson-Merrell. Id. at 416-17 n.3.
6- See Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973); Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 409 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. La. 1976); Walbrun v. Berkel,
Inc., 433 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
67 See, e.g., Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Johnson
v. Husky Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976); Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523
F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973); Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414
F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii
1975); Drake v. Wham-O Mfg., 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Sabich v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior
Ct. City of Sacramento, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Pease v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 71 Cal.
Rptr. 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 253 N.E.2d 636 (Ill. App. Ct.
1969), aff'd, 263 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. 1970); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1978).
,0 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 894 (1981).
11 Much of this renewed interest in punitive damages was due to the publication
of Professor Owen's seminal article on the subject. See Owen, supra note 33. Most of
the courts that allowed punitive damages in products liability cases relied heavily on
Professor Owen's analysis.
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damages in products liability cases. In Sturm the plaintiff was
shot and injured when the .41 magnum single-action revolver
slipped out of his hands as he was unloading it. The manufac-
turer's instructions included a warning that the firearm could
discharge while the hammer was located in any of the four
positions, including the safety and loading positions.72 The plain-
tiff, however, maintained that the revolver was defectively de-
signed and the warning was not sufficient to relieve the defendant
from liability. Accordingly, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer
under strict liability in tort and sought punitive damages. The
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding $137,750 in
compensatory damages and $2,895,000 in punitive damages.73
The defendant argued that punitive damages were incompat-
ible with the "no-fault" underpinnings of strict liability. The
Alaska Supreme Court, however, responded that punitive dam-
ages are designed not only to punish, but also to deter similar
wrongdoing in the future. In the court's opinion, punitive dam-
ages served a deterrence function in cases where the product
caused numerous minor injuries and in cases where it was cheaper
for the manufacturer to pay compensatory damages than to
remedy the product's defective condition. Furthermore, punitive
damage awards in products liability actions would prevent a
reckless manufacturer from gaining an unfair commercial ad-
vantage over its more socially responsible competitors. 74 In this
manner, therefore, punitive damage awards promoted the same
objectives in products liability cases as strict liability in tort.
Thus, the court upheld the punitive damages award."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a lengthy opinion, also
thoroughly evaluated the benefits and disadvantages of allowing
plaintiffs to seek punitive damages in products liability actions.
In a landmark decision, Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.,76 the Wis-
consin court opted in favor of punitive damages.
72 The warning stated in part: "The loading notch and the safety notch provide
only partial security. If these notches are damaged, as they may be by 'fanning,' they
offer no security. Never depend on this or any other mechanical safety device to justify
pointing the firearm at any person." 594 P.2d at 41.
1 Id.
14 Id. at 47.
" Id. at 46-47. The Alaska Supreme Court reduced the award to $250,000 but, on
rehearing, modified its earlier ruling and raised the award to $500,000. 615 P.2d at 624.
294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980).
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The plaintiffs in Wangen were occupants of a 1967 Ford
Mustang who were either killed or severely injured77 when the
fuel tank of their automobile ruptured and burst into flames
after being struck in the rear by another vehicle. The plaintiffs
sought both compensatory and punitive damages. The trial court
denied Ford's motion to dismiss the punitive damages claims
and an interlocutory appeal was taken. The intermediate appel-
late court held that punitive damages could be recovered, at least
in some instances, in a products liability action based on strict
liability in tort.
78
On appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Ford maintained
that punitive damages were antithetical to the theories of negli-
gence and strict liability because such damages were appropriate
only when the defendant was guilty of intentional wrongdoing.
The court, however, determined that punitive damages were not
contingent upon the classification of the underlying tort for
which compensatory damages were sought; rather a punitive
damages claim was justified if supported by proof of aggravating
circumstances beyond those supporting compensatory damages.
Furthermore, proof of an intentional desire to injure, vex, or
annoy was not necessary as long as the injured party could show
that the wrongdoer acted with reckless indifference or disregard
for others' rights.79
The defendant also contended that punitive damages were
unnecessary in products liability cases to effect punishment and
deterrence objectives. According to Ford, compensatory damages
" The driver, Robin Duvall, and her sister, Terri Wangen, were injured. Robin's
brother, Kip Wangen, and Robin's son, Christopher Duvall, died as a result of their
injuries. Id. at 440.
" The court of appeals concluded:
(I) punitive damages are recoverable in a products liability suit for com-
pensatory damages predicated on strict liability in tort; (2) punitive damages
are not recoverable in a product liability suit for compensatory damages
predicated on negligence; (3) punitive damages are recoverable in an action
which survives the death of the injured person; (4) punitive damages are
not recoverable in a wrongful death action; and (5) punitive damages are
recoverable by parents in an action for damages for loss of society and
companionship of a child but not in an action for damages for loss of the
minor's earning capacity and medical expenses.
Id. at 441.
19 Id. at 441-42.
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were a substantial punishment and thus sufficient to deter man-
ufacturers from marketing defective products. 0 In addition, Ford
argued that punitive damages would not punish or deter wrong-
doing because the public, not the manufacturer, would ultimately
pay the damages through higher prices for goods.8'
The Wisconsin court rejected each of these contentions. In
the court's view, compensatory damages were not always suffi-
cient to discourage the defendant manufacturer from further
wrongdoing because "[s]ome may think it cheaper to pay dam-
ages or a forfeiture than to change a business practice."18 2 The
court was likewise skeptical that federal product quality regula-
tions obviated the need for additional sanctions.83 Finally, while
admitting that compensatory damages would normally be passed
on to consumers, the court doubted that manufacturers could
pass on punitive damage awards quite so easily. 4
Ford also alleged that allowing plaintiffs to recover punitive
damages in product liability actions would have undesirable eco-
nomic and social consequences. According to Ford, if punitive
damages were not passed on to the consumer, innocent share-
holders would bear the burden.35 Moreover, since there would
be a practical limit to the amount of punitive damages a man-
ufacturer could pay, the injured parties who brought suit first
would reap "the bonanza of punitive damages" while later
victims would receive little or nothing. 6 Finally, echoing the
concerns of the Roginsky court, Ford maintained that large
claims for punitive damages could cause financial ruin for a
manufacturer responsible for a single defect appearing in many
products.
8 7
Again, after considering each of these arguments, the court
concluded that punitive damages were not contrary to public
" Id. at 451.
' Id. at 452.
$2 Id. at 451.
" Id. at 451-52. Moreover, the court observed, even if Ford had such data it
would be more relevant in persuading the fact-finder at the trial level not to impose
punitive damages in a particular case rather than as an argument against the allowance
of punitive damages generally in products liability cases. Id. at 452.
SId.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 454.
Id. at 455.
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policy. The court observed that loss of investment was a risk
that shareholders knowingly undertook. Moreover, the court
held that the prospect of punitive damage awards might encour-
age shareholders and corporate management to exercise closer
control over company operations."' The court responded to the
"windfall" argument by declaring that such awards compensate
effort required of the early plaintiffs to uncover and prove
misconduct.8 9 Finally, the court expressed doubts about Ford's
claim that multiple punitive damage awards would bankrupt
manufacturers. According to the court, trial courts could exercise
control over jury verdicts to prevent undue punishment of
defendants .9
Finding punitive damages appropriate in a products liability
action, the court then considered whether allegations in the
complaint, if proved, were sufficient to establish conduct that
was willful and wanton, and in reckless disregard of the plain-
tiff's rights. 9' According to the complaint, "Ford knew of the
defects in the design of the gas tank and filler neck and in the
lack of a barrier betweeen the gas tank and passenger compart-
ment of the 1967 Mustang." 92 Because of tests conducted by it
as early as 1964, Ford also was aware of the fire hazard associ-
ated with the design. Moreover, years before the plaintiff's
accident, Ford knew that design defects were causing serious
burn injuries to occupants of Mustang automobiles. Ford could
have corrected these defects. Nevertheless, to avoid bad publicity
and the costs of recall and repair, Ford deliberately chose not
to recall its 1967 Mustangs or issue public warnings of the
defects. 93 These actions, according to the court, were sufficient
to support a claim for punitive damages.
94
11 Id. at 453-54.
$9 Id. at 454.
Id. at 455-57. The court also pointed out that the plaintiff must prove "to a
reasonable certainty by evidence that is clear, satisfactory and convincing" that punitive
damages are warranted. Id. at 457. In addition, the court declared that excessive multiple
punitive damages awards can be avoided because the jury, in considering the defendant's
wealth, may take account of compensatory and punitive damages, along with fines and
forfeitures, already imposed on the defendant or likely to be imposed on him. Id. at
459-60.
91 Id. at 462.
92 Id.
93 Id.
'A Id.
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Shortly after the Wangen decision, the Minnesota Supreme
Court also upheld a punitive damage award. In Gryc v. Dayton-
Hudson Corp.,9s a four-year-old child was severely burned when
her pajamas came into contact with a lighted electric stove
burner.9 6 The pajamas were made of cotton flannelette manu-
factured by a defendant in the suit, Riegel Textile Corp. 97 The
cotton fabric was not treated with a flame retardant, nor was
any warning provided about its highly flammable characteris-
tics.98 The plaintiff sought compensatory damages on the theory
that the fabric was unreasonably dangerous. The plaintiff also
claimed punitive damages on the basis that Riegel had acted
maliciously, willfully, or wantonly. The jury awarded the plain-
tiff $750,000 in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive
damages. 99 This award was affirmed on appeal.' °°
According to the court, manufacturers, through "design,
testing, inspection and collection of data on product safety per-
formance in the field," had exclusive control over the means of
discovering and correcting product hazards.' 0' Punitive damages
offered a means of punishing those manufacturers who abused
their control over safety information and marketed defective
products in flagrant disregard for the public safety. Punitive
awards also deterred others from acting with similar disregard
for the public welfare.'0
The trial court listed a number of factors for the jury to con-
sider in determining whether Riegel had acted in "willful or reckless
" 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980).
'6 Id. at 729. The plaintiff, Lee Ann Gryc, suffered severe second and third degree
burns on twenty percent of her body. Although she underwent a series of painful skin
grafting procedures, the burns caused permanent scarring and disfigurement. The testi-
mony at trial also indicated that this permanent disfigurement could adversely affect Lee
Ann's psychological makeup and impair her employment and matrimonial opportunities.
Id. at 743-44.
',7 Suit was brought against Riegel Textile Corp., the manufacturer of the cotton
fabric, Style Undies, Inc., the manufacturer of the pajamas, Associated Merchandising
Corporation, the wholesale distributor, and Dayton-Hudson Corporation, the retail
seller. The other defendants, excluding Riegel, settled with the plaintiffs prior to trial.
Id. at 742 n.8.
13 Id. at 729-30.
19 Id. at 729.
'J Id.
Id.
Id. at 732-33.
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disregard of the plaintiff's rights."'' 03 These factors included the
magnitude of the danger, the feasibility of reducing the hazard,
and the defendant's knowledge of the risk.'0 4 The appellate court
approved these factors, concluding that there was sufficient evi-
dence of misconduct by Riegel to justify a punitive damages
award.'05
Perhaps the most dramatic products liability case of the
decade was Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,06 decided by the
California Supreme Court in 1981. In Grimshaw, a 1972 Ford
Pinto Hatchback, which had stalled on a freeway, erupted into
flames when it was rear-ended by another vehicle. Lilly Gray,
driver of the Pinto, suffered fatal burns and thirteen-year-old
Richard Grimshaw, a passenger, suffered severe and permanently
disfiguring burns on his entire body. Grimshaw and the heirs of
Gray sued Ford Motor Co. and others.'0 7 Grimshaw's case was
submitted to the jury on theories of negligence and strict liability,
while Gray's case went to the jury only on a strict liability
theory, The jury awarded Grimshaw $2,516,000 compensatory
damages and over $125 million punitive damages; the Grays
received a $559,680 compensatory award. 03 On Ford's motion
for a new trial, the court required Grimshaw to remit all but
$3.5 million of the punitive award as a condition of denial of
the motion. Ford did not contest the compensatory damage
0" Id. at 739.
- Other factors listed by the trial court included:
[1] [t]he manufacturer's awareness of the danger, the magnitude of the
danger, and the availability of a reasonable remedy; [2] [t]he nature and
duration of, and the reasons for, the manufacturer's failure to act appro-
priately to discover or reduce the danger; [3] [t]he extent to which the
manufacturer purposefully created the danger; [4] [t]he extent to which the
defendants are subject to federal safety regulation; [5] [t]he probability
that compensatory damages might be awarded against the defendant in
other cases; and [6] [t]he amount of time which has passed since the actions
sought to be deterred.
Id.
J0 Id.
" 174 Cal. Rptr, 348 (Cal. 1981).
107 "The plaintiffs settled with the other defendants before and during trial; the
case went to verdict only against Ford." Id, at 363 n.3.
"I The trial court refused to allow the Grays to amend their complaint to seek
punitive damages because punitive damages were not permitted by California's wrongful
death statute. Id. at 363, The trial court's ruling was upheld on appeal. Id. at 392-99.
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awards but contended on appeal that the punitive award was
statutorily unauthorized and unconstitutional. In addition, Ford
insisted that the evidence did not support a finding of malice or
corporate responsibility for malice.109
At the time of the accident, the six-month-old Pinto had
been driven approximately 3,000 miles. Apparently, the impact
of the other car propelled the Pinto's gas tank forward, where
it was punctured by a bolt on the differential housing, causing
the punctured tank to spray fuel into the passenger compart-
ment."10
Evidence at trial showed that crash tests performed by Ford
on prototypes and production models revealed the risk of fire
from rear-end collisions."' Ford executive officers knew of these
crash test results but nevertheless proceeded with production."
2
The plaintiff also showed that Ford could have alleviated the
Pinto explosion risk at relatively small cost." 3
IO: Id. at 358-59,
" Id. at 359. At the time the Pinto was designed, the accepted practice was to
place the gas tank over the rear axle in subcompacts because small vehicles had less
"crush space" between the rear axle and the bumper than larger cars. The Pinto's
styling, however, required the tank to be placed behind the rear axle, leaving only nine
or ten inches of crush space-far less than in any other American automobile or Ford
overseas subcompact. In addition, the Pinto's bumper was little more than a chrome
strip, less substantial than the bumper of any other American car then being produced.
The Pinto's rear structure also lacked reinforcing members known as "hat sections"
and horizontal cross-members running between them such as were found in cars of
larger unitized construction. The absence of these reinforcing members rendered the
Pinto less crash resistant than other vehicles. Finally, the Pinto's differential housing
had an exposed flange and a line of exposed bolt heads, These protrusions were sufficient
to puncture a gas tank driven forward against the differential upon rear impact. Id.
"I See id. Ford also tested the Pinto as designed to determine whether it would
meet a proposed federal safety regulation. The regulation required that all automobiles
manufactured in 1972 be designed to withstand a twenty-mile-per-hour crash without
significant fuel spillage. Id.
2Id. at 361.
"1 Id.
Equipping the car with a reinforced rear structure, smooth axle, improved
bumper and additional crush space at an additional cost of $15.30 [per
vehicle] would have made the fuel tank safe in a 34 to 38-mile-per-hour
rear end collision, If, in addition to the foregoing, a bladder or tank within
a tank were used or if the tank were protected with a shield, it would have
been safe in a 40 to 45-mile-per-hour rear impact. [The cost of these
additional precautions ranged from $4.00 to $8.00 per vehicle. Further-
more,] [i]f the tank had been located over the rear axle it would have been
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Because California had codified the doctrine of punitive
damages in its Civil Code,1 14 Ford attacked the validity of the
statute rather than questioning the concept of exemplary damages
itself. Nevertheless, the court rejected Ford's contention that its due
process rights were violated because it did not have "fair warn-
ing" that its conduct would result in punitive damages liability
under this statutory provision."15 Ford also argued that "malice"
as used in the California Civil Code required animus malus, or
evil motive-an intention to injure the person harmed-and that
the term was, therefore, conceptually incompatible with a non-
intentional tort such as the manufacture and marketing of a
defectively designed product."16 The court, however, responded
that "malice" in California included not only a malicious inten-
tion to injure the specific person harmed, but conduct demon-
strating "a conscious disregard of the probability that the actor's
conduct will result in injury to others. 111 7 The court declared
this interpretation of the term "malice" in the products liability
context to be consistent with the objectives of punitive damages.
The court also observed that compensatory damages may not
serve as a sufficient deterrent against wrongdoing because the
manufacturer may find it more profitable to treat compensatory
damages as a part of business costs instead of remedying the
defect." 8
Finally, Ford maintained that the punitive damages award,
many times over the highest award for such damages ever upheld
in California, was excessive. The court responded that the bench
mark was not the size of other punitive awards' '9 but the "degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the wealth of the
defendant, the amount of compensatory damages, and an amount
safe in a rear impact at 50 miles per hour or more.
Id.
,,4 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970). At the time of the trial this provision
declared:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express
or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
Id.
115 See 174 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
116 See id. at 381.
117 Id.
,tS Id. at 382
,, Id. at 388.
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which would serve as a deterrent effect on like conduct by the
defendant and others who may be so inclined.' 120 Applying the
standard to Ford, the court held that Ford management had
acted in an extremely reprehensible manner, 2' exhibiting a "con-
scious and callous disregard of public safety in order to maximize
profits.' The size of the award was not considered excessive
vis-a-vis Ford's net worth-$7.7 billion at the time of the trial
with 1976 after-tax income of over $983 million. 23 Finally, the
roughly 1.4-to-I ratio of punitive to compensatory damages 24
supported the court's contention that the former were not out
of line but still substantial enough to have the desired deterrent
effect.12 Accordingly, the trial court's award of compensatory
and punitive damages to Grimshaw was affirmed.
The number of punitive damages claims against product
manufacturers has escalated substantially in the four years since
Grimshaw. Although a wide variety of products have been in-
volved in the reported decisions, 26 some of the most significant
12J Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
IL Id.
124 Id.
' Id. at 388-89.
See, e.g., Saupitty v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., 726 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1984) (lawn
mower); Alley v. Gubser Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36 (D. Colo. 1983) (mobile home);
Gorman v. Saf-T-Mate, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Ind. 1981) (motorboat); Butcher
v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692 (D. Md. 1981) (hot water heater); Campus
Sweater & Sportswear v. M.B. Kahn Const. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd
per curiam, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981) (roof); Airco, Inc. v. Simmons First National
Bank, 638 S.W.2d 660 (Ark. 1982) (artificial breathing machine); Forrest City Mach.
Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 616 S.W.2d 720 (Ark. 1981) (grain cart); Coale v. Dow
Chemical Co., 701 P.2d 885 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (lice control product for cattle);
Cloroben Chemical Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887 (Del. 1983) (drain cleaner); Piper
Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (airplane); Skil
Corp. v. Lugsdin, 309 S.E.2d 921 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (circular saw); Beerman v. Toro
Mfg. Corp., 615 P.2d 749 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1980) (lawn mower); Collins v. Interroyal
Corp., 466 N.E.2d 1191 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (stool); Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling
Systems, 455 N.E.2d 142 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (conveyer gear drive mechanism); Moore
v. Remington Arms Co., 427 N.E.2d 608 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (shotgun shell); Baleno
by Baleno v. Jacuzzi Research, Inc., 461 N.Y.S.2d 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (hot tub);
Willis v. Floyd Brace Co., 309 S.E.2d 295 (S.C. App. 1983) (leg brace); Int'l Armament
Corp. v. King, 686 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. 1985) (shotgun); Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. v.
Daniels, 619 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (football helmet); Walter v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 358 N.W.2d 816 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (airplane).
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cases have involved motor vehicles,' 27 pharmaceuticals,' 2 and
asbestos. 129
Encouraged perhaps by the Wangen and Grimshaw decisions,
a number of plaintiffs have sought punitive damages against the
manufacturers of defective motor vehicles. Thus, in American
Motors Corp. (AMC) v. Ellis,'3° a case reminiscent of Wangen
and Grimshaw, a Florida appellate court reversed a directed
verdict for the defendant on the punitive damages issue. The
plaintiff was burned when a truck hit from behind his AMC
Ambassador. The plaintiff alleged that the automobile's fuel
system was defective because it was placed beneath the trunk
27 See, e.g., Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1983); Dorsey v.
Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981), mod. on other grounds, 670 F.2d 21
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Martin v. Smith, 534 F. Supp. 804
(Wv.D.N.C. 1982); Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978),
aff'd., 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g en banc granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir.
1980), vacated, 665 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part, 722 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.),
mod. on reh'g, 727 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1984); Wolmer v. Chrysler Corp., 474 So.2d 834
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); American Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So. 2d 459 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981); Turney v. Ford Motor Co., 418 N.E.2d 1079 (Il1. App. Ct. 1981);
Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Wisniewski, 437 A.2d 700 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981);
Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981); Ford Motor Co.
v. Nowak, 638 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew,
297 S.E.2d 675 (Va. 1982).
,28 See, e.g., Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
(DES); Wolf ex rel. Wolf v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 555 F. Supp. 613 (D.N.J. 1982)
(tampon); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526
F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983); Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1983) (IUD); Palmer
v. A.H. Robins, 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984) (IUD); Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 681 P.2d 1038 (Kan. 1984) (birth control pill), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 365 (1984);
Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (flammable surgical tape),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 803 (1982). But see Magallanes v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 213 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1985) (punitive damages not allowed under market share
liability theory).
' See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984);
Hansen v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S.Ct. 1749 (1985); Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir.
1982); Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 553 F. Supp. 482 (D.N.J. 1982); Neal v.
Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 760 F.2d 481
(1985); Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Froud v. Celotex Corp., 437 N.E.2d 910 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), rev'd, 456 N.E.2d
131 (1983); Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 472 A.2d 577 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1984); Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515 (Okla. 1983).
13" 403 So. 2d 459 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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floor rather than in the "kick-up" area above the rear axle.' 3'
The appellate court held that the plaintiff could recover punitive
damages if he could show that the defendant's actions consti-
tuted "willfulness, recklessness, maliciousness, outrageous con-
duct, oppression or fraud.' 3 2 According to the plaintiff, the
defendant was aware of the risk of fire from its own crash tests,
but to save money had refused to relocate the fuel tank, despite
the recommendation of its own engineers. 3 3 The company did
not correct the problem until required to do so by new govern-
ment standards. Relying on Wangen, the court concluded that
the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial.
34
The injured parties also were allowed to put forth a claim
for punitive damages in Maxey v. Freightliner Corp. ,'135 another
"second collision" case. In Maxey, the plaintiffs' parents died
when a truck manufactured by the defendant overturned, slid
288 feet, and burst into flames. Apparently, when the truck
overturned, the fuel tank punctured, allowing fuel to spill and
ignite. 36 The plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturer had placed
the fuel tanks close to ignition sources and occupants without
also including impact absorbers and fuel line fittings that would
separate in the event of a crash. 37 In addition, the defendant
had not performed any crash tests on the fuel system or the
truck, nor did it maintain any records on accident or safety
experience.'
33
At the first trial, the jury awarded $150,000 compensatory
and $10 million punitive damages. 39 The trial court, however,
concluded that compliance with industry custom regarding the
design of truck fuel systems precluded an award of punitive
" Id. at 459. The "kick-up" area is the space above the rear axle and beneath the
package shelf below the rear seat. Id.
Id. at 467.
' Id.
Id. at 469.
450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.), reh'g en
bane granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 665 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1982),
aff'd in part, 722 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.), mod. on reh'g, 727 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1984).
"1 450 F. Supp. at 957.
'" Id.
Id. at 963.
Id. at 958-59.
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damages. °4 0 Therefore, it granted a judgment n.o.v. with respect
to the punitive damage award. Initially, on appeal, the court
held that punitive damages were proper under Texas law only if
a "willful act, or omission, or gross neglect" were shown.'
4'
Evidence of even "some care" was sufficient to preclude a
finding of "gross neglect."'' 42 Since under state law, compliance
with industry custom was sufficient to constitute "some care,'
4 3
the trial court had not erred in dismissing the punitive damages
claim. 144
On rehearing, however, the appellate court changed its mind
after learning that the Texas courts had abandoned the "some
care" standard while Maxey was on appeal. 45 The new rule
focused not on whether the defendant exercised "an entire want
of care," but on whether his conduct raised an inference of
conscious indifference. 46 Under this approach, compliance with
industry custom was relevant, but not conclusive, on the issue
of conscious indifference. 47 Accordingly, the court remanded
the case to the trial court. The trial court, however, concluded
that the evidence failed to demonstrate conscious indifference
on the defendant's part and, therefore, reinstated its original
judgment. 48 The trial court also declared that if the punitive
damages award was reinstated on appeal, it would order a re-
mittitur limiting the plaintiffs' recovery to three times the amount
of the compensatory award. 49 The plaintiffs again appealed and
the appellate court again reversed. 50 The court found ample
evidence to support a conclusion that the manufacturer had
behaved with conscious indifference to the safety of its
consumers' 5' and thus determined that punitive damages were
'40 Id. at 966.
"4 623 F.2d at 398.
665 F.2d at 1372.
See Hernandez v. Smith, 552 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1977).
'' 623 F.2d at 399
,' 665 F.2d at 1373.
,46 Birk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (rex. 1981).
141 See 665 F.2d at 1376.
,4 722 F.2d at 1241.
141 Id.
1 Id. at 1238.
M Id. at 1241-42.
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justified. 52 However, the appellate court upheld the trial court's
ruling as to a remittitur.'
53
Crashworthiness also figured in Leichtamer v. American Mo-
tors Corp.,' 54 decided by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1981.1 5 The
plaintiffs in Leichtamer were involved in an accident when the
Jeep CJ-7 in which they were riding at an off-the-road recreation
facility pitched over and crashed. The accident killed the driver,
Vance, and his wife. Carl Leichtamer suffered a fractured skull,
while his sister, Jeanne, was left a paraplegic as the result of
her injuries. The plaintiffs admitted that Vance was driving
negligently and that his conduct caused the vehicle to overturn.
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs contended that improper placement
of the Jeep's roll bar "substantially enhanced, intensified, ag-
gravated, and prolonged" the injuries that they sustained from
the accident.
5 6
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. Compensatory
damages of $100,000 and punitive damages of $100,000 were
assessed on behalf of Carl Leichtamer, while Jeanne Leichtamer
received $1 million in compensatory damages and $1 million in
punitive damages. 7 The intermediate appellate court affirmed
the punitive damage award because the manufacturer was aware
of the risk of a forward pitch-over 5 yet failed to remedy the
dangerous condition or warn the public about it. In addition,
the defendant's advertising showed the vehicle engaging in var-
ious off-road maneuvers and implied that they could be done
safely. According to the intermediate appellate court, the "in-
citement to reckless conduct"' 9 depicted in the advertisements,
coupled with the defendant's failure to reveal that the roll bar
1 2 Id.
'' Id. at 1242. The court also affirmed the compensatory damages award and
declared that a new trial only on the punitive damages claim would be necessary if the
plaintiffs refused to agree to the remittitur. 727 F.2d at 351-52.
1- 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981).
'' For other punitive damages cases involving the crashworthiness issue, see Dorsey
v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981), mod. on other grounds, 670 F.2d
21 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); 534 F. Supp. 804.
424 N.E.2d at 572.
Id. at 573.
A pitch-over occurs when the vehicle turns end over end and lands upside down;
a side roll occurs when the vehicle turns over on its side. Id. at 572.
I" d. at 579.
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was not as safe as it appeared, 60 justified an inference of malice.
The Ohio Supreme Court declared that conduct manifesting
a "flagrant indifference to the possibility that the product might
expose consumers to unreasonable risks of harm" was sufficient
to support an award of punitive damages.' 61 The court felt that
the representations in the manufacturer's advertisements were
not enough by themselves to establish the requisite degree of
malice. Nevertheless, the advertisements, in conjunction with other
wrongful acts, were sufficient to meet the "flagrant indiffer-
ence" standard and thus to justify a punitive award.1 62 The court
noted that the manufacturer had not only misrepresented the
safety of its vehicles, but also had failed to perform any tests
on the roll bar under pitch-over conditions. In the court's opin-
ion, this additional misconduct was enough to warrant the pu-
nitive damage award.
63
As mentioned earlier, a number of punitive damages cases
involved pharmaceutical products. In two of these cases, women
injured by the Dalkon Shield' 64 intrauterine device (IUD) sought
punitive damages against A.H. Robins, the manufacturer of the
contraceptive device. In Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co.,165 the
plaintiff sued to recover for personal injuries suffered in con-
nection with her use of the Dalkon Shield. 6  In support of her
1 Id. at 580.
161 Id. at 579.
162 Id.
161 Id. at 580.
64 See Van Duke, The Dalkon Shield: A Primer in IUD Liability, 6 WEsr. ST.
U.L. REv. 1, 6-10 (1978). The Dalkon Shield is a small plastic device with a thin
translucent plastic membrane attached to a plastic outer rim. This rim is serrated with
fins on each side to hold the device in place in the uterine cavity. A four-inch nylon
string is attached to the device. When the Dalkon Shield is in place, the string extends
through the cervical canal. Id.
16 196 Cal. Rptr. 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
" Id. at 131-32. The plaintiff alleged that the Dalkon Shield was defective in three
respects. First, because of the serrated edges, the IUD migrated and perforated through
the wall of the plaintiff's uterus. Second, the IUD could not be readily discovered by
physical means once it was out of the plaintiff's uterus and somewhere else in her pelvic
cavity. Moreover, the device could not be discovered by ordinary X-ray techniques
because of the low level radiopacity of the device. Third, the tail string attached to the
Dalkon Shield was a major carrier of bodily fluids laden with bacteria from the vagina
to the uterus and to other parts of the pelvic cavity if the IUD migrated or went through
the walls of the uterus. Id.
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claim for punitive damages, the plaintiff alleged that A.H. Ro-
bins, which had acquired the rights to the Dalkon Shield from
its original developers, failed to test the product properly before
placing it on the market. 167 In addition, the plaintiff maintained
that the defendant received numerous complaints that the Dal-
kon Shield was causing pelvic inflammatory disease in women
users, but did nothing to modify the product or warn prospective
users of this risk.
163
The lower court held a bifurcated trial. The jury returned a
verdict of $600,000 on the compensatory claim, but the trial
court granted a directed verdict for the defendant on the punitive
damages issue. 169 This ruling was reversed on appeal, however.
70
According to the appellate court, the jury could have concluded
that "the defendant acted with conscious disregard of the rights
or safety of others, that it was aware of the probable dangerous
consequences of its conduct, and that the defendant wilfully and
deliberately failed to avoid these consequences."' 17
Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 72 which also involved the Dal-
kon Shield, is a landmark Colorado Supreme Court decision.
Not only was the punitive award at stake the largest yet upheld
on appeal, but the court's opinion on the punitive damages issue
was one of the most comprehensive since Wangen. The plaintiff
in Palmer, a twenty-four-year-old woman, was fitted with a
Dalkon Shield in January, 1973. Her physician specifically relied
on the promotional claims made by the manufacturer as to the
safety and effectiveness of the IUD. 173 Seven months later, how-
ever, she became pregnant. Believing that removal of the IUD
might cause a spontaneous abortion, her physician decided to
leave the device in place. Three months into her pregnancy
Palmer suffered a spontaneous septic abortion caused by a blood
borne bacterial infection centered in the uterine area. Due to a
massive infection with a concomitant fall in blood pressure,
" Id. at 125.
"' Id. at 132.
i Id. at 123.
Id.
Id. at 132.
684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).
'" Id. at 196.
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Palmer went into septic shock. She also developed a blood
disorder impeding normal blood clotting. A total hysterectomy
then was performed to save her life. Thereafter, the plaintiff
experienced continuing health problems attributed to the hyster-
ectomy. 74
The evidence strongly indicated that the Dalkon Shield had
caused the uterine infection, resulting in the plaintiff's septic
abortion. Consequently, Palmer sued the IUD's manufacturer.
After a lengthy trial, the jury returned a verdict in her favor for
$600,000 compensatory and $6.2 million punitive damages."5 As
in the Hilliard case, 76 the plaintiff presented evidence that the
manufacturer had marketed the Dalkon Shield without adequate
testing' 77 and had ignored reports of septic abortions and other
injuries caused by the intrauterine device.
178
The defendant claimed that the state statute which authorized
punitive damages was unconstitutionally vague. The statute al-
lowed the jury to award punitive damages where the defendant's
conduct was "attended by circumstances of fraud" or where it
constituted "a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured
party's rights and feelings.' 79 As the court observed, the test
of vagueness is "whether the statute proscribes conduct in terms
so vague that persons of ordinary intelligence must necessarily
guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application." 1 0 In
this case, however, the court felt that the statutory terms "cir-
cumstances of fraud" and "wanton and reckless disregard" were
"I Id. at 197.
175 Id.
176 See notes 165-71 supra and accompanying text.
"1 684 P.2d at 197. Dr. Hugh Davis, one of the inventors of the Dalkon Shield,
Conducted a test study for one year at a family planning clinic that he directed. After
A.H. Robins acquired the rights to the Dalkon Shield it made several modifications to
the device. A.H. Robins then began marketing the product without completing any
clinical testing of the modified IUD. Id. at 195.
,71 Id. at 197. Dr. Thad J. Earl, a Robins clinical investigator and consultant, sent
a letter to the company's management in June, 1972, in which he warned of the danger
of septic abortion in shield users who might become pregnant. He cited five instances
from his own experience where septic abortions had occurred when the IUD was left in
pregnant patients. During the following seventeen months, Robins received twenty-two
additional reports of spontaneous septic abortions in shield users, one of which resulted
in death. Id. at 196.
171 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1973).
11 684 P.2d at 215.
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well-established common law concepts and, therefore, were suf-
ficiently clear to afford a practical guide for behavior.' 8'
A.H. Robins also alleged that possible "punitive overkill"
from multiple punitive damages awards gave rise to an uncon-
stitutional application of the punitive damages statute. However,
the court found no evidence to support the overkill theory:
Robins' claim of "punitive overkill," when viewed in this light,
takes on a speculative cast. The record is devoid of any evi-
dentiary showing that Robins experienced such a number of
past punitive damages verdicts as to render the award in this
case so oppressive as to raise a colorable due process claim.'82
The manufacturer also asserted that a punitive damage award
was incompatible with a strict liability claim because the former
is solely concerned with the conduct of the defendant, while the
latter focuses on the condition of the product, regardless of
fault. The court also rejected this argument by observing that
strict liability primarily was oriented toward compensation, while
the purpose of punitive damages was to punish wrongful conduct
and to deter similar conduct in the future.' 83
Concluding that punitive damage awards were proper in
products liability cases, the court then reviewed the jury verdict
itself. First, the appellate court determined that the manufactur-
er's conduct met the statutory standard for punitive damages.
As the court noted, Robins advertised its product as having a
pregnancy rate of 1.1 percent when it knew that the actual rate
was 5.5 percent.8 4 As early as 1971 the manufacturer's quality
control supervisor informed the company of the risk of uterine
infection to users, yet A.H. Robins continued to describe the
's, Id. at 214-15.
Id. at 216.
, ' Id. at 217-18.
'I Id. at 218. A.H. Robins based its claim of a 1.1 percent pregnancy rate on the
clinical experience reported by Dr. Davis, one of the inventors of the Dalkon Shield.
Subsequently, two memoranda were sent to A.H. Robins' management by members of
the company's medical department. The first memorandum indicated that Davis' claim
of a 1.1 percent pregnancy rate in twelve months had jumped to the equivalent of a 5.5
percent pregnancy rate after fourteen months. A second memorandum again called
attention to the higher pregnancy rates and stated that the Davis study was "not long
enough ... to project with confidence to the population as a whole." Id. at 195.
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Dalkon Shield as "the modern superior" IUD, combining "min-
imal pregnancy rates with exceptional patient tolerance," pre-
venting pregnancy "without producing any general effects on
the body, blood or brain," and providing "safe, sure, sensible
contraception."' 85 Finally, one of its own consultants informed
the defendant in June, 1972, of the danger of septic abortion,
but A.H. Robins not only failed to warn physicians and users,
but, as late as April, 1973, advised physicians to leave the shield
in place if an unplanned pregnancy occurred.'8 6 This conduct, in
the court's opinion, was sufficient to constitute "fraud" or
"wanton and reckless disregard.' ' 87
The final issue addressed by the Colorado Supreme Court
was the size of the punitive award. A.H. Robins contended that
the $6.2 million verdict was "a product of passion and prejudice
and thus excessive as a matter of law." 188 The court noted that,
while a ten-to-one ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
was high, higher ratios had been upheld where the purposes of
a punitive damages award properly guided the jury in reaching
its verdict. 89 According to the court, it was proper for the jury
to consider in assessing the punitive award "the nature of the
act which caused the injury, the economic status of the defend-
ant, and the deterrent effect of the award on others. '"'9 The
court noted, "Robins' marketing program occurred over a long
period of time, was directed to a vast array of unwary con-
sumers, and was accompanied by false claims of safety and a
conscious disregard of life threatening hazards known by it to
be associated with its product."'1'9 The court also observed that
A.H. Robins had made a substantial profit from sales of the
Dalkon Shield and that company earnings and net worth had
increased significantly during the period that the IUD was on
"I' Id. at 219.
196 Id.
'" Id.
' Id. at 220.
'* Id. See also Vossler v. Richards Mfg. Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 219 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (20:1 ratio upheld); Mailloux v. Bradley, 643 P.2d 797 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982)
(ratios of 10:1 and 34:1 upheld); Ettus v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 665 P.2d 730 (Kan.
1983) (24:1 ratio upheld).
M 684 P.2d at 220.
191 Id.
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the market. 92 Consequently, the court concluded, "The sum of
$6,200,000 is neither grossly disproportionate to the amount of
actual damages sustained by Palmer, nor, in light of Robins'
financial condition, unconscionably oppressive."'' 93
In Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. ,194 the plaintiff
was awarded $2 million in compensatory damages and $2.75
million in punitive damages against the maker of Ortho-Novum,
an oral contraceptive. 95 The plaintiff suffered kidney failure and
other injuries as a result of taking Ortho-Novum 1/80 from 1972
until 1976.196 A British study197 had revealed the danger of he-
molytic uremic syndrome (HUS) from high estrogen levels as
early as 1969.198 The Food and Drug Administration had sent
letters in 1970 to physicians advising them of the British study
findings, yet the manufacturer failed to warn of the danger until
January, 1977. 99 The defendant argued that the submission of
the punitive damages claim to the jury prejudiced the compen-
satory damages issue. 200 The Kansas Supreme Court, however,
concluded that the manufacturer had a duty to warn once it
became aware of the danger 20 ' and upheld the punitive damage
award.
20 2
At least eight cases have dealt with the question o punitive
damages in the context of asbestos. 203 Fischer v. Johns-Manville
1 1 Id. The defendant's net worth nearly doubled during the period when the Dalkon
Shield was marketed, reaching $158 million in 1974. During this period, the company's
annual net earnings ranged from $19 million to $27 million. In 1978, the year before
the trial, A.H. Robins earned almost $30 million and its net worth increased to $240
million. Id. at 220-21.
IA Id. at 221.
681 P.2d 1038 (Kan.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 365 (1984).
IA Id. at 1042.
I. Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1062-63.
Hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) involves malignant hypertension, vessel wall
damage, and acute kidney failure. Id. at 1062.
I Id.
Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1042.
See 734 F.2d 1036; 727 F.2d 506; 691 F.2d 811; 548 F. Supp. 357; 553 F. Supp.
482; 437 N.E.2d 910; 472 A.2d 577; 611 P.2d 515. For additional information on the
problem of compensating asbestos victims, see Phillips, Asbestos Litigation: The Test
of the Tort System, 36 ARK. L. REv. 343 (1982); Special Project, An Analysis of the
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Corp.20 4 is illustrative. The plaintiff in Fischer worked for Bell
Asbestos Mines, Ltd. from 1938 until 1942 and for an additional
four-month period in 1945. Despite job duties requiring the
plaintiff to handle asbestos on a regular basis, his employer
never provided him with any protective clothing, safety appa-
ratus, cautionary warning, or instructions on how to handle the
product safely.20 5 After leaving Bell in 1945, the plaintiff never
again was exposed to asbestos or other substances deleterious to
the lungs. Nevertheless, in 1977 he began to exhibit symptoms
of pulmonary disease linked to asbestos exposure. 206 By 1980 this
had led to permanent disability.20 7 The plaintiff then brought
suit against Bell, his former employer, as well as Johns-Manville
and another asbestos supplier. 203 At trial, the jury awarded the
plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages against Bell
as well as asbestos supplier Johns-Manville. 2 9
The plaintiff based his punitive damages claim on the con-
tention that the defendants knew of the hazards associated with
exposure to asbestos as early as the 1930's and had made a
conscious decision to withhold this information from the public.
This conduct, according to the plaintiff, constituted an outra-
geous and flagrant disregard of the substantial health risks to
which the defendants subjected the public and, therefore, justi-
fied the imposition of punitive damages. 210
Legal, Social and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REv. 573
(1983); Note, Examination of Recurring Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 46 ALB. L. REv.
1307 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Asbestos Litigation]; Note, The Manville Bank-
ruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1121
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Manville Bankruptcy]; Note, Issues in Asbestos
Litigation, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Issues in Asbestos].
Note, Asbestos Litigation, 10 OKLA. CiTY U. L. RFv. 393 (1985).
-' 472 A.2d 577 (N.J. 1984).
201 Id. at 579.
Z Id.
Z7 Id.
101 Id. The claim against the Celotex Corporation, the other asbestos supplier, was
dismissed at the close of the plaintiff's case. Id.
209 Id. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $86,000 on the basis of 20
percent against Bell and 80 percent against Johns-Manville. The plaintiff's wife also
recovered $5,000 in compensatory damages on the same basis. In addition, the jury
awarded Fischer $240,000 punitive damages against Johns-Manville and $60,000 against
Bell. Id.
210 Id. at 580.
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On appeal, neither Johns-Manville nor Bell challenged the
amount of the punitive award as such or the trial court jury
instructions. Instead, the defendants argued that punitive dam-
ages should not be allowed at all in products liability cases. They
also contended that their actions were not sufficiently culpable
to meet the necessary standard of outrageous conduct in delib-
erate disregard of the rights of others. 21' The New Jersey appel-
late court disagreed with these contentions, however, and upheld
the punitive damages award.
212
In response to the argument that punitive damages were
inappropriate in cases where compensatory damages were re-
covered on a strict liability basis, the court surveyed decisions
from other states and concluded that the overwhelming majority
had found no difficulty in adapting the concept of punitive
damages to strict liability situations. 13 According to the court,214
the only dissenting view was the New Jersey federal district court
in Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.2t5 Relying on the reason-
ing of the California court in Grimshaw, the New Jersey court
in Fischer declared that punitive damages were consistent with
the policies supporting strict products liability and were necessary
to punish manufacturers who disregarded public safety and to
deter them from continuing to act in such a manner.2 1 6 In the
court's words: "Both punishment and deterrence are appropriate
responses to a supplier of defective goods who has knowledge
of the high degree of risk of grave harm to which they will
subject the public but who nevertheless makes the cynical, con-
scious business decision to place and keep them on the mar-
ket. 217 The court also rejected the contention that allowance of
punitive damages in mass injury cases would lead to bankruptcy.
It agreed with Grimshaw, Gryc, and Wangen that predictions of
wholesale insolvency caused by punitive awards were greatly
exaggerated and observed that exposure to liability for compen-
2" Id. at 581.
212 Id. at 579.
21 Id. at 581-83.
254 Id. at 583.
"' 553 F. Supp. 482 (D.N.J. 1982). Accord Wolf v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 555
F. Supp. 613 (D.N.J. 1982).
11 472 A.2d at 584.
217 Id.
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satory damages218 largely caused Johns-Manville's financial dif-
ficulties.
The court also concluded that the defendant's conduct met
the standard of egregiousness properly underlying a punitive
award. 2 9 As the court observed, a considerable amount of evi-
dence presented at trial showed that the manufacturers of as-
bestos were aware of pulmonary risks. For example, eleven
scientific articles published between 1936 and 1941 documented
the grave pulmonary hazards of exposure to asbestos and dis-
cussed measures to protect workers.220 Moreover, asbestos work-
ers had made claims against Johns-Manville as early as 1933. 221
The court also referred to the Sumner Simpson correspond-
ence. 222 The papers showed that Johns-Manville and other asbses-
tos suppliers not only failed to warn of the risks of asbestos
exposure, but took affirmative steps to prevent this information
from reaching workers, consumers, and the general public. 3
The court noted that the plaintiff's employer, Bell, also was
aware of the danger of exposure to asbestos, but failed to warn
its employees of the risk.
224
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,2 5 in contrast to most
of the other asbestos cases, resisted the trend toward awarding
punitive damages. In Jackson, a former shipyard worker brought
an action seeking both compensatory and punitive damages
against various manufacturers and sellers of asbestos products.
At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff $391,500 in compensatory
damages. Punitive awards of $500,000 and $125,000 respectively
were returned against asbestos suppliers Johns-Manville and
2,1 Id. at 586.
29 Id. at 588,
120 Id. at 580.
221 Id.
2Id.
Id. at 580-81. Sumner Simpson was the president of Raybestos, an asbestos
supplier, during the 1930's. In 1935, and later in 1941, he attempted to prevent publi-
cation in the trade periodical Asbestos of articles relating to asbestosis. Simpson informed
Vandiver Brown, the secretary of Johns-Manville, of his intention and on each occasion
received Brown's support. Id. The Sumner Simpson papers are also discussed in 734
F.2d at 1039-40 and in 727 F.2d at 530. The papers are reproduced in an appendix to
the Jackson opinion. 727 F.2d at 532-33.
472 A.2d at 587-88.
727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984).
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Raybestos. 226 On appeal, the federal circuit court acknowledged
that the defendants were guilty of culpable conduct, but con-
cluded that the basic policy objectives of punitive damages were
satisfied in this case by the defendants' multiple exposure to
liability for compensatory damages.227
The court obviously was skeptical about the deterrent effect
of punitive damages in a case where overall compensatory lia-
bility was extensive.
The significance of punitive damages as a deterrent depends
on the size of the penalty increase relative to the "base pen-
alty" exacted by strict liability compensatory awards .... Be-
cause of the dimensionless character of the prospects for future
litigation in this instance, the "base penalty" for all practical
purposes, is illimitable. Correspondingly, the significance of
punitive damages as a deterrent diminishes to the vanishing
point.
228
The prospect of "overkill" also concerned the appellate court.
The court believed that payment of prior punitive damages claims
might consume the defendants' resources, thus depriving future
claimants of compensation. 229 Although acknowledging that a
bankruptcy court could give future compensatory damage claims
priority over earlier punitive damage claims, the Jackson court
declared that the existence of multiple punitive awards "would
only complicate the already formidable problems of devising a
bankruptcy reorganization plan that would make adequate pro-
vision for future claimants. ' 23 ° The Jackson decision is one of
the first since Roginsky23' to give serious thought to the overkill
problem. It remains uncertain whether Jackson represents a
change in judicial attitude, however, The court did not suggest
that punitive damages were inherently unsuitable in products
liability cases, 32 and the plight of the asbestos industry created
a special situation not shared by other product manufacturers.
:: Id. at 511.
' Id. at 525-26.
I' d. at 527.
' Id. at 526.
" Id. at 528.
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832.
727 F.2d at 529.
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For the most part, the cases discussed above are illustrative
of the growing trend toward allowing plaintiffs in products
liability actions to seek punitive damages. Of the many courts
that have considered this question since Roginsky and Tooleu33
were decided in 1967, only a few have rejected the idea of
punitive damages in such cases.23 4 In contrast, the vast majority
of states now appear to have accepted the principle of punitive
damages in products liability litigation.23 5 Product manufactur-
ers, of course, have strongly objected to the introduction of
punitive damages into the products liability area, and while a
number of courts have considered their arguments, very few
have found them persuasive. Nevertheless, some of the concerns
expressed by product manufacturers are indeed legitimate. These
issues are discussed below.
II. THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Courts and legal scholars have offered a variety of rationales
to explain the practice of awarding punitive damages in civil
"I Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398.
214 See, e.g., 553 F. Supp. 482; 555 F. Supp. 613; 550 F. Supp. 692; Phillippe v.
Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151 (La. Ct. App. 1979), aff'd, 395 So. 2d 310 (La.
1980). A federal appeals court, applying Mississippi law, also refused to allow punitive
damages in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., but did not foreclose the imposition
of such damages in other situations.
2 See, e.g., 734 F.2d 1036 (Texas law); Saupitty v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., 726 F.2d 657
(10th Cir, 1984) (Oklahoma law); Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828 (3d Cir.
1983) (Virgin Islands law); 691 F.2d 811; D'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d
886 (9th Cir. 1977) (Arizona law); 546 F.2d 993; Johnson v. Husky Industries, 536 F.2d
645 (6th Cir. 1976) (Tennessee law); 485 F.2d 132 (Pennsylvania law); 573 F. Supp.
1324; 569 F. Supp. 36; 548 F. Supp. 357; 513 F. Supp. 1028; 534 F. Supp. 804; 515 F.
Supp. 64, aff'd per curiam, 644 F.2d 877; LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F. Supp. 301 (D.
Conn. 1973); Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976) (punitive
damages in wrongful death products liability action); 594 P.2d 38, mod. on reh'g, 615
P.2d 621, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); 196 Cal. Rptr. 117; 174 Cal. Rptr. 348; 60
Cal. Rptr. 398; 661 P.2d 515; 681 P.2d 1038; 297 S.E.2d 675; 294 N.W.2d 437; 616
S.W.2d 720; 403 So. 2d 459; 426 So. 2d 1108; 309 S.E.2d 921; 615 P.2d 749; 253 N.E.2d
636; 418 N.E.2d 1079; 427 N.E.2d 608; 437 N.E.2d 910; 309 S.E.2d 295; Cantrell v.
Amarillo Hardware Co., 602 P.2d 1326 (Kan. 1979); American Laundry Mach. Indus.
v. Horan, 412 A.2d 407 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980); 437 A.2d 700; 297 N.W.2d 727;
Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Racer v. Utterman,
629 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 803 (1982); Leslie v. Jones
Chemical Co., 551 P.2d 234 (Nev. 1976); 472 A.2d 577; 461 N.Y.S.2d 659; 638 S.W.2d
660; 464 A.2d 887; Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 293 N.W.2d 897 (Wis.
1980); 638 S.W.2d 582; 619 S.W.2d 435; 424 N.E.2d 568; 684 P.2d 187; CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-240(b) (West Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West Supp.
1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (1981).
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cases. Foremost among these justifications are punishment and
deterrence,236 but compensation and law enforcement also some-
times are suggested as additional, though subsidiary, social func-
tions of exemplary damages. 2 7 In this section of the Article each
of these functions will be examined to determine if any provide
a rationale for allowing assessment of punitive awards against
product manufacturers.
A. The Retributive Function
Courts have almost universally accepted punishment as one
of the principal functions of punitive damages. 23 Strictly speak-
ing, however, punishment is not an end in itself but rather a
means of achieving social goals such as retribution, rehabilita-
tion, and deterrence.23 9 Therefore, it is better to use the term
"retribution" instead of "punishment" to distinguish between
the vindictive function of punitive damages and deterrence or
other utilitarian objectives. Retribution in this context means the
imposition of a sanction or detriment upon one who has com-
mitted a wrongful act.24°
Some commentators have offered retribution as a rationale
for awarding punitive damages in products liability cases. 24' Pu-
nitive damage awards are applauded as a means of restoring the
injured party's peace of mind242 and of expressing public outrage
at the nature of the manufacturer's conduct. 243 In addition,
punishment of corporate misbehavior is said to reaffirm the
notion that business enterprises must observe the same social
norms as individuals. 244 For this reason, it is appropriate to
" See notes 238-459, 486-591 infra and accompanying text.
-" See notes 460-85 infra and accompanying text.
2" See, e.g., Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851); Hays v.
Houston G.N.R.R., 46 Tex. 272, 280 (1876); Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive
Damages, 12 HASTmnS CONST. L.Q. 241, 258 (1985). Note, supra note 1, at 433.
"I See Peters, supra note 3, at 376 n.50.
211 According to the retributive view of justice, punishment is justified because the
wrongdoer deserves punishment. See Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in THE PHMOSOPHY
OF PUNISHiMENT 105, 107 (H. Acton ed. 1969).
"I See, e.g., Comment, Exemplary Damages in Products Liability Cases, 1980 DaT.
C.L. REV. 647, 648.
21 See Owen, supra note 33, at 1282; Note, supra note 1, at 433.
:" See Note, supra note 28, at 466.
"44 See Owen, supra note 33, at 1282 n.127.
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consider whether retributive goals can justify punitive damages
in the products liability context.
1. Principles of Retributive Justice
An important principle of retributive justice is the notion of
desert. 245 The desert theory dictates that retributive measures be
imposed only when the actor has voluntarily and inexcusably
committed a wrongful act.246 When a detriment is deserved,
however, its imposition on the offender is an objective in itself,
and the sanction does not have to produce any other benefit.
247
Other considerations, however, also come into play when detri-
ments imposed by law are justified in terms of retributive justice.
For example, any punishment imposed on the wrongdoer must
be reasonably proportioned to the offense.245 In addition, no
punishment should be imposed for an act unless it has been
authoritatively declared to be wrongful before its commission. 249
Additionally, the concept of fair procedure requires that the
offender's guilt be established by methods minimizing the danger
of punishing innocent defendants.
2 10
Therefore, with these principles in mind, analyzing punitive
damages from the perspective of retribution requires two fun-
damental questions be answered. First, are the actual wrongdoers
punished when courts impose punitive damages on the manufac-
turers of defective products? Second, is punishment imposed in
a fair and principled manner when punitive damages are injected
into products liability litigation? In response to the first question,
arguably the "sting" of punitive damages falls largely on share-
holders and other innocent parties rather than on wrongdoers in
"I See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRImINAL LAW § 6.3.2, at 414-20 (1978); I. KANT,
TiH METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 99-107 (1965); Note, Developments in the
Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions,
92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1232 (1978-79) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
246 See Mundel, Punishment and Desert, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 65, 71
(H. Acton ed. 1969); Quinton, On Punishment, in TiH PHILOSOPHY OF PUNiSHmENT 56,
58-59 (H. Acton ed. 1969).
247 See Ellis, supra note 37, at 4.
"I8 See id. at 6.
149 This is sometimes referred to as the principle of "legality." See id. at 5.
I" Note, Punitive Damages in California: The Drunken Driver, 36 HASTINGS L.J.
793, 798 (1985).
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the product manufacturer's corporate management.21 As for the
second question, the assessment of punitive damages against
product manufacturers may be unfair in a number of ways.
First, the conventional punitive damages liability formula, ex-
pressed in terms of malice or reckless conduct, is not well
adapted to institutional behavior and thus fails to provide cor-
porate decision makers with a clear idea of proscribed conduct.252
Second, permitting assessment of punitive damages more than
once for a single design defect results in punishment wholly
disproportionate to the degree of wrongdoing.2 3 Finally, the
joinder of strict liability and punitive damages claims prejudices
the defendant's case for compensatory damages.
2 4
2. Effectiveness of Punitive Damages
as a Means of Punishment
It is self-evident that punitive damages cannot serve any
legitimate retributive function if the wrongdoer does not actually
bear the sanction imposed by society. Accordingly, it must be
considered whether the manufacturer of defective products can
avoid punishment by shifting the cost of the penalty to others.
Some commentators maintain that a culpable manufacturer will
frequently pass the cost of punitive awards on to its customers
either directly through higher prices or indirectly through liability
insurance2 5 If this occurs, the public in effect foots the bill for
a penalty imposed for its own protection.
2 16
The manufacturer's ability to shift costs directly through
higher prices largely depends upon its competitive situation. If
demand for the product is inelastic, the culpable manufacturer
may be able to treat punitive damages as a cost of doing business
and shift the cost on to the public in the form of higher prices.
' See notes 255-83 infra and accompanying text.
2 See notes 284-370 infra and accompanying text.
' See notes 371-418 infra and accompanying text.
2 4 See notes 419-54 infra and accompanying text.
"' See Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative
Outline, 11 FoRuri 57, 60 (1975-76); Coccia & Morrissey, supra note 45, at 62.
I- See Ghiardi & Koehn, Punitive Damages in Strict Liability Cases, 61 MARQ. L.
REV. 245, 251 (1977-78); Snyman, The Validity of Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Cases, 44 INS. CorNs. J. 402, 406 (1977).
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In a competitive industry, however, the manufacturer will not
be able to increase prices at will, and, therefore, may be forced
to absorb punitive damages costs itself.257 This will lead to lower
profits and result in stockholder complaints about the quality of
management. 2 8 Thus, wrongdoers within company management
ultimately will be punished although innocent shareholders will
suffer as well.
It is also claimed that punitive damages do not really punish
manufacturers because they can insure against such llability 5 9
Thus, if insurance proceeds cover losses from punitive awards,
the consuming public, not the manufacturer, will suffer through
higher insurance premiums. 260 This argument is not persuasive,
however. Some states prohibit insurance coverage for punitive
damages on grounds of public policy. 261 Northwestern National
Casualty Co. v. McNulty262 is the leading proponent of this view.
According to the McNulty court, "Where a person is able to
insure himself against punishment he gains a freedom of mis-
conduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanctions against
such misconduct.
' 263
Furthermore, the culpable manufacturer will not completely
escape the consequences of its wrongdoing, even where courts
allow insurance coverage of punitive damages. First, many in-
dustrial insurance policies have very high deductible provi-
117 See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 452 (Wis. 1980).
See id.
" See Ghiardi & Kircher, supra note 34, at 37-40.
110 See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967);
Ghiardi & Koehn, supra note 256, at 251.
2I See Snyman, supra note 256, at 405 n.31.
-2 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (punitive damages assessed against drunk driver).
"I Id. at 440. The majority of states appear to allow insurance coverage against
punitive damage judgments. Cf. Burrell & Young, Insurability of Punitive Damages, 62
MARQ. L. REv. 1, 18 (1978-79) (trend to allow coverage); Note, supra note I, at 431-
32, 443-45 (jurisdictions equally split but a trend to allow coverage). Arkansas, Arizona,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,
New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin
presently allow insurance coverage of punitive damages, while California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania
prohibit such coverage. See J. GHuADI & J. KIRCHNER, supra note 21, §§ 7.29-.30 (1984
& Supp. 1984).
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sions.264 Second, companies with high insurance claims will
eventually be forced to pay higher insurance premiums.
265
Consequently, one can fairly conclude that punitive damages
will sometimes, but not always, be an effective mechanism for
punishment. On the other hand, there is a significant chance
that the brunt of punitive awards will fall on innocent parties
rather than those in corporate management who are the real
target of punitive measures.
3. Punishment of Innocent Parties
Assuming that the manufacturers will be unable to shift the
cost of punitive damages to the public, who ultimately will feel
the effect of these sanctions? The persons who presumably de-
serve punishment are those corporate employees who engage in
wrongdoing or encourage acts of wrongdoing by others.2 6 Ob-
viously, these employees go unpunished when punitive damages
are assessed against a product manufacturer, if the business
entity, rather than individual wrongdoers, actually pay the judg-
ment.267 As the Roginsky v. Richardson-MerrelP6t court observed
since punitive damage awards must be paid out of corporate
earnings, the penalty ultimately falls on shareholders and others
who are innocent of wrongdoing.2 69 Of course, this result is not
limited to products liability cases; it occurs whenever courts
impose punitive damages vicariously on a business entity.
Although most states allow imposition of punitive damages
on a vicarious liability basis, they disagree about when such
: See Note, supra note 8, at 445.
:, See id. Insurance is usually provided on a "loss-rated" basis. Under this ap-
proach, insurance companies set their rates on a retrospective basis. Initial rates are
calculated on a general industry basis. Later rates are a function of the company claims
experience with the individual policyholder. Thus, a manufacturer incurring a series of
large punitive damage judgments eventually will pay much higher premiums than business
competitors with better claims records. Id. at 445 n.56.
'4' See Note, The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against an Entrepreneur for
the Malicious Torts of His Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, 1306-07 (1960-61).
' For a general criticism of imputing wrongful employee acts to the employer, see
id. at 1301-10.
378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
:- See id. at 841. See also Note, supra note 266, at 1304-10.
See generally Note, supra note 266, at 1296-1310 (discussing effects of punitive
damages on businesses outside products liability context).
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liability is appropriate. The majority appear to apply the so-
called "vicarious liability rule" under which punitive damages
may be assessed against the corporation for the misconduct of
employees acting within the scope of their employment.27' Other
jurisdictions take a more lenient view, following the "complicity
rule" which imposes liability only when corporate officers order,
participate in, consent to, or otherwise ratify the wrongful acts
of their employees. 72
Although the complicity rule is less harsh than the vicarious
liability rule, these two approaches differ merely in degree, since
both authorize vicarious punitive damage liability based on em-
ployee conduct. 273 The imposition of sanctions on a vicarious
liability basis cannot be justified on retributive grounds because
the ultimate objects of the punitive measures are shareholders
and others who have committed no wrongful act.274 Under the
theory of just desert it is not proper to subject these innocent
parties to punishment. 275 In the words of one commentator:
The punishment function is not a principled basis for the
imposition of punitive damages on one who by definition is
innocent of wrongdoing; punishing the innocent is generally
conceded to be morally reprehensible and inconsistent with the
notions of fundamental fairness underlying our system of jus-
tice.
276
Some scholars have attempted to justify vicarious liability
on nonretributive grounds. For example, they argue that punitive
"I See K. REDDEN, supra note 39 § 4.14, at 131; Parlee, Vicarious Liability For
Punitive Damages: Suggested Changes in the Law Through Policy Analysis, 68 MARQ.
L. REv. 27, 31-32 (1984). Note, Liability of Employers for Punitive Damages Resulting
from Acts of Employees, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 829, 841 (1977-78).
212 See Sales, supra note 34, at 367; Comment, supra note 33, at 774. Sales & Cole,
supra note 5, at 1139-40. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909 (1979).
2I Ellis, supra note 37, at 63-64.
274 See P. FITZGERALD, CRIMINAL LAW AND PUNISHMENT 112 (1962) (criminal law
context); Schwartz, supra note 37, at 136; Parlee, supra note 271, at 50.
273 See P. FITZGERALD, supra note 274, at 112. A similar situation occurs when
punitive damages are awarded against local municipalities. Innocent taxpayers are pun-
ished rather than culpable municipal employees. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 263 (1981); Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965).
276 Ellis, Punitive Damages in Iowa Law: A Critical Assessment, 66 IoWA L. REv.
1005, 1037 (1980-81) (footnote omitted).
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damage awards do not ascribe personal blame to shareholders,
but merely function as a device to recoup illicit profits from the
sale of defective products. 277 The sale of defective products ap-
parently is thought to give the defendant an unfair competitive
advantage over more socially responsible manufacturers. 27 How-
ever, it is difficult to reconcile this rationale with either the
underlying theory of punitive damages or the manner in which
punitive damage awards are calculated in practice.279 If punitive
damages are justified on either an unjust enrichment or an unfair
competition theory, damage awards should explicitly reflect the
defendant's illicit gain. Moreover, if punitive damages are to be
based on a restitutional rationale, the defendant's competitors
(or perhaps the public) should recover since they are victimized
in this respect, not the injured consumer.
Punitive sanctions may not adversely affect shareholders only.
If punitive awards undermine the product manufacturer's eco-
nomic condition, creditors, suppliers, and employees will also be
harmed. 210 If punitive damage awards deplete the defendant's
resources, the awards even will harm future litigants. 281 Punitive
awards may also injure the public in one of two ways. On the
one hand, if the defendant corporation is in a strong competitive
position, it will pass the costs of punitive damages awards on to
2, See Owen, supra note 33, at 1304-05; Note, supra note 26, at 407.
Punitive damages admittedly are an imprecise mechanism for achieving this
objective and shareholders will in fact be penalized when punitive damages
awards exceed excessive profits. Yet this penalty may be viewed as a fair
assessment against both the manufacturing entity for its willingness to
gamble recklessly with the public safety and the shareholders for whose
benefit the marketing decision was made.
Owen, supra note 33, at 1304-05.
1 1 Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska 1979), opinion mod. on
reh'g, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied 454 U.S. 894 (1983).
I-, The jury appears to have used the illicit profit approach in Sturm. Evidence at
trial indicated that the manufacturer could have corrected the design defect at a cost of
$1.93 per revolver. Apparently, the jury multiplied this figure by 1.5 million, the number
of guns produced, to arrive at an award of $2,895,000. See 594 P.2d at 50 (Burke, J.,
dissenting). The appellate court, however, ruled that it was improper to punish the
defendant for wrongs committed against other consumers and reduced the award to
$250,000. See id. at 48-49.
- 1 See Coffee, "No Soul to Damn; No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MIcH. L. Rav. 386, 401-02 (1980-81);
DuBois, supra note 38, at 349.
See Long, supra note 24, at 887 (general tort context).
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consumers in the form of higher prices. 2 2 On the other hand, if
such awards force a company to cut production or go out of
business, this may destroy competition or deprive the public of
desirable goods and services. 283 In either event, the general public
suffers as much from these punitive measures as any actual
wrongdoers.
4. Problems with the Liability Standard
The liability standard, which the judge and jury employ to
determine whether punitive damages should be imposed, is dif-
ficult to justify from a retributive standpoint. The problem with
this liability standard is that it is not well-suited to institutional
behavior and, therefore, fails to provide corporate decision mak-
ers with a clear idea of proscribed conduct. Under the conven-
tional liability standard, a "positive element of conscious
wrongdoing" is necessary before punitive damages may properly
be awarded. 2 4 Thus, not only must the defendant be at fault in
causing the plaintiff's injury, he also must have an evil mind.2 5
Over the years the courts have employed a variety of expressions
to describe this culpable state of mind and the resulting type of
conduct. Terms such as "malice," "ill will," "fraud," and
"oppression" are often invoked.2 6 Other states also allow as-
sessment of punitive damages when the defendant has acted
"wantonly," "recklessly," or with "conscious disregard or in-
difference toward the interests of others.' '287 However, these
2 See 378 F.2d at 841; Carsey, supra note 255, at 60.
" Note, supra note 4, at 68-69.
2 McCormick, supra note 16, at 134.
21 See Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of
Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1158, 1163 (1966); Comment, supra note 22, at
898.
" See, e.g., Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1110 (Cal. 1974)
(oppression, fraud, or malice); General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 352 A.2d 810, 817 (Md.
1976) (fraud, malice, evil intent, or oppression) (punitive damages instructions also
proper where assault or false imprisonment is committed in a "wanton or malicious
manner"), aff'd upon remand, 381 A.2d 16 (Md. 1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221
(1983) (oppression, fraud, or malice); NEv. REV. STAT. § 42.010 (1981) (oppression,
fraud, or malice); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (Supp. 1983) (oppression, fraud, or
malice); S.D. CoDIriaD LAWs ANN. § 21-3-2 (1979) (oppression, fraud, or malice).
21 See, e.g., Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d 711, 714 (Del. 1972) (willfully and
wantonly); McClellan v. Highland Sales & Inv. Co., 484 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo. 1972)
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liability formulas originally were developed to punish outrageous
behavior by private individuals 289 or oppressive abuses of power
by government officials.289 Concepts like malice and recklessness,
which focus on the mental state of the individual wrongdoer,
290
are not very meaningful when applied without modification to
the actions of corporate product manufacturers.
29'
The Restatement's formula suffers from the same weakness.
Section 908 provides, "Punitive damages may be awarded for
conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil mo-
tive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others." 292 De-
signed for general use in all types of tort situations, this formula
is also oriented primarily toward individual conduct. 293 Never-
theless, many courts have also applied it to products liability
cases.
294
The Restatement formulation distinguishes between malice
and reckless indifference to the rights of others. 295 Malice typi-
cally involves an intentional act coupled with a desire to harm
another. The most common situation arises when the defendant
deliberately causes the injury because of ill will toward the
(willful, wanton, malicious, or reckless); Sandier v. Lawn-A-Mat Chem. & Equip. Corp.,
358 A.2d 805, 811 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (wanton and willful disregard of
the rights of another); Jeffers v. Nysse, 297 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1980) (wanton, willful,
or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights). A few states also allow punitive damages
when the defendant is guilty of gross negligence. See, e.g., Randall v. Ganz, 537 P.2d
65, 67 (Idaho 1975); Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 362 N.E.2d 845, 847 (Ind.
1977); Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d 1136, 1150 (Kan. 1978); Foss v. Maine
Turnpike Auth., 309 A.2d 339, 345 (Me. 1973); Seals v. St. Regis Paper Co., 236 So.
2d 388, 392 (Miss. 1970).
. See Coccia & Morrissey, supra note 45, at 46. See also Owen, supra note 42, at
15.
Z, See Owen, supra note 33, at 1365.
' See Comment, supra note 33, at 773.
" See Owen, supra note 42, at 16 (describing the fragmented corporate decision
making process). See also Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Sys., 455 N.E.2d 142, 152
(Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
r RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977).
See Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 834 (3d Cir. 1983).
" See id.; D'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886, 894 (9th Cir. 1977);
Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1973); Neal v. Carey
Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 374-75 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affd, 760 F.2d 481
(3d Cir. 1985); Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, 414 F. Supp. 255, 266 (E.D.
Pa. 1976); 594 P.2d at 46; American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 412 A.2d 407, 419
(Md. App. 1980).
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977).
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victim, or some other evil motive. 296 Also, the law can presume
intent to injure if the defendant acts knowing that his conduct
will cause injury to another. 297 In this situation, the injury can
be termed intentional, thus indicating a culpable mind without
actual ill will. This is sometimes referred to as "constructive
malice.' '298 The imposition of punitive damages for malicious
conduct is consistent with retributive goals because one inten-
tionally injuring another deserves punishment under the theory
of just desert. 299 Malice in this sense, however, rarely occurs in
products liability cases since no manufacturer would deliberately
set out to injure thousands of anonymous consumers.3 00
Recklessness is the second type of conduct for which the
Restatement prescribes punitive damages as a remedy.30' Section
908 does not define reckless conduct, 30 2 but Section 500 provides:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of
another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act
which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having
reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man
to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable
risk of physical harm to another but also that such risk is
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his
conduct negligent. 303
As the comment to Section 500 points out, to be guilty of
recklessness, the defendant must subject the plaintiff to a risk
much greater than that associated with ordinary negligence:3°4
"It must involve an easily perceptible danger of death or sub-
stantial physical harm, and the probability that it will so result
must be substantially greater than is required for ordinary neg-
11 See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 205 (1973); C. McCORtucK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 280 (1935).
297 See Comment, supra note 22, at 898.
2 See Note, supra note 8, at 448.
See Ellis, supra note 37, at 21-22.
See Owen, The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Implications on Rules of
Liability and Defense in Products Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REV. 769, 772 (1976-
77); Comment, supra note 22, at 911.
"I See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979).
"02 See id.
Id. at § 500.
See id. at § 500 comment a.
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ligence. '"3°0 Not only must the risk be extremely great, but it
also must be so obvious that knowledge of the risk can be
imputed to the defendant under the reasonable prudent person
standard. 06
Recklessness, in various forms, is a popular liability formula
for products liability cases. The Model Uniform Product Liabil-
ity Act 07 employs similar language. Section 120(a) of the Uni-
form Act allows the award of punitive damages when an injury
results from the "product seller's reckless disregard for the safety
of product users, consumers, or others who might be harmed
by the product." 03 "Reckless disregard" is defined as "con-
scious indifference to the safety of persons who might be injured
by the product."309 Both "reckless disregard" and "conscious
indifference to public safety" are often employed in products
liability cases.310
Product manufacturers, however, claim that "recklessness"
as a liability standard for punitive damages is excessively vague
when applied to products liability litigation a.3 1 For example, the
corporate defendant in Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Daya12 contended
that Alaska's standard for imposing punitive damages violated
its due process rights by not providing fair warning as to what
conduct would result in liability. The court, however, rejected
this argument, citing its previous adoption of the Restatement
formula"' as evidence that a clear standard had been specified.
According to the court, the Restatement view would permit the
" Id.
See id.
MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714
(Dept. of Commerce offered Oct. 31, 1979) [hereinafter cited as MUPLA].
Id. at 62,748, § 120(A).
Id. at 62,749 (analysis of MUPLA Section 120).
See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 225 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1975) (conscious disregard of safety); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655,
668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (conscious disregard for the safety of others); Thiry v.
Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515, 518 (Okla. 1983) (reckless disregard); Wangen v.
Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d at 442 (reckless indifference for others' rights and conscious
deliberate disregard for them).
" See, e.g., notes 312-13, 316, 319-20 infra and accompanying text.
594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 894 (1981).
"I See id. at 46 (quoting Bridges v. Alaska Housing Auth., 375 P.2d 696, 702
(Alaska 1962) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 908, 908(2) (1939)).
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jury to award punitive damages if the plaintiff demonstrated
that the manufacturer knew the product was defective, was
aware of the resulting deaths or injuries, but nevertheless con-
tinued to market the product with reckless disregard for public
safety. 
1 4
The defendant in Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., an
asbestos case, made a similar assertion. 3 6 The court, however,
observed that the liability standard was no more vague than
proximate cause and similar legal concepts. 3 7 The court declared
that "the standard for outrageous conduct-'willfully, mali-
ciously or so carelessly as to indicate wanton disregard of the
rights of the party injured'-provides sufficient notice to a
defendant of the consequences that such a wrongful act may
have in a suit brought by plaintiffs for damages." 3 '
Finally, the Dalkon Shield manufacturer in Palmer v. A.H.
Robins Co. 3 19 challenged Colorado's punitive damages statute,
alleging that the statute was unconstitutionally vague in violation
of due process of law.3 20 In response, the court noted that the
operative terms, "fraud" and "wanton and reckless disregard,"
were familiar legal concepts, and therefore afforded the defend-
ant sufficient notice of proscribed conduct to satisfy constitu-
tional requirements .321
Although the courts have been unwilling to invalidate on due
process grounds the conventional punitive damage liability for-
mulas, no one has suggested that any of them are models of
clarity. All of these formulas suffer from one inescapable defi-
ciency: they are based on a model of individual behavior."2
314 See id.
548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
3,6 One of the corporate defendants argued that imposition of punitive damages
violated its due process guarantees. According to the defendant, there was inadequate
notice of the condemned conduct since the standards for liability were vague. The
defendant contended that the judge and jury were free to decide the prohibited conduct
issue without any legally fixed standards. See id. at 377.
317 See id.
i' Id.
3'9 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).
See id. (construing CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1973)).
12l See id. at 214-15.
2' See generally Owen, supra note 33, at 1361-67 (discussing the theory and stand-
ards of liability for punitive damages in products liability cases).
[VOL. 74
1985-861 PuNiTrvE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABIITY 51
Consequently, when courts apply these standards to products
liability cases, they must impute human characteristics to a cor-
porate entity.323
To remedy this problem, Professor Owen has proposed a
standard that is specifically tailored to products liability litiga-
tion. Under his approach, "[p]unitive damages may be assessed
against the manufacturer of a product injuring the plaintiff if
the injury is attributable to conduct that reflects a flagrant
indifference to the public safety. '3 24 According to Professor
Owen, the "flagrant indifference" test requires an objective
decision about the manufacturer's apparent attitude, not a sub-
jective finding of the manufacturer's actual state of mind. 25 The
term "indifference to public safety" implies a basic disrespect
and consequent disregard for others, while the word "flagrant"
involves much more serious misconduct than inadvertent behav-
ior. 326 The flagrant indifference approach is an improvement over
the conventional liability standards and has already received
considerable judicial acceptance.3 27 Nevertheless, the concept of
punitive damages is so inextricably tied to notions of individual
wrongdoing that it is virtually impossible to formulate a general
liability standard that can be applied in a meaningful way to the
kind of collective decision-making that occurred in product de-
sign.
Although no abstract formula can identify with specificity
the type of conduct that will be sanctioned, 328 it may be possible
to get some idea of proscribed conduct by looking for recurring
patterns in court decisions. 329 Not only does this approach help
clarify the meaning of the liability formula, but it also focuses
attention on the retributive purpose behind imposing punitive
damages on product manufacturers. 30 To pose the issue differ-
' See 455 N.E.2d at 152.
Owen, supra note 33, at 1367.
See id. at 1368.
': See Owen, supra note 42, at 24; Owen, supra note 33, at 1368-69.
' See Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 815-16 (6th Cir. 1982);
Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 427 N.E.2d 608, 617 (I11. App. Ct. 1981); Liechtamer
v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 580 (Ohio 1981).
"I See Owen, supra note 33, at 1326 (appropriate standard requires breadth for
flexibility but specificity to give manufacturers adequate notice).
':' See Owen, supra note 33, at 1326-28.
' See id. at 1326.
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ently, one might ask what conduct does society wish to punish
when imposing punitive damages on product manufacturers?
There is general agreement that placing a defective product on
the market, in and of itself, is not enough to warrant punish-
ment.33" ' What additional element, then, makes the product man-
ufacturer's conduct both sufficiently blameworthy, and
sufficiently threatening to a recognized public interest, to justify
the imposition of punitive sanctions?
In product development cases, punitive damages have been
awarded for inadequate product testing and for ignoring known
risks when designing a product. On the other hand, courts
generally have been reluctant to award punitive damages when
the manufacturer was unaware of the risk posed by its product.3 2
A few courts have imposed liability for failure to discover a
dangerous condition when routine product testing would have
revealed the risk, but these cases also involved express or implied
representations of safety by the manufacturer 3 3 For example,
in Sabich v. Outboard Marine Corp. ,34 the plaintiff was injured
when the snowmobile he was driving rolled over while descending
a twenty-four to thirty-eight degree slope. The jury assessed
punitive damages against the manufacturer. The defendant
claimed in its promotional statements that the snowmobile could
operate on inclines up to forty-five degrees when, in fact, the
defendant never tested the vehicle on slopes to determine at what
point the snowmobile would overturn. 35
The design itself also may be a source of punitive damage
liability. Usually the product design involves a risk of serious
"I See id. at 1367.
131 See 717 F.2d at 841; Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734, 738
(5th Cir. 1980); Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Cochran v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 564 F. Supp. 237, 243 (N.D. Miss. 1983); 414 F.
Supp. at 267; 427 N.E.2d at 618; Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Wisniewski, 437 A.2d
700, 704-05 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
131 See 424 N.E.2d at 582. Cf. 552 F.2d at 104; Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co.
v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd, 644 F.2d 877 (4th
Cir. 1981).
314 131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
" See Owen, supra note 33, at 1342 (citing letter from plaintiff's attorney, Daniel
Wilcoxera, to David G. Owen, July 16, 1975). The appellate court, however, reversed
the punitive damages award because of an erroneous jury instruction on the required
standard of proof. See 131 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
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injury to users or bystanders. In addition, the risk normally is
one that the manufacturer can eliminate or reduce at relatively
small cost. 336 Most of these cases have involved motor vehicles.
In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 337 Wangen v. Ford Motor
Co., 338 and American Motors Corp. v. Ellis,339 the courts em-
phasized that the risk of being badly burned was a serious one,
that the manufacturer was aware of the hazard, and that the
manufacturer failed to install safety devices that could have
substantially reduced the risk of fire from rear-end collisions.
30
Although violation of government or industry safety stand-
ards may provide a basis for awarding punitive damages,
341
compliance with such standards does not appear to immunize
the manufacturer from liability in design defect cases. For ex-
ample, in Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp. ,342 the manufacturer
was held liable for punitive damages even though its pajamas
complied with the flammability standards set by the federal
Flammable Fabrics Act. 343 The Minnesota court held that com-
pliance with the federal regulation did not preclude the jury
from concluding that the defendant had acted with reckless
disregard for the plaintiff's safety. 44 Likewise, a federal circuit
court in Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co.,34 held that the manufac-
turer could have acted with reckless indifference for the rights
of others even though it complied with federal automobile safety
standards.3" The plaintiff, severely injured when his subcompact
." Cf. Airco, Inc. v. Simmons First Nat'l Bank, 638 S.W.2d 660 (Ark. 1982) (use
of defective optional device caused injury). But cf. 412 A.2d at 420 (no reason additional
safety device not used).
... 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. App. 1981).
294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980).
403 So. 2d 459 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
'" See 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85; 403 So. 2d at 467; 294 N.W.2d at 462. Accord
Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 319 S.E.2d 470, 475, 481 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
'' See Owen, supra note 33, at 1335.
'42 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Riegel Textile Corp. v.
Gryc ew rel. Gryc, 449 U.S. 921 (1980).
'' See id. at 733-36; Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953, ch. 164, § 4, 67 Stat. 111
(1953) (amended 1954). See also 16 C.F.R. §§ 1610.3(2), 1610.4 (1984). The Act was
later amended to require stricter regulation of the fabric used in children's sleepwear.
See 297 N.W.2d at 733 n.2.
See 297 N.W.2d at 733-34.
' 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981), opinion modified on other grounds, 670 F.2d 21
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
' See id. at 656.
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car collided with a full-size vehicle, claimed that the Honda
automobile could have been designed more safely without fore-
going the advantages of a small car .
47
Product marketing activities include misrepresentation about
product safety, concealment of hazardous conditions, and failure
to correct hazards after their discovery. When the manufacturer
makes affirmative misrepresentations to induce consumers to buy
a product, the manufacturer is engaging in conduct that is uni-
versally regarded as undesirable.348 False claims about product
safety not only deceive the consumer into thinking that the
product is better than it is, but misplaced reliance on such claims
also can lead to unnecessary accidents a49 Leichtamer v. Ameri-
can Motors Corp.3 0 is illustrative of this principle. The manu-
facturer was aware of the Jeep's tendency to pitch-over, yet
advertisements encouraged Jeep owners to drive down steep
slopes.'
Concealment is closely related to misrepresentation. The lat-
ter involves affirmative representations, while the former merely
involves a failure to divulge information. Often a manufacturer
is guilty of both at the same time. Thus, in Roginsy 352 and
Tooe v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.35 3 the defendants not only
suppressed data about the harmful side effects of MER/29, but
also continued to assure the public that the drug was safe.11
4
The asbestos cases reveal a similar pattern of behavior on the
part of some asbestos manufacturers.3 15 Concealment, however,
may also occur prior to the marketing phase. For example, in
Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter,16 the occupants of an airplane
' Id. at 655-56. See also Cloroben Chem. Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887, 893
(Del. 1983) (failure of manufacturer to change product after gaining knowledge of the
defect indicates willful and wanton act).
'4 See Owen, supra note 33, at 1334.
See 424 N.E.2d at 579-80.
"o 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981).
Id. at 579.
2 378 F.2d 832.
60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
"' See 378 F.2d at 835-36; 60 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 404-08, 416. See also Rheingold,
supra note 55, at 117-20.
"I See, e.g., Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (5th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1749 (1985); 548 F. Supp. at 375-76; Fischer v. Johns-
Manville Corps., 472 A.2d 577, 580-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
-1 426 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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died in a crash caused by a faulty door latch.31 7 A test pilot
apparently discovered the defective design when the airplane first
was developed. Instead of redesigning the door latch, however,
the manufacturer ordered the test pilot to destroy the records of
the problem.358
Concealment should not be confused with failure to provide
an adequate warning. A manufacturer who is aware of a serious
risk and, for commercial reasons, chooses not to disclose the
risk has made a conscious decision to make greater profits by
subjecting the public to an unnecessary risk.35 9 Such conduct is
contrary to accepted social norms and justifiably deserves pun-
ishment.316 A warning that does not explain clearly the nature
of the risk, or one that inadvertantly fails to disclose some risks
or some aspects of them to the consumer, may make the product
defective, but this deficiency alone should not subject the man-
ufacturer to punitive damages.1
61
Generally, case law supports this distinction between con-
cealment and failure to warn adequately. For example, in John-
son v. Husky Industries,62 the court reversed a punitive damage
award based on the defendant's failure to provide an adequate
warning. In Johnson, a family of four died of asphyxiation from
carbon monoxide fumes produced by the defendant's charcoal
briquets. The manufacturer knew the product could be lethal
when used indoors without sufficient ventilation and, therefore,
placed on the bag a warning that said "CAUTION - FOR
INDOOR USE - COOK ONLY IN PROPERLY VENTI-
LATED AREAS." The appellate court believed that the warn-
ing, though inadequate, was not such as "to raise a presumption
of conscious indifference to consequences. ' 3 63 A similar result
' See id. at 1109.
See id. at 1110. Later Piper Aircraft Corp. redesigned the plane to remedy the
problem, but did not warn purchasers of the earlier defect. See id.
'" The cost of the warning may be low, but the lost sales due to the loss of
consumer confidence may be significant. See Owen, supra note 33, at 1294 n.183.
,10 See id. at 1352.
?6 See id.
536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976).
"' See id. at 650-51. But cf. Hill v. Husky Briquetting, Inc., 220 N.W.2d 137
(Mich. Ct. App.), aff'd, 223 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. 1974) (directed verdict against plaintiff's
compensatory damage claim reversed on similar facts).
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was reached in Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp.364 The manufac-
turer failed to place a "baffle" in the fuel tank of its Baron D-
55 aircraft to prevent fuel from moving away from the fuel
outlet during certain flight maneuvers. Nevertheless, the defend-
ant warned against engaging in such maneuvers, although it did
not fully explain the nature of the risk involved. The appellate
court upheld the trial court's refusal to submit the issue of
punitive damages .365
The last type of product marketing conduct involves failure
to take remedial measures once the manufacturer has become
aware of a dangerous condition in the product. One of the most
common situations is failure to issue a warning after discovering
a hazard. The courts' approach in these types of cases, most of
which involve pharmaceutical products, is similar to that applied
to concealment.166 In other words, failure to warn once a risk
becomes known may result in the imposition of punitive dam-
ages. In some cases, however, more than a warning may be
necessary once a risk is discovered. For example, in Cloroben
Chemical Corp. v. Comegys, 67 the appellate court upheld a
punitive damages award against the distributor of a sulfuric acid
drain cleaner. The defendant was aware that its product, "Drain
Snake," was available to the public even though the cleaner was
intended for professional use only. Accordingly, the court ruled
that after becoming aware of the danger to consumers, the
defendant's refusal to place a safer cap on its product was
sufficiently culpable to warrant exemplary damages.3 6 Other
courts have imposed liability in similar circumstances.169
This brief review of the case law permits certain observations
about the liability standard. First, the manufacturer must be
aware of the risk involved in the design or use of its product.
Second, the manufacturer must make a conscious decision to
36, 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973).
161 See id. at 1096-97.
6 See, e.g., Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 117, 131-32 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983); 684 P.2d at 217-21; Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d
1038, 1062-64 (Kan.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 365 (1984).
167 464 A.2d 887 (Del. 1983).
See id. at 891-92.
161 See, e.g., 594 P.2d at 47 (handgun); Cantrell v. Amarillo Hardware Co., 602
P.2d 1326 (Kan. 1979) (stepladder).
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subject consumers to substantial risk of serious and unnecessary
injuries to maximize profits. In other words, since manufacturers
determine the degree of risk from defective products to which
consumers are subjected, punitive damages may be imposed on
those who take advantage of their control over the risk deter-
mination process to enhance their financial interests at the ex-
pense of society.370 Nevertheless, the liability standard still presents
problems. First of all, although manufacturers and others can
determine after the fact that certain types of conduct will result
in punishment, the requirement that they be given a clear idea
of proscribed conduct in advance is not satisfied. Secondly,
courts in the future are likely to expand the range of conduct
that can be sanctioned by the imposition of punitive damages.
There is certainly nothing in the concept of "recklessness" or
"flagrant indifference" that will prevent this ad hoc expansion
of liability from occurring. Thus, product manufacturers will be
forced to adjust their conduct to a constantly changing standard
of liability.
5. Disproportionate Punishment
The assessment of punitive damages against product manu-
facturers also violates the principle that punishment should be
proportional to the degree of wrongdoing. 37' Excessive punish-
ment is inconsistent with the principle of desert because
"[p]unishment that is excessive is not deserved. 3 72 Dispropor-
tionate punishment in products liability cases can result from
excessive verdicts in individual cases or from the cumulative
effect of multiple punitive awards for the same wrongful act.
The uncertain criteria for determining the size of punitive
damage assessments in individual cases allow the jury to act out
of passion or prejudice,3 73 thereby inflicting excessive punishment
on the defendant in individual cases. Judicial supervision of jury
1 See 297 N.W.2d at 732-33.
"I See Riewe v. McCormick, 9 N.W. 88, 89-90 (Neb. 1881).
'72 Ellis, supra note 37, at 6. See Mundel, supra note 246, at 71-72.
"7 See Ellis, supra note 37, at 53-57; Wheeler, The Constitutional Case For Re-
forming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269, 285-88 (1983). See also
Ghiardi, supra note 24, at 287; Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L.
Rv. 1173, 1188-89 (1931); Morris, supra note 60, at 226-27.
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verdicts is not always sufficient to prevent this type of behav-
ior.a74 Some jurisdictions require that a punitive damage assess-
ment bear a reasonable relationship to the size of the
compensatory award. a75 Although this rule places some con-
straint on unreasonable jury verdicts, however, it does not really
protect against the risk of excessive punishment.37 6 This is be-
cause compensatory damages reflect the plaintiff's injury, not
the defendant's culpability; 377 consequently, neither the compen-
satory award, nor some multiple of it, necessarily bears any
relation to the amount of punishment the defendant deserves.3 78
The problem of excessive verdicts in individual cases is greatly
magnified in product liability litigation because a single act may
result in numerous punitive damage claims. 79 The cumulative
effect of multiple punitive damage awards can jeopardize the
financial stability of even the largest product manufacturers.-
0
Sometimes referred to as the "overkill problem," 3' 1 when mul-
tiple punitive damage awards bankrupt a company, this amounts
to a form of corporate capital punishment, totally out of pro-
portion to the degree of corporate wrongdoing and is neither
desirable nor justifiable from a retributive standpoint.
3
1
2
"4 See Ellis, supra note 37, at 53-57; Wheeler, supra note 373, at 285-91. See also
Ghiardi, supra note 24, at 287; Morris, supra note 373, at 1189; Morris, supra note 60,
at 226.
" See Ellis, supra note 37, at 58. See Schroeder v. Auto Driveway Co., 523 P.2d
662, 672 (Cal. 1974); Addair v. Huffman, 195 S.E.2d 739, 743-44 (W. Va. 1973). See
also Belli, supra note 2, at 11; Comment, Punitive Damages and the Reasonable Relation
Rule: A Study in Frustration of Purpose, 9 PAC. L.J. 823, 832 (1978).
336 See Belli, supra note 2, at 12; Ellis, supra note 37, at 58; Comment, supra note
375, at 832.
171 See 22 Azs. JUR. 2d Damages §§ 11, 236 (1965).
"I See Ellis, supra note 37, at 58.
171 See Sales, supra note 34, at 370. Sales & Cole, supra note 5, at 1142.
1w See Dubois, supra note 38, at 349; Note, The Punitive Damage Class Action:
A Solution to the Problem of Multiple Punishment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 153, 156-57.
378 F.2d at 839; Note, supra note 28, at 469.
32 Note, supra note 380, at 156. A number of courts have declared that punitive
damage awards are not intended to bankrupt the defendant. See, e.g., In re Northern
Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D.
Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom., 459 U.S. 1171
(1983); 515 F. Supp. at 106; 661 P.2d at 518. But see Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
469 A.2d 655, 665 (Pa. Super. 1983) (product manufacturer must accept consequences
of wrongdoing even if it results in bankruptcy), vacated, 494 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1985).
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There is considerable disagreement about whether the overkill
problem is real.3 3 In Roginsky, Judge Friendly expressed concern
about the aggregate effect of punitive damage awards on product
manufacturers.3 84 This fear proved to be unfounded, at least in
the instance of the defendant Richardson-Merrell.3"' Only eleven
of more than one thousand MER/29 cases were tried.386 The
defendant won four of these cases, while the plaintiffs won the
other seven.387 Three juries awarded punitive damages, one of
which was reversed on appeal.388 In the remaining two cases, the
trial judge ordered a remittitur.389 The total amount of compen-
sation Richardson-Merrell and its insurers paid to MER/29 vic-
tims amounted.to $22 million, and of that, only $1 million was
paid for punitive damages.39°
A federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, which
drafted the Uniform Product Liability Act, also found that the
overkill problem was not serious.391 The task force based its
conclusion on a closed claims survey conducted by the Insurance
Services Offices (ISO) in 1976-77.392 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court relied on the ISO survey when it rejected Ford's overkill
argument in Wangen.393 However, the situation has changed
dramatically since the ISO survey.394 Nowadays an increasing
number of accident victims are seeking punitive damages against
"' See notes 384-96, 414 infra and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note
28, at 469.
378 F.2d at 839.
Note, supra note 28, at 469. See text accompanying notes 386-90 infra.
Note, supra note 28, at 469. See Rheingold, supra note 55, at 132.
' Rheingold, supra note 55, at 132-33; Note, supra note 28, at 469.
' Note, supra note 28, at 469. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 254 F.
Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967)
(compensatory award affirmed, punitive award reversed).
' " Note, supra note 28, at 469.
Rheingold, supra note 55, at 137-41; Note, supra note 28, at 469 n.83. Richard-
son-Merrell's assets were estimated at $150-200 million. Rheingold, supra note 55, at
135.
, See note 390 supra.
2 The Interagency Task Force declared: "While many product sellers have ex-
pressed great concern about the economic impact of punitive damages, the 'ISO Closed
Claims Survey' suggests that the number of cases in which such damages are imposed
is not substantial. 'ISO Closed Claims Survey' at 183." 44 Fed. Reg. 62,748 (1979).
294 N.W.2d at 456.
A Nelson, supra note 12, at 390.
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product manufacturers, 395 and multimillion dollar verdicts, if not
commonplace, are becoming more common.
3 6
While a single substantial punitive damage award is unlikely
to bankrupt a financially secure company, some manufacturers
face the prospect of thousands of large punitive damage claims.
39
Even if they are resolved through litigation or settlement for
relatively modest amounts, the cumulative effect of such claims
could be staggering. 398 For example, more than 16,000 suits had
been filed against Johns-Manville for asbestos-related injuries at
the time the company petitioned for bankruptcy.399 The manu-
facturer estimated that 52,000 lawsuits would eventually be
brought against the company and projected potential liability at
$2 billion. 400 The company based the estimate on an average cost
of $40,000 per claim, including legal expenses. 40'
This figure would have been much higher if Johns-Manville
had given more consideration to potential punitive damage claims
when estimating liability. In fact, two years later, the company
claimed that 14,000 cases seeking a total of over $50 billion were
pending against it; 9300 of these suits included demands for
punitive damages. 4°2 Moreover, since the Manville bankruptcy in
1982, punitive damage awards against the company have been
191 Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of
Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FoDnnari L. REv. 37, 38-39 (1983).
3 See, e.g., 655 F.2d 650 ($5 million); 638 S.W.2d 660 ($3 million); 174 Cal. Rptr.
348 ($3.5 million); 684 P.2d 187 ($6.2 million); 319 S.E.2d 470 ($8 million); 681 P.2d
1038 ($2.75 million); 297 N.W.2d 727 ($1 million); 424 N.E.2d 568 ($1 million); Ford
Motor Co. v. Nowak, 638 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) ($4 million). Int'l Arma-
ment Corp. v. King, 686 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. 1985) ($3 million).
Special Project, supra note 45, at 690-91.
I d.; Comment, supra note 45, at 370-72.
39 Note, Mass Tort Claims and the Corporate Tortfeaser: Bankruptcy Reorgani-
zation and Legislative Compensatory Versus the Common-Law Tort System, 61 TFx. L.
REv. 1297, 1300 (1982-83). According to a study commissioned by Johns-Manville, the
number of future lawsuits after 1982 was expected to range from 30,000 to 120,000. See
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 528 n.29 (5th Cir. 1984).
40 Seltzer, supra note 395, at 39 n.12.
,o Id.; Note, The Manville Bankruptcy, supra note 399, at 1300 n.11. It is also
interesting to note that the defense costs in the 3500 suits that Johns-Manville disposed
of by 1982 were nearly equal to the total cost of the judgments rendered against it.
Note, supra note 203, at 1129 n.44.
101 727 F.2d at 524.
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upheld in three reported cases; these awards were for $240,000,40
$300,000,4 and $500,000.05
In some respects the Johns-Manville case is unique. Not only
were thousands of persons exposed to asbestos4 6 but the evi-
dence of misconduct against the company was overwhelming.
40 7
Perhaps no other product manufacturer will ever be placed in
such a defenseless position, facing massive compensatory and
punitive liability. Consequently, the Johns-Manville bankruptcy
may not indicate that a serious overkill problem exists. Never-
theless, other manufacturers also face exposure to lawsuits from
thousands of victims, many of whom also will seek punitive
damages. 40s For example, over 5500 lawsuits have been filed
against A.H. Robins, the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield
IUD.409 Also, more than 1000 suits have been brought against
the DES manufacturers. 410 Ford Motor Company reports ap-
proximately 700 suits filed against it in connection with trans-
mission defects in some of its cars and trucks. Another 200 suits
have been brought against American Motors for design defects
in its Jeep vehicles.41 1 Punitive damages have been recovered in
at least one instance against the manufacturers of each of these
products. 2 Other victims will undoubtedly seek punitive dam-
ages as well. Moreover, the overkill danger is not limited to
*' 472 A.2d at 579.
734 F.2d at 1046-47.
691 F.2d at 811.
One study declared that more than twenty-one million American workers were
significantly exposed to asbestos over the past forty years. Over the next twenty years,
an estimated 8200 to 9700 of these workers are expected to die each year from asbestos
related cancers. The total number of deaths from asbestos exposure will reach 200,000
by the end of the century. SELnco , DISABILITY COMPENSATION FOR ASBESTOS-AssoCIATED
DISEASE IN Tit UNITED STATES 4 (1982) (report to the U.S. Dep't of Labor).
' Several courts have cited the Sumner Simpson Papers as evidence of serious
misconduct by Johns-Manville and other asbestos suppliers. See, e.g., 727 F.2d at 530;
734 F.2d at 1039-40; 472 A.2d at 580-81.
- See text accompanying notes 409-11 infra.
-' Seltzer, supra note 395, at 38 n.7.
,1" Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94
HARV. L. REv. 668, 669 (1981). For a detailed discussion concerning the lawsuits brought
against DES manufacturers, see Comment, Punitive Damages in DES Market Share
Litigation, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 185 (1983).
"4 Seltzer, supra note 395, at 38 n.5.
412 E.g., 684 P.2d 187 (Dalkon Shield); 424 N.E.2d 568 (jeep roll bar); 638 S.W.2d
582 (automobile transmission).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
large manufacturers. Smaller companies also are vulnerable to
the financial effects of multiple punitive damage awards.41 1 Ob-
viously, not all product manufacturers face the prospect of
bankruptcy from punitive damage awards. However, the expe-
riences of those companies that have already been subjected to
this risk should give advocates of punitive damages cause for
concern.
414
Moreover, the penalty imposed on a product manufacturer
may still be excessive even though it falls short of corporate
capital punishment. 4 5 Disproportionate punishment is virtually
certain to occur because of the fragmented process by which
courts assess punitive damages in products liability cases. When
numerous victims receive punitive damages, punishment is not
determined once and for all, as it is in a criminal proceeding,
but instead is meted out on an incremental basis as each claimant
recovers something.416
Theoretically, each jury should consider past, and possibly
future, punitive damage recoveries when calculating the size of
an individual award. 417 However, even if courts could tally a
defendant's aggregate punitive liability, no mechanism exists for
determining when the appropriate level of punishment has been
reached. As Judge Friendly exclaimed in Roginsky: "Neither
does it seem either fair or practicable to limit punitive recoveries
to an indeterminate number of first-comers, leaving it to some
unascertained court to cry, 'Hold, enough,' in the hope that
others would follow. ' 41 1 This fragmented and essentially unsu-
pervised method of awarding punitive damages in products lia-
",3 Note, supra note 26, at 426; Note, supra note 4, at 68.
414 Nevertheless, most courts remain skeptical about the seriousness of the overkill
problem. See, e.g., 734 F.2d at 1040-41; 717 F.2d at 838; 548 F. Supp. at 376-77; 515
F. Supp. at 109. A few courts, however, have acknowledged that multiple punitive
damage awards can create financial problems for product manufacturers. See, e.g., 727
F.2d at 526; 526 F. Supp. at 899.
411 See notes 372-82 supra and accompanying text.
416 J. GHkaRDi & J. KIRCHER, supra note 21, § 5.40.
417 See Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 629 P.2d 196, 206 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1981); State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 618 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Or. 1980);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West Supp. 1981); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.925(3)(g)
(1979); Riley, Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of Just Enrichment, 27 DptuKa L. REv.
195, 213 (1978); REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 908, comment e (1979).
"1 378 F.2d at 839-40.
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bility litigation does not constitute a principled method of
imposing punishment.
6. Other Fairness Considerations
Allowance of punitive damage awards in products liability
cases arguably offends other aspects of fairness. One concern is
the double jeopardy or multiple punishment problem. This issue
arises because each person injured by a defective product may
seek punitive damages from the manufacturer. 41 9 If punitive
damages are primarily retributive in nature, the manufacturer
may claim that it is being punished more than once for the same
wrongful act.420 Sometimes product manufacturers have claimed
that multiple punitive damage awards violated the constitutional
prohibition against "double jeopardy. ' 42' The courts, however,
have responded that protection against double jeopardy is limited
to criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings. 422 Nevertheless, as
one court pointed out, "A defendant in a civil action has a right
to be protected against double recoveries not because they [sic]
violate 'double jeopardy' but simply because overlapping damage
awards violate that sense of 'fundamental fairness' which lies at
the heart of constitutional due process."4 23
Unfortunately, other courts do not share this concern. 424 For
example, an asbestos supplier raised the question of multiple
punishment in Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd.42 The court,
"1 Putz & Astiz, supra note 36, at 13. Under the doctrine of Toole v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., every claimant injured by the defendant's wrongful conduct may sue for
both actual and punitive damages, even if punitive damages have previously been
awarded to other claimants for the same wrongful act. Id. (citing Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr.
398).
'12 See Duffy, supra note 24, at 10; Tozer, supra note 47, at 304.
4'1 Tozer, supra note 47, at 304. Punitive damages obviously create a form of
double jeopardy in cases where criminal prosecution is also available. See Murphy v.
Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 124-26 (Colo. 1884); Note, supra note 27, at 1041. However, the
practice is generally held to be constitutional. See J. Gm.ARi & J. KIRCHER, supra note
21, § 3.02; Comment, supra note 29, at 413-17. See also Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
"1 734 F.2d at 1042; 684 P.2d at 217; See J. GHmAuI & J. KIRCHER, supra note
21, § 3.02.
111 526 F. Supp. at 899. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188 (8th
Cir.), discretionary rev. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
421 See, e.g., 548 F. Supp. 357.
"1 548 F. Supp. 357, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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however, declared that since the defendant owed a duty to each
victim injured, each breach of duty constituted a separate wrong-
ful act deserving punishment. 426 Thus, while multiple punishment
may be unfair from a retributive standpoint, courts are likely to
hold it constitutional.
427
Product manufacturers also have asserted frequently that
punitive damages, emphasizing wrongdoing, are inappropriate in
a lawsuit where the defendant is held strictly liable for compen-
satory damages. 42 There are a number of dimensions to this
argument. First, opponents of punitive damages claim that per-
mitting the plaintiff to seek exemplary damages in a products
liability suit is conceptually inconsistent.429 A few courts have
adopted this view.4 10 For example, in Walbrun v. Berkel, Inc. ,41
the plaintiff sought punitive damages based on a claim of reck-
less disregard of his rights while also seeking compensatory
damages on negligence and strict liability theories. 432 The court
dismissed the punitive damages count, declaring that the reck-
lessness allegation was not part of the underlying compensatory
damage claim. 433 Walbrun is a minority view, however.4 4 The
prevailing view allows recovery of punitive damages if the plain-
tiff meets the requisite criteria for liability, regardless of the
nature of the compensatory claim.4
3 5
A second and more sophisticated version of the incompat-
ibility argument is that punitive damages frustrate the goals of
416 Id. at 377-78. Compare 548 F. Supp. 357 with 618 P.2d 1268 (The court discussed
awarding punitive damages to each plaintiff injured by a company's defective product,
but expressed no opinion.).
"I Putz & Astiz, supra note 36, at 13. Note, The Dubious Extension of Punitive
Damage Recovery in Pennsylvania Products Liability Law, 23 DuQ. L. REv. 681, 695
(1985). See also Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692, 705 (D. Md.
1981).
411 See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 431-35. See also Haskell, supra note 21, at 620.
" Ghiardi & Kircher, supra note 34, at 47-48; Haskell, supra note 21, at 618-
20; Nelson, supra note 12, at 382; Sales, supra note 34, at 389.
41° See notes 431, 434 infra.
411 433 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
432 Id.
411 Id. at 385.
414 See Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692, 705 (D. Md. 1981).
See also note 435 infra and accompanying text.
4" See, e.g., 717 F.2d at 833; 548 F. Supp. at 378; Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d
387, 395-96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); 472 A.2d at 582-84; 294 N.W.2d at 441-42.
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products liability. 436 A federal district court recently relied on
this theory in Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. ,4 7 holding
that a plaintiff could not seek punitive damages when predicating
the underlying compensatory damage claim solely on strict lia-
bility in tort.438 The court was concerned that spreading the cost
of punitive awards to the public would undermine the resource
allocation function of products liability.43 9 Other courts, how-
ever, have disagreed with this analysis. 440 For example, the Col-
orado Supreme Court in Palmer declared that punitive damages
complemented strict liability in achieving the social objectives of
products liability. 441 The Alaska Supreme Court, in Sturm,
reached the same conclusion.
442
A third aspect of the incompatability issue is related to the
fairness of the adjudicative process. 43 According to some com-
mentators, mixing fault and no-fault issues in a single trial puts
the defendant manufacturer at a serious disadvantage when de-
fending the suit.4" According to these critics, injecting punitive
damages into products liability litigation prejudices the defend-
ant's case in several ways. First, the "piggybacking" of a pu-
nitive damage claim onto a strict liability claim creates practical
litigation problems for the defendant at trial. 445 For example,
the pleadings contain vastly different allegations to support both
fault based and no-fault theories of recovery.
446
Mixing fault and no-fault concepts in a single suit also
increases the chances of confusing the jury.447 As the court in
1 See Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 553 F. Supp. 482 (D.N.J. 1982). But
see 684 P.2d 187; 594 P.2d 38.
07 553 F. Supp. 482 (D.N.J. 1982).
41- Id. at 484-85.
S" Id. at 484. The Gold decision was followed in Wolf by Wolf v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 555 F. Supp. 613, 618 (D.N.J. 1982).
See, e.g., 594 P.2d 38; 684 P.2d 187.
" 684 P.2d at 218.
594 P.2d at 46-47.
"' Fulton, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases, 15 FoRUi 117, 128-32
(1979-80).
"Id.
" Id.
"Id.
"7 553 F. Supp. at 485. But cf. Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955,
962 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Gold declared: "Punitive damages is clearly a negligence concept
concerned with normative behavior. Its inclusion, I find, in a
strict products liability suit would confuse the jury and under-
mine the goals of the cause of action. ' ' 448 On the other hand,
the federal district court in Maxey v. Freightliner Corp.,49 dis-
counted this fear, pointing out that strict liability in tort is not
entirely free of fault concepts. 40 The court stated,
the risk of infecting a no-fault concept by simultaneous presentation
of a fault based claim is exaggerated in a mind that fails to perceive
that present formulation of strict liability grandly tosses fault out
the front door but quietly brings much of it through the back door
with language drawn from fault-riddled syntax.
4
1'
Finally, it is argued that the emphasis given to the manufac-
turer's misconduct as part of the punitive damages case inflames
the jury and thereby improperly influences its decision on the
compensatory damages issue. 452 As one commentator wrote: "Es-
sentially, the product supplier is denuded of the usual safeguards
imposed on discovery, the admission of evidence, the submission
of issues, and defenses that traditionally govern simple negli-
gence actions and then, in the same law suit, is subjected to an
assault based on gross negligence (minus any safeguards). ' 4"1 In
addition, evidence of the defendant's wealth, which can be in-
troduced as part of the punitive damages claim, may also prej-
udice the jury on the compensatory damages issue.45 4
7. Evaluation of the Retribution Rationale
Punitive damages in product liability cases are frequently
imposed vicariously against innocent parties.455 In addition, the
553 F. Supp. at 485.
"9 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
410 Id. at 962.
-$1 Id.
411 Nelson, supra note 12, at 389.
41 Sales, supra note 34, at 390. Manufacturers have unsuccessfully made this
argument in several cases. See, e.g., 681 P.2d at 1064-65; 437 A.2d 700 at 705.
4" Wheeler, supra note 373, at 291.
411 See text accompanying notes 267-83 supra.
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standards under which liability is determined and punitive awards
are measured are vague. 4 6 Moreover, the cumulative effect of
multiple punitive damage awards amounts to punishment that is
disproportionate to the degree of wrongdoing. 457 Furthermore,
the mixture of fault and no-fault concepts in a single product
liability action places the defendant at an unfair disadvantage.4 8
Consequently, we conclude that the use of punitive damages in
such cases cannot be justified in terms of retributive goals. This
does not mean that punitive damages do not have a sanctioning
effect; it merely means that retribution cannot serve as a raison
d'etre for the practice of assessing punitive damages against
product manufacturers. Instead, one must consider whether de-
terrence or some other social purpose can justify punitive dam-
ages.
Nevertheless, we must emphasize that even though retributive
principles provide no support for the imposition of punitive
damages on product manufacturers, they are not irrelevant. Re-
tributive principles still have a residual role-to act as an ethical
constraint on policy measures, such as deterrence, that are based
on utilitarian principles. 4 9 This issue will be addressed later.
B. The Compensation Function
Critics of punitive damages claim that exemplary awards
constitute an undeserved windfall to the plaintiff.46° In response
to this allegation, proponents claim that punitive damages rep-
resent a form of additional compensation to an injured party.
46'
As mentioned earlier, one of the earliest justifications given for
punitive damages was that they represented compensation to the
victim for injuries or expenses not included in a normal com-
,' See text accompanying notes 284-370 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 371-418 supra.
See text accompanying notes 443-51 supra.
See Schwartz, supra note 37, at 135. See also G. CALABREsi, Tim COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS 24-26 (1970).
Il Long, supra note 24, at 886; Note, supra note 26, at 429. See Riewe v.
McCormick, 9 N.W. at 89-90.
'1 Freifield, supra note 14, at 7.
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pensatory award.462 Even today, a few courts regard compensa-
tion as the sole basis for awarding punitive damages.463
The compensatory rationale for punitive damages assumes
that awards of actual damages in tort actions do not provide
full compensation to accident victims. 464 These injured parties
"often suffer damage to emotional tranquility, family harmony
and employment security that is particularly difficult to prove
and generally not compensable anyway. ' 465 In addition, com-
pensatory damages do not always reimburse litigants for the
"enormous diligence, imagination and financial outlay required"
to prove product manufacturers' wrongful conduct.4 66 For ex-
ample, in most states plaintiffs cannot recover attorneys' fees. 67
Ordinarily, a plaintiff spends at least one-third of his recovery
on attorneys' fees. 468 Thus, verdicts that do not include an award
of attorneys' fees usually leave the victim in worse financial
469condition than before his injury.
Nevertheless, although punitive damages may incidentally
compensate injured parties in some cases, it is difficult to accept
compensation as a rationale for their imposition.470 First, the
liability standard focuses on the defendant's conduct, rather than
the plaintiff's injury. This has nothing to do with compensa-
tion.47' Moreover, the compensation rationale fails to explain
why some injured parties will be "compensated," while other
"I See Brause v. Brause, 177 N.W. 65, 70 (Iowa 1920); Long, supra note 24, at
875; Comment, supra note 33, at 774-75.
", E.g., Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 234 A.2d 825, 831-32 (Conn. 1967);
Westview Cemetery, Inc. v. Blanchard, 216 S.E.2d 776, 780-81 (Ga. 1975); Wise v.
Daniel, 190 N.W. 746, 747 (Mich. 1922); Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66,
67 (N.H. 1972). See J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 21, at § 4.02; Long, supra
note 24, at 875.
4 See J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 21, at §§ 4.02-.06, 4.13; Long, supra
note 24, at 875; Owen, supra note 33, at 1295-96.
" ' Owen, supra note 33, at 1298.
Id. at 1325, quoted in Comment, supra note 410, at 194-95.
7 See Note, supra note 380, at 153.
4 Owen, supra note 33, at 1297. See Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive
Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 241, 304-05 (1985) (criticizing Professor Owen's
conclusion that punitive damages can be justified as a means of compensating victims
for litigation costs).
469 Id.
470 Sales & Cole, supra note 5, at 1122.
411 Id. at 1316-19.
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equally deserving victims will not.472 In addition, the size of the
award seldom bears any resemblance to the plaintiff's uncom-
pensated loss. 473 Although the jury may consider the extent of
the plaintiff's harm, the jury may also consider the injury to
society and the wealth of the defendant in determining the size
of the punitive award. 474 Consequently, punitive damages only
satisfy the need for additional compensation in a haphazard and
irrational manner.
C. The Law Enforcement Function
Some courts and commentators have suggested that punitive
damages serve a law enforcement function. 475 In other words,
the prospect of punitive damages encourages private persons to
enforce societal norms through civil litigation, thereby supple-
menting enforcement through the criminal process.47 6 Some of
these commentators have also claimed that the law enforcement
rationale is applicable to products liability litigation.
4 77
The law enforcement function is closely related to the deter-
rence function, and perhaps can be considered a part of it.
478
Without the opportunity to recover punitive damages, it would
be economically impossible for a victim to bring a lawsuit in
those cases in which actual damages would be minimal. Conse-
quently, in those situations manufacturers would probably not
be deterred from such wrongful conduct in the future. 479
Some commentators also use the law enforcement theory to
respond to the windfall argument.4 80 According to the windfall
argument, a plaintiff who has recovered compensatory damages
•72 Id.
" Id. at 1319-25.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment e (1979).
471 See, e.g., State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 618 P.2d at 1272; Morris, supra
note 373, at 1183-88; Comment, supra note 33, at 776.
,16 D. DOBBS, supra note 296, § 3.9, at 205; Long, supra note 24, at 878; Note,
Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARv. L. REv. 517, 525-26 (1956-57). See
Note, supra note 8, at 439.
4" Owen, supra note 33, at 1287-95; Note, supra note 15, at 330-31. See Grimshaw
v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
4"7 Owen, supra note 33, at 1287. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 47, at 649-50.
4," Mallor & Roberts, supra note 47, at 650.
'"J Owen, supra note 33, at 1287.
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has no further claim. 48' To the extent punitive damages reflect
injury to society rather than the plaintiff, recovery of punitive
damages by the plaintiff is an undeserved windfall. 43 2 In re-
sponse, the proponents of punitive damages maintain that such
awards not only serve as an inducement, but also as a reward
for the plaintiff's important role as a "private attorney gen-
eral."
4 83
Although the law enforcement argument may be persuasive
in cases where actual damages are likely to be small, the rationale
has little force in products liability cases where compensatory
damages usually are sufficient to justify the cost of litigation.4 4
In fact, the threat of punitive damages may pressure manufac-
turers to settle dubious claims. 4 -
D. The Deterrence Function
There is general agreement that punitive damages are sup-
posed to deter both the defendant and others from engaging in
proscribed conduct.4 6 It is not so clear, however, that the de-
terrence rationale supports the imposition of punitive damages
on product manufacturers. To resolve this question, two issues
8' See generally Morris, supra note 373, at 1206 (suggests that there is doubt about
the "need for punishment beyond 'compensation' ").
'8 DuBois, supra note 38, at 350.
481 Mallor & Roberts, supra note 47, at 650.
"I See Tozer, supra note 47, at 303-04. Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive
Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 241, 302 (1985). But see Comment, Class Actions
in New York: Recovery for Personal Injury in Mass Tort Cases, 30 SYRAcuSE L. REv.
1187, 1200 n.107 (1978-79). See generally Long, supra note 24, at 889 (The author states
that the "private attorney-general" rationale is "far-fetched.").
411 DuBois, supra note 38, at 350. Sales & Cole, supra note 5, at 1156. See Maheu
v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp. 166, 170 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 569 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977).
' E.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d at 816; Sturm, Ruger &
Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d at 47; Gryc ex rel. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d
at 733; Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d at 517. See Ellis, supra note 37, at
8. Punitive damages, like criminal penalties, may be used to achieve either special or
general deterrence. Special deterrence involves a sanction imposed to deter one who has
committed a wrongful act from repeating the same act in the future. General deterrence,
on the other hand, is directed at other potential wrongdoers to discourage commission
of similar acts in the future. See G. CALABRsI, Tim CosTS OF ACCIDENTS 22 n.4 (1970);
Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 949-
54 (1966).
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must be addressed: (1) Whether additional deterrent measures are
needed in the products liability area, and (2) Assuming the need
for deterrence exists, whether punitive damages are the most
appropriate means of achieving this additional deterrent effect.
1. The Relationship Between Retribution and Deterrence
As mentioned earlier, retribution is grounded in ethical con-
siderations of fairness and desert.4 7 Deterrence, on the other
hand, largely is utilitarian in orientation. 4 8 Thus, when exam-
ining punitive damages from a retributive standpoint one asks,
"Is it fair?" But when analyzing punitive damages in terms of
deterrence one asks, "Does it work? ' 4 9 Deterrence probably
offers more leeway as a rationale than retribution, but each is
subject to constraints. 40 In the case of retribution, fairness and
desert delimit the proper scope of punitive sanctions; when de-
terrence is invoked as a justification, the concept of efficiency
functions in a similar manner.49'
Thus, when the deterrence rationale is invoked, one must con-
sider "whether the costs incurred by imposing a detriment on a
defendant will be offset by a reduction in the expected losses to
society from future harmful acts." 492 Moreover, the level of
deterrence should be "optimal. '"4 93 Therefore, "overdeterrence,"
in the sense of excessive deterrent measures, should be avoided to
prevent discouraging appropriate conduct. 494 Efficiency operates
in yet another way in this area: when a number of measures are
4- Ellis, supra note 37, at 6-8.
"' Id. at 8-10.
See id. at 6-10; Note, Punitive Damages in California: The Drunken Driver, 36
HASTINGS L.J. 793, 801 (1985).
" See Schwartz, supra note 37, at 135.
'' Ellis, supra note 37, at 6-10; Schwartz, supra note 37, at 135. Efficiency is a
concept that pervades the law of torts. For example, many commentators claim that the
reasonableness formula used in the law of negligence requires that risks and benefits be
balanced in a way promoting an efficient allocation of resources. See Calabresi &
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1057 (1972);
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG A. STuD. 29, 32-33 (1972); Schwartz, Forward:
Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 435, 464 n.181 (1979).
4, Ellis, supra note 37, at 8.
"I Schwartz, supra note 37, at 135.
4 Id. at 135 & n.9.
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available to achieve a given deterrent effect, efficiency dictates
choosing the most cost-effective technique.
49 5
Many of the issues examined previously in connection with
retribution are also relevant to deterrence. The difference be-
tween retributive and deterrent perspectives is illustrated by ana-
lyzing vicarious liability. From a retributive standpoint, the
imposition of punitive damages through vicarious liability raises
the major concern that innocent parties are punished when juries
assess such damages against product manufacturers. On the other
hand, from the perspective of deterrence, vicarious liability fo-
cuses on whether those punished can influence the actual wrong-
doers.
Likewise, because it violates the principle of fair notice, the
vague liability standard associated with punitive damages is un-
desirable from a retributive standpoint. However, this standard
is also deficient in terms of deterrence. Under the existing stand-
ard, it is difficult for the manufacturer to know when to alter
business practices. Consequently, deterrence goals are not achieved.
Likewise, just as disproportionate punishment from a retributive
standpoint violates the principle of just desert, it also results in
"overdeterrence" by inducing manufacturers to forego legitimate
activities in order to avoid the risk of economic Armageddon. This
results in an excessive allocation of societal resources to acciden-
tal cost prevention.
2. The Need for Additional Deterrence
Some commentators maintain that punitive damages are un-
needed because state and federal regulations govern product
quality.496 The threat of civil or criminal penalties for violation
of regulatory standards supposedly deters manufacturers from
conducting themselves in a manner for which punitive damages
can be awarded.497 Ford Motor Company made this argument
491 For example, if a civil penalty or a prison sentence were equally effective at
deterring a particular type of conduct, the civil remedy will probably involve fewer costs.
The cost of enforcement would probably be less, and the detrimental effects on third
parties such as family members (in terms of stigmatization, loss of economic support,
and the like) would also probably be less severe. Therefore, it would not be cost-effective
to choose a criminal penalty over a civil penalty in these circumstances.
"6 Comment, supra note 33, at 783. See text accompanying notes 497-500 infra.
"9 Comment, supra note 33, 783; Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d
at 840-41. See Tozer, supra note 47, at 304.
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in Wangen, calling for the abolition of punitive damages. 491
However, the court observed that all manufacturers were not
subject to the same degree of regulation as the automobile
industry.4 9 Moreover, Ford's argument assumed that the govern-
ment would actively search for violators and enforce regulations
when, in reality, economic, political, and practical restraints hinder
enforcement by governmental agencies.: °
Ford Motor Company also claimed in Wangen that compen-
satory damages alone were sufficient to achieve an appropriate
level of deterrence .50 The court, however, rejected Ford's con-
tention, observing, "Some may think it cheaper to pay damages
or a forfeiture than to change a business practice." 02 Wangen
expressly relied on Funk v. H.S. Kerbaugh, Inc. °503 for this
proposition.: 4 In Funk, the defendant, while engaged in con-
struction work for a railroad, carried out blasting operations in
such a way as to damage buildings belonging to the plaintiff
"because it was cheaper to pay damages ... than do the work
in a different way. ' 505 The Funk court imposed punitive damages
on the defendant to discourage such thinking in the future.
Apparently, the court felt that the defendant should not be
allowed to invade the plaintiff's interest even if willing to pay
damagesY 6
With Funk in mind, the Wangen court declared, "The pos-
sibility of the manufacturer paying out more than compensatory
damages might very well deter those who would consciously
engage in wrongful practices and who would set aside a certain
amount of money to compensate the injured consumer."5 7 Wan-
" Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d at 451.
I d.
. Comment, supra note 33, at 783.
294 N.W.2d at 451. For other cases in which the defendant company argues
that compensatory damages are an adequate deterrent, see 378 F.2d at 841; Gryc v.
Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d at 741. See also Coccia & Morrissey, supra note
45, at 50.
294 N.W.2d at 451.
70 A. 953, 954 (Pa. 1908).
294 N.W.2d at 451.
70 A. at 954.
" The interest invaded might be classified in Calabresian terms as one protected
by a property rule. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
'11 294 N.W. 2d at 451.
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gen's reliance on the blastihg case analogy raises two distinct
issues. The first issue is whether compensatory damages are
sufficient to achieve the goals of products liability law. The
second issue is whether punitive damages are a suitable mechan-
ism for accomplishing these goals.
3. Compensatory Damages and Deterrence
It is assumed that compensatory damages are normally suf-
ficient to promote efficient levels of deterrence. °0 Accordingly,
deterrence goals justify imposing punitive damages only where
compensatory damages alone result in less than optimal deter-
rence.509 A number of courts and commentators have concluded,
however, that compensatory damages do not sufficiently dis-
courage product manufacturers from engaging in undesirable
conduct. 10
. Ellis, supra note 37, at 9.
Id. Market deterrence uses the free market to determine an appropriate level of
safety or accident cost avoidance, based on what consumers are willing to pay. See
generally G. CA.ABREsi, supra note 486, at 68-94. The ultimate goal of market deterrence
is not to achieve the maximum degree of safety that is technologically possible, but
rather to establish an "optimum" balance between safety costs and accident costs. The
concept of economic efficiency determines this optimum balance.
Efficiency is achieved when economic resources are exploited to maximize human
satisfaction, as measured by consumer willingness to pay. See R. POSNER, ECONO!MC
ANALYsIs OF LAv 4 (1972). See also McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implica-
tions, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 3, 24-42 (1970); Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119-36 (1979). If market transactions are used to achieve
an efficient allocation of economic resources, however, the prices of goods must reflect
their true costs, including the social costs of injuries. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 502 (1961). As Professor Calabresi
points out: "Failure to include accident costs in the prices of activities will, according
to the theory, cause people to choose more accident prone activities than they would if
the prices of these activities made them pay for these accident costs, resulting in more
accident costs than we want." 0. CA.ABRESI, supra note 486, at 70. Consequently, the
costs of injuries should be placed on the party that is more likely to cause this cost to
be reflected in the price of the product. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 505 (1961). In the case of products, the
manufacturer usually is considered the party upon whom this liability should be placed.
Strict liability in tort accomplishes this objective.
110 See, e.g., Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d at 836-37; Campus Sweater &
Sportswear v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. at 107; Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382; Robinson & Kane, supra note 15, at 142; Comment, supra
note 33, at 782-83.
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According to these observers, compensatory damage awards
do not provide sufficient deterrence because the aggregate amount
of compensatory damages assessed against a manufacturer does
not always reflect the full cost to society of the injuries caused
by defective products. For example, some victims might not sue
because they were unwilling to undergo the emotional and fi-
nancial stress of a lawsuit.51 ' Other victims might not recover
because they are unable to meet their burden of proof or because
the manufacturer can successfully raise affirmative defenses.1
12
Finally, under the existing liability rules, many of the social costs
which fall on third parties are not compensable.5 11
Of course, deterrence does not necessarily require that all
harm caused by the marketing of defective products be compen-
sated. Presumably, a product manufacturer will be deterred from
engaging in a particular course of conduct when the cost of
paying damage claims exceeds the benefits of that conduct. Thus,
for example, a product manufacturer whose conduct generates
$1,000 in benefits, will discontinue that conduct when the lia-
bility costs to it reach $1,000, regardless of whether the actual
detriment to others is $1,000 or $10,000. Nevertheless, the less
compensatory damages reflect the full social cost of an activity,
the less they are likely to deter undesirable conduct.
4. Punitive Damages and Deterrence Goals
Assuming that compensatory damages do not adequately
force product manufacturers to internalize the cost of consumer
injuries caused by defective products, can punitive damages be
used as a supplement to compensatory awards to achieve an
optimal level of deterrence? In the author's opinion, punitive
damages are inappropriate for this purpose for several reasons.
First, if compensatory damage rules fail to provide full com-
pensation to accident victims and thereby frustrate deterrence
goals, the better response should be to reform compensatory
damage principles directly instead of trying to remedy deficien-
See 717 F.2d at 837; Robinson & Kane, supra note 15, at 142.
2 See 717 F.2d at 837.
" See id.; Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 103,
113 (1982-83).
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cies through the use of punitive damages.1 4 For example, courts
could allow successful plaintiffs to recover their attorneys' fees
in product liability actions. As to the underdeterrence that occurs
because some victims either do not sue or are unable to prevail
at trial, the solution might lie in relaxing some of the barriers
that create proof problems for victims in product injury cases.1 5
The second objection to using punitive damages as a surro-
gate for compensatory damages is that the focus of punitive
damages is too narrow. As pointed out in the discussion of the
liability formula, exemplary damages have not, and should not,
be awarded in every instance where the product manufacturer
puts a defective product on the market. 16 Rather, courts should
reserve this sanction for conduct that is highly culpable. The
court in Palmer noted this distinction:
Most manufacturers, both from a desire to avoid liability and
from a generalized sense of social responsibility, use their
resources to prevent the marketing of hazardous products. To
remedy the injuries resulting when a defective product is never-
theless marketed, section 402A imposes liability on the manu-
facturer without regard to fault. The principles of strict liability,
however, are ill equipped to deal with problems at the other
end of the culpability scale, that is, when an injury results
from the marketing of a product in flagrant disregard of
consumer safety .... A legal tool calculated "to expose this
type of gross misconduct, punish those manufacturers [engag-
ing in] such flagrant misbehavior, and deter all manufacturers
from acting with similar disregard for the public welfare" is
therefore needed to fill this legal void .... The remedy of
punitive damages is tailor-made to fill this need.
5 17
The Palmer court's remarks were meant to show that punitive
damages complemented compensatory damages in promoting the
1,4 See Schwartz, supra note 37, at 139-40.
"I For example, the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,
573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978), shifted the burden of proof on the issue of defect from
the plaintiff to the defendant. According to the court, once the plaintiff makes a prima
facie showing that the product's design proximately caused the injury, the burden shifts
to the defendant manufacturer to prove, in light of the relevant risk-utility criteria, that
the product was not defective. Id.
516 See Owen, supra note 33, at 1367.
"I Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d at 218 (quoting Owen, supra note 33, at
1259-60).
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goals of products liability law, but the court implicitly acknowl-
edged that punitive damages, with their emphasis on culpable
conduct, could not act as an all-purpose substitute for compen-
satory damages. It is essential to keep this point in mind. To
the extent that punitive damages serve any deterrent purpose,
they should be limited to deterring the narrow categories of culpable
conduct for which quasi-penal sanctions are considered appro-
priate.
Another difficulty with punitive damages is that they are
designed to promote retribution and other purposes as well as
deterrence. While these goals are not necessarily inconsistent
518
they do not always complement each other. Consequently, rules
directed toward retributive or other objectives sometimes under-
mine the potential deterrent effect of punitive damages. The
rules relating to liability and assessment of damages illustrate
this problem.
For example, the deterrent effect of punitive sanctions de-
creases when some wrongdoers are not subject to liability. Yet
this occurs in many states when the victim dies as the result of
the defendant's culpable conduct. 1 9 Currently, thirty-one states
do not permit recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death
actions.52 0 The rationale for this curious rule is that wrongful
death statutes are solely intended to compensate the next of kin
for economic loss suffered as the result of the victim's death.
52 1
In effect, the compensatory objectives of wrongful death legis-
lation are deemed to outweigh the deterrent purposes of punitive
damages. Consequently, product manufacturers who kill people
are not deterred by punitive damages.
The situation is somewhat similar where the defendant man-
ufacturer's misconduct causes property damage, but no physical
"I See, e.g., Note, Punitive Damages, the Common Question Class Action, and
the Concept of Overkill, 13 PAC. L.J. 1273, 1279 (1982).
"I See Schwartz, supra note 37, at 142-43.
510 See Note, Constitutional Law-Wrongful Death, 8 Cum. L. REv. 567, 574
(1978).
'n, See, e.g., id. at 575-76. But see ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (1975) (wrongful death
statute allows only punitive damages to be recovered). See also Eich v. Town of Gulf
Shores, 300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1973).
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injury. At least some courts refuse to allow punitive damages to
be imposed in such cases. s2
Punitive damages, for example, were denied in Eisert v.
Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co.52 The defendant in Eisert
sold flammable insulation material and paint, which the defend-
ant claimed was "self-extinguishing" and "fire retardant," to a
school district. The material allowed a fire originating in a school
automobile body shop to spread, killing several students and
causing property damage to the building.524 After suit was filed,
the school district sought to amend its complaint to add a claim
for punitive damages5 2s but the trial court denied the motion.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court declared that the
property interest involved was not sufficient to justify the exten-
sion of punitive damages into strict liability actions of this sort.
26
The court's conclusion is difficult to justify, at least in terms
of deterrence: If the defendant's conduct poses a sufficient threat
to human safety to justify deterrent measures, why should the
sanction be withheld simply because a particular type of harm
did not occur? In any event, the deterrent of punitive damages
is considerably weakened because some courts will not allow
them to be imposed in situations where the product manufac-
turer's culpable conduct caused one type of harm (property
damages) instead of another (personal injury).
The standards for determining the size of punitive damage
awards are also inconsistent with deterrence objectives. 27 Ac-
cording to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, when a jury
assesses punitive damages it may consider: (1) the character of
22 Of the small number of courts that have addressed this issue, one upheld an
award of punitive damages. Art Hill Ford, Inc. v. Callender, 423 N.E.2d 601 (Ind.
1981) (repeated failure to repair defective automobile). Another court allowed assessment
of punitive damages but reduced the size of the award because the product did not
subject the consumer to a risk of physical harm. In Slough v. J.I. Case Co., 650 P.2d
729 (Kan. 1982), the defendant knowingly marketed a trencher with a defective axle and
failed to inform dealers or customers of the problem. A punitive award of $350,000 was
reduced to $150,000.
-2 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 1982).
5124 Id. at 227.
121 Id. at 228. (The state wrongful death act prohibited the beneficiaries of the
students who were killed by the fire from recovering punitive damages.).
1 Id. at 229.
12 See Schwartz, supra note 37, at 140-41.
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the defendant's act, (2) the nature and extent of the harm the
defendant caused, or intended to cause, to the plaintiff, and (3)
the wealth of the defendant . 28 However, none of these elements
is clearly relevant to the achievement of an appropriate level of
deterrence.
The first consideration-the character of the defendant's
act-relates to motivation or state of mind, and is more relevant
to retribution than to deterrence. Under the theory of desert,
the character of the defendant's act is significant because the
more culpable his behavior, the more punishment he deserves.
As mentioned earlier, the only state of mind existing in products
liability cases is a fictitious state of mind imputed to the cor-
poration.
The second element, the nature and extent of harm, is more
germane to deterrence goals. However, the courts do not treat
this factor consistently in design defect cases. Some courts state
that the jury should consider the harm suffered by the individual
plaintiff only and not any additional harm suffered by other
members of the public. Other courts have allowed the jury to
take into account not only the harm suffered by the individual
plaintiff, but also the injury actually or potentially incurred by
the general public .
29
Thus, the federal district court in Hoffman v. Sterling Drug,
Inc.530 excluded evidence of injuries to other persons from the
defective product, the drug Aralen.5 31 The court also ruled that
the plaintiff could not ask the jury to punish the defendant for
injuries caused to other Aralen users. The court declared:
Applying the plaintiff's rationale, each injured consumer of
Aralen, using identical evidence regarding testing, notice, etc.,
could individually recover on behalf of "society" to punish
"I' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). See also Note, supra note 8, at
443.
' See, e.g., 174 Cal. Rptr. at 388 ("Unlike malicious conduct directed toward a
specific individual, Ford's tortious conduct endangered the lives of thousands of Pinto
purchasers."); 297 N.W.2d at 741 ("The evidence shows that Riegel created a substantial
danger to the public by marketing its highly flammable cotton flannelette."). See also
Putz & Astiz, supra note 36, at 13; Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming
Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. Rav. 269, 287-88 (1983).
374 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
"' Id. at 857.
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the affront. Such a result would be ludicrous. Instead, we view
the law to be that each Aralen consumer showing a bona fide
injury may, if the evidence warrants, collect his reasonable
proportion of punitive damages the defendant owes to "soci-
ety. ''532
This approach, if literally applied, would result in undeterrence
unless each member of society injured by the manufacturer's
misconduct actually brought suit and recovered his or her pro
rata amount of punitive damages.
The opposing view is illustrated by cases like Grimshaw and
Gryc where the court allowed the jury to consider potential
injuries to others in assessing the punitive award. 533 This ap-
proach, however, leads to overdeterrence where numerous suits
arise out of the same course of conduct. This is because each
plaintiff will claim damages not only for himself, but also for
other members of the public, including potential litigants. Thus,
injury to the public will be assessed against the manufacturer
not once, but many times.
A third factor to be considered in calculating punitive dam-
ages is the wealth of the defendant. Once again, this consider-
ation, if it is relevant to anything, is more appropriate to the
goal of retribution than to the achievement of deterrence. If one
subscribes to the diminishing utility theory of money, 34 it is
arguable that, to achieve a uniform degree of punishment, the
size of the penalty assessed should vary according to the wealth
of the wrongdoer. This principle, however, does not carry over
to deterrence, particularly where the wrongful conduct is eco-
nomically motivated. 535 Thus, a $1000 penalty should deter some-
,32 Id. See also Owen, supra note 42, at 51 n.243. But see Seltzer, supra note 395,
at 58. Professor Seltzer contends that a jury cannot properly award a proportionate
share of the appropriate total of punitive damages deserved by the defendant before
first determining what the aggregate awards to all injured persons should be. Id.
131 See note 529 supra and accompanying text.
534 For a discussion of this theory, see G. CALABP si, supra note 486, at 39-40. See
also Blum & Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. Cm. L. Ray.
417, 455-57 (1952).
"' See Schwartz, supra note 37, at 140. Professor Schwartz points out that, if the
diminishing utility of money reduces the real cost of punishment for a wealthy person,
then it also reduces the cost of complying with the required legal norm to avoid liability.
Id.
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one from committing a wrongful act that will gain him less
than $1000 (assuming a 100 percent chance of getting caught),
whether the wrongdoer is rich or poor. 3 6
Finally, some states also require that the size of the pu-
nitive damage award bear a reasonable relation to the amount
of compensatory damages allowed.5 37 But, as a number of
commentators have noted, there is no obvious correlation be-
tween the optimum penalty required for deterrence and some
multiple of the actual damages suffered by a particular plain-
tiff. 38 Consequently, this rule does nothing to promote deter-
rence goals.
5. Punitive Damages as a Deterrent
to Manufacturer Misconduct
Despite the problems discussed above, there is still consid-
erable support for the proposition that punitive damages can be
an effective deterrent against certain flagrant forms of product
manufacturer misbehavior.5 39 Perhaps this is true, but a number
of conditions must be met before punitive damages can operate
as a deterrent in even this limited sense. First, the potential
wrongdoer must know what sort of conduct is prohibited and what
the potential penalty for violation will be. 4" Second, the economic
effect of the sanction must fall on the potential wrongdoer or on
"1 Cf. Ellis, supra note 37, at 32-33. An exception is where the emotional satisfac-
tion gained by the defendant from his wrongful act exceeds the detriment imposed upon
him by society. Business entities such as product manufacturers are not likely to be
motivated by such noneconomic factors, however.
"I' See, e.g., Schroeder v. Auto Driveway Co., 523 P.2d 662, 672 (Cal. 1974);
Adair v. Huffman, 195 S.E.2d 739, 743-44 (W. Va. 1973); Comment, Punitive Damages
and the Reasonable Relation Rule: A Study in Frustration of Purpose, 9 PAc. L.J. 823,
832 (1978).
" See Ellis, supra note 37, at 59-60; Comment, supra. note 241, at 649-50.
S See, e.g., 594 P.2d at 47; 297 N.W.2d at 741; Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus.,
661 P.2d 515, 517-18; Ingoe, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases Should be
Allowed, 22 T mL LAWv. GurDE 24, 29 (1978); Note, Allowance of Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. REv. 613, 625-26 (1972); Note, In Defense of
Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 303, 328 (1980).
- Punitive damages are often attacked as being violative of constitutional due
process because juries have only a vague standard by which to determine liability. See,
e.g., 594 P.2d at 47 (punitive damages not void for vagueness). See generally J. GmHUWi
& J. KmcHER, supra note 21, at § 6.06.
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someone who can control the wrongdoer.5 ' Finally, the target of
these punitive measures must be able to alter its conduct.1
42
The first condition, knowledge of the prohibited conduct,
relates to the clarity of the liability standard, an issue discussed
earlier in connection with the retribution rationale. Just as it is
unfair to punish a product manufacturer who has not been given
clear notice of the proscribed conduct, so it is pointless from
the standpoint of deterrence to impose a detriment without first
indicating what conduct the sanction is supposed to discour-
age. 43 As concluded in the previous discussion, the various
liability formulas provide little guidance except in the case of ob-
vious wrongdoing. In addition, the manufacturer has no way of
calculating the cumulative amount of punitive damages that will
be assessed against it if it engages in proscribed conduct.
44
The second condition, effective economic sanction of the
wrongdoer, also presents difficulties. To accomplish its purpose,
any detriment, whether imposed as a punishment or as a deter-
rent, must ultimately affect the potential wrongdoer. Thus, pu-
"I See notes 266-83 supra and accompanying text. See generally J. GmHaDI & J. InR-
CHER, supra note 21, at § 6.10; Owen, supra note 33, at 1300-01.
' Owen, supra note 33, at 1283.
See, e.g., 661 P.2d at 517.
4"4 See notes 373454 supra and accompanying text. The theory of deterrence
assumes that a potential wrongdoer will weigh the benefits and costs that may result
from his actions. This is particularly true where the potential wrongdoer is a business
enterprise motivated primarily by economic considerations. Consequently, to achieve
deterrence it is useful, if not essential, that the wrongdoer know in advance the size of
any punitive damage award that may be assessed against him. Wheeler, supra note 529,
at 306. However, the vagueness of the rules governing assessment of damages, coupled
with the broad scope of jury discretion in applying these rules, makes it extremely
difficult for product manufacturers to estimate their potential punitive damage liability.
This uncertainty casts considerable doubt on the deterrent value of punitive damages.
Schwartz, supra note 37, at 141. Not everyone agrees, however, that uncertainty as to
the extent of punitive damage liability undermines the deterrent effect of punitive awards.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co. declared that this type of
uncertainty actually enhanced the deterrent effect of punitive damages. The court de-
clared:
Indeed, one virtue of Colorado's statutory remedy of punitive damages is
that, from a deterrent standpoint, the precise magnitude of cost of the
offending party is impossible to project. This uncertainty of cost will
undoubtedly affect a manufacturer's decision to introduce a product in the
marketplace. If punitive damages are predictably certain, they become just
another item in the cost of doing business, much like other product costs,
and thereby induce a reluctance on the part of the manufacturer to sacrifice
profit by removing a correctible defect.
684 P.2d at 218.
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nitive damages will have little deterrent effect if the product
manufacturer is able to pass on the cost of such awards1 45 or
the cost of insuring against them, to the public in the form of
higher prices.54 As the Wangen court observed, a product man-
ufacturer's ability to treat punitive damages as a cost of doing
business depends on its market situation. 47 Obviously many
manufacturers will not be able to shift these costs onto the
public. Some manufacturers, however, by virtue of their com-
petitive positions, can raise prices without losing business. 48 In
addition, as one commentator pointed out, the practice of mul-
tiple business ownership within parent companies sometimes en-
ables costs to be spread among unrelated corporate divisions.1
49
Even when the product manufacturer is unable to shift the
cost of punitive damage awards onto consumers, the ultimate
effect of punitive sanctions falls on the company's sharehold-
ers. 550 Since shareholders are not guilty of any misconduct, the
only justification for imposing a detriment on shareholders is
their supposed ability to influence the behavior of the actual
wrongdoers. 5 ' Proponents of punitive damages claim that share-
holders, particularly institutional shareholders, "will not idly
endure what amounts to corporate mismanagement. ' 5 2 Share-
holder control over corporate management is likely to vary con-
5'" See Haskell, supra note 21, at 612. In addition, shifting losses from punitive
damage awards from the manufacturer to consumers would result in a misallocation of
resources if the total amount of these awards exceeded the cost to society of the risk
caused by the manufacturer's conduct. See Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 553 F.
Supp. at 484.
" See Ghiardi & Koehn, supra note 256, at 251; Comment, supra note 45, at 371-
72.
',' See 294 N.W.2d at 452. See also Ghiardi & Kircher, supra note 34, at 37-40;
Comment, supra note 33, at 783-84.
11 See generally J. GmLni & J. KmcHER, supra note 21, at § 6.12; Owen, supra note
33, at 1292-94; Comment, supra note 22, at 907. Note, The Dubious Extension of
Punitive Damage Recovery in Pennsylvania Products Liability Law, 23 DUQ. L. REv.
681, 697 (1985).
" See Ghiardi & Kircher, supra note 34, at 27.
"' See 294 N.W.2d at 453-54; Note, supra note 266, at 1306-08.
"' See 294 N.W.2d at 453-54 ("There is a public interest to encourage shareholders
and corporate management to exercise closer control over the operation of the entity,
and the imposition of punitive damages may serve this interest.").
"2 See Parlee, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages: Suggested Change in the
Law Through Policy Analysis, 68 MARQ. L. Rav. 27, 51 (1984); Robinson & Kane,
supra note 15, at 143.
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siderably from company to company, however, and in many
cases will be insufficient to affect daily management decisions.
Thus, imposing punitive damages on product manufacturers will
often be nothing more than a futile gesture." 3
The third condition for deterrence is that the product man-
ufacturer be capable of altering its conduct to avoid imposition
of punitive damages. Assuming that, due to pressure from share-
holders, upper level corporate management desires to avoid sub-
jecting the company to punitive damage liability, can management
respond in an effective way? Product development and market-
ing decisions frequently are made in a splintered, decentralized
manner involving contributions from persons at all levels of
management.5 1 4 Arguably, this diffusion of decision making re-
sponsibility within the corporation makes it difficult for a prod-
uct manufacturer to alter its conduct.
This is not to say that nothing can be done about the
corporate decision making process. For example, management
could learn all of a particular decision's ramifications by includ-
ing specialists from each discipline in high-level decision mak-
ing.55 5 Management could also discourage a "profit-at-all-cost"
mentality on the part of its employees. In addition, the company
should provide channels for receiving and analyzing reports of
injuries and field failures of its products. Finally, management
should be prepared to take immediate corrective action when
the occurrence of injuries becomes apparent.5 6 Nevertheless, the
ability of product manufacturers to respond to legal sanctions
in this way is likely to vary according to the size of the company
and the character of its management structure.
6. The Social Costs of Punitive Damages
Even assuming that punitive damages have some deterrent
effect on product manufacturers, one must consider whether the
" But see Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 427 (1974).
See Owen, supra note 42, at 15; Owen, supra note 33, at 1306.
" See Note, supra note 8, at 452-53.
55 See id.; Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081, 1098 (N.D. Ohio
1975), aff'd, 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978); Owen, supra note 33, at 1316. See also text
accompanying notes 366-69 supra.
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social gains realized from deterring unwanted conduct outweigh
the social costs necessary to achieve them.5 7 If punitive damages
are not "cost effective" as a deterrent, then one cannot rely on
deterrence as a rationale for utilizing punitive damages in the
products liability area.
Perhaps the most significant social cost of punitive damages
comes from overdeterrence. As stated earlier,-5  overdeterrence
is undesirable, particularly when it discourages legitimate, eco-
nomically productive conduct. Although some assert that over-
deterrence does not occur when punitive damages are imposed
on product manufacturers,5 9 given the present structure of the
punitive damages regime, some overdeterrence is inevitable. The
real issue, therefore, is whether the prospect of overdeterrence
is substantial enough to militate against the use of punitive
damages for deterrence in the products liability area.
One aspect of the overdeterrence problem is the imposition
of a greater detriment than is necessary to discourage unwanted
behavior. As discussed earlier, the rules that govern the assess-
ment of punitive damages are not particularly oriented toward
deterrence goals.56 Obviously, plaintiffs and their attorneys have
no incentive to limit deterrence to an optimal amount; their
main concern is to obtain the highest award possibles.61 More-
over, the vagueness of the criteria for determining the size of
punitive damage awards, coupled with the lack of effective ju-
dicial control, encourages juries to act out of passion or preju-
dice. 62 This makes it unlikely that jury verdicts will consistently
promote deterrence goals. Finally, the assessment of punitive
damages in numerous individual suits results in aggregate liability
that is excessive in terms of deterrence objectives.
The imposition of excessive liability creates its own social
costs, particularly if product manufacturers are seriously harmed
by multiple punitive damage awards. In the earlier consideration
of the overkill problem as an aspect of disproportionate punish-
' See Ellis, supra note 37, at 8-9.
. See text accompanying note 494 supra.
. See Note, supra note 15, at 340-41.
*, See text accompanying notes 514-38 supra.
;' See Wheeler, supra note 373, at 307.
". See Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages be Abolished?-A Statement for the
Affirmative, 1965 ABA SECTION OF INs., NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW 282, 287.
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ment1 63 it was concluded that punitive damage assessments would
financially ruin some companies. As pointed out, shareholders
would not be the only parties to suffer if a product manufacturer
were forced into bankruptcy. 64 The bankruptcy would also harm
creditors, employees, and suppliers . 65 In addition, future acci-
dent victims might be deprived of a chance to recover for their
injuries, 56 and the loss of competition could harm the public.567
Overdeterrence also occurs when product manufacturers are
discouraged from engaging in legitimate conduct. Cost-benefit
analysis, a process essential to product design5 63 is one such
activity. Arguably, the imposition of punitive damages on prod-
uct manufacturers inhibits certain types of cost-benefit decisions
and thereby undermines the accident cost reduction function of
products liability law.
Accident cost reduction is one of the principal reasons for
imposing strict liability on product manufacturers . 69 As early as
563 See text accompanying notes 380-82 supra.
'6 See text accompanying notes 280-83 supra.
16 See Coffee, supra note 280, at 401; DuBois, supra note 38, at 349.
5 See Long, supra note 24, at 887; Comment, supra note 7, at 677-78.
167 See Note, supra note 4, at 68-69.
' See Owen, supra note 42, at 24.
16 See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 1982);
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 406 A.2d 140, 151-52 (N.J. 1979). Accident
cost avoidance, however, is not the only rationale for strict products liability. Risk
distribution, for example, is another important goal. As the New Jersey Supreme Court
declared, "[S]preading the costs of injuries among all those who produce, distribute and
purchase manufactured products is far preferable to imposing it on innocent victims
who suffer illness and disability from defective products. This basic normative premise
is at the center of our strict liability rules." 447 A.2d at 547. See also Ray v. Alad
Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8 (Cal. 1977); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722, 726 (Cal. 1970);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962); Calabresi, supra note
509, at 517-27; Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of
Risks, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1329, 1333 (1966). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
comment c (1977).
Some courts and commentators have espoused a representational theory of liability.
Under this approach, strict liability in tort is justified because manufacturers possess
superior knowledge and skill, induce consumer reliance on their judgment through
advertising, and expressly or impliedly represent their products to be safe. See Phipps
v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976); Greenfield, Consumer Protection
in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L.
REv. 661, 688; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1123 (1960); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer
Protection: Doctrine, Function, and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA.
[VOL. 74
1985-861 PuNITrvE DAAmAos IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
1944, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court declared
that "public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever
it will effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent
in defective products that reach the market. ' -5 70 Without such
liability, only competitive forces and state regulation would re-
strain product manufacturers as to the level of risk they imposed
on consumers.17' Strict liability, however, by forcing manufac-
turers to internaliz& the costs of product injuries, creates an
economic incentive on the part of manufacturers to discover and
reduce the risks associated with their products when it is reason-
able to do so.572
This does not mean that product manufacturers are expected
to prevent consumer injuries at any cost; rather manufacturers
are encouraged to achieve that degree of product safety that is
economically efficient. In the words of Professor Calabresi:
A manufacturer is free to employ a process even if it occa-
sionally kills or maims if he is able to show that consumers
want his product badly enough to enable him to compensate
those he injures and still make a profit. Economists would say
that except in those few areas of collective decision, this is the
best way to decide if the activity is worth having.1
73
L. REV. 1111 (1974).
Finally, strict liability is sometimes justified as a means of enabling injured con-
sumers to overcome the procedural and practical difficulties of proving negligence on
the part of the product manufacturer or seller. See Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 467
P.2d 256, 262 (Ariz. App. 1970); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d at 455;
Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391 (Wis. 1977); James, Products Liability, 34 TEx.
L. REv. 44, 68-77 (1955); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer) 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114-17 (1960); Powers, Distinguishing Between Products
and Services in Strict Liability, 62 N.C.L. REV. 415, 425-27 (1983-84).
- Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944). See also
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (N.J. 1960) (The court declared:
"In that way the burden of losses consequent upon the use of defective articles is borne
by those who are in a position to either control the danger or make an equitable
distribution of the losses when they do occur.").
"' Cowen, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1091
(1965).
"I Strict liability also creates a market for cost saving substitutes. G. CALABRESI,
supra note 486, at 75.
-" Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARv. L. REv. 713, 717-18 (1965). Another commentator has stated: "Where
compensatory damages are the standard remedy for breach of legal duty, the effect of
liability is not to compel compliance with law but to compel the violator to pay a price
equal to the opportunity costs of the violation." R. POSNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF
LAW 320 (1972).
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The formulas used to determine whether a product is defective
or unreasonably dangerous reflect the economic orientation of
products liability law. Each test relies, at least to some degree,
on cost-benefit principles.5 74 Safety is important, but the manu-
174 Comment, The Impact of Current Production Management Techniques on the
Design-Production Distinction in the Law of Products Liability, 50 TENN. L. Rav. 515,
531 (1983). The three generally accepted tests for evaluating product design are the
consumer expectation test, the prudent manufacturer test, and the risk-benefit or risk-
utility test.
The consumer expectation test, embodied in § 402A of the REsTATEmENT (SEcoND)
oF ToRTs, but ultimately derived from warranty law, characterizes a product as "unrea-
sonably dangerous" if it reaches the public in a condition that is more dangerous than
that contemplated by the ordinary consumer. See, e.g., Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 242
S.E.2d 671, 680 (S.C. 1978); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool
Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 798-99 (Wis. 1975). See also Dickerson, Products Liability: How
Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301, 305-18 (1967); Fischer, Products
Liabity-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 348-52 (1974). Because the
ordinary consumer expects a product to have some risks, some courts, utilizing this
formula, require the jury to balance the product's risks and benefits. E.g., Aller v.
Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834 (Iowa 1978); Estate of Ryder v. Kelly-
Springfield Tire Co., 587 P.2d 160, 163-64 (Wash. 1978). A few courts, however, apply
a purely subjective test based on what the plaintiff actually expected the product to be
like. See, e.g., Garrett v. Nissen Corp., 498 P.2d 1359, 1364 (N.M. 1972); 242 S.E.2d
at 680. See also Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Products Liability
Theory, 34 HAsTINGs L.J. 529, 535 (1983).
Under the prudent manufacturer rule, a product is considered defective if a rea-
sonably prudent manufacturer, aware of the product's harmful character, would not
have put the product into the stream of commerce. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Union
Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Ky. 1980); Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering
Co., 386 A.2d 816, 821 (N.J. 1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d 1033,
1037 (Or. 1974); Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence
[to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VANi). L. REv. 593, 618-31 (1980);
Note, Reasonable Product Safety: Giving Content to the Defectiveness Standard in
California Strict Products Liability Cases, 10 U.S.F.L. REv. 492, 518-19 (1976). The
only difference between the prudent manufacturer rule and the concept of reasonable
care, which emphasizes an optimal level of risk, is that the former rule imputes knowledge
of the risk to the manufacturer.
The risk-utility test explicitly balances the risk of harm against the utility, or social
benefit, of the product. This usually involves a comparison between the product, as
designed, and some type of alternative design proposed by the plaintiff. See, e.g., 573
P.2d at 455 (alternative standard); Thibault v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846
(N.H. 1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979). See
also Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 37-
38 (1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-
38 (1973). Most jurisdictions that apply this standard, however, do not expressly instruct
juries to balance risk against utility. Rather, the trial judge more often uses the test to
decide whether the plaintiff's case is sufficient to go to the jury. See Note, Strict
Products Liability and the Risk-Utility Test for Design Defect: An Economic Analysis,
84 COLUM. L. REv. 2045, 2050 (1984).
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facturer must also consider elements such as marketability, ap-
pearance, ease of operation, durability, freedom from
maintenance or repair, ease of manufacture, and economics of
materials and labor.
75
Strict liability, therefore, is intended to induce the product
manufacturer to make a cost-benefit analysis between accident
costs (deaths and injuries to consumers) and accident reduction
costs (more safety features or better quality control) and to act
on that decision after it is made.5 76 However, making this sort
of trade-off, where serious known risks are involved, can easily
give rise to liability for punitive damages even though the deci-
sion appears cost efficient when made. Unfortunately for prod-
uct manufacturers, juries have not accepted the concept of cost-
benefit analysis, at least where human life is concerned, with the
same enthusiasm as economists and legal scholars. 77 One com-
mentator described the manufacturer's dilemma:
As Professor Calabresi has suggested, the American public
harbors a deep-seated belief-nurtured, no doubt, by our Ju-
deo-Christian ethic-that life is of infinite or near infinite
value. To claim that the "value of life ... is reducible to a
money figure" works a serious "affront to [society's] values."
Now it may well be that authorities like Calabresi and the
California Supreme Court do not really believe that life is a
priceless pearl; but much of the public does so believe-or at
least professes that it so believes. So long as jurors are drawn-
as they must be-from the general population, it seems un-
17 See FINAL REPORT, NATIONAL COMW'N ON PRODUCT SAFETY 69-72 (1970). See
also Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability:
From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 347, 355-56 (1980). For a
discussion of how cost-benefit analysis is employed in corporate decision making, see F.
MOORE, MANUFACTURING MANAGEMENT 342 (5th ed. 1969); R. OLSEN, MANAGEMENT: A
QUANTITATIVE APPROACH 462 (1968).
M. Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1060-67 (1972).
'" A number of legal scholars have argued that too much emphasis is placed on
economic efficiency in discussions about products liability law, while significant none-
conomic considerations are not given sufficient attention. See generally Hubbard, Rea-
sonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for Imposing Strict Liability for
Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REV. 465 (1978); Hubbard, Efficiency, Expectation,
and Justice: A Jurisprudential Analysis of the Concept of Unreasonably Dangerous
Product Defect, 28 S.C.L. REv. 587 (1977).
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realistic to expect the jury to disregard this basic belief either
in determining liability or in ruling on punitive damages. With
appropriate rhetoric, a skillful plaintiff's lawyer can vivify and
dramatize, for the jury's benefit, the traditional public sense
of the sanctity of life. 7
Grimshaw reflects how conscious risk taking could result in the
imposition of punitive damages. A California intermediate ap-
pellate court in Grimshaw affirmed a $3.5 million punitive award
primarily because Ford Motor Co. "decided to defer correction
of the [Pinto's] shortcomings by engaging in cost-benefit analysis
balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profit.
'579
The evidence in Grimshaw revealed that when crash tests
first indicated that the Pinto's fuel system was vulnerable to
rear-end collisions, Ford had considered whether to proceed with
the original design of the Pinto or whether to correct the prob-
lem. 580 A study known as the Grush-Saunby Report estimated
that Ford could substantially reduce the fuel leakage hazard at
a cost of eleven dollars per vehicle.5 s' Since 11 million cars and
1.5 million light trucks were affected, the total cost of redesign-
ing fuel systems would have been $137 million .1 2 The study
undoubtedly was undertaken in good faith since it was part of
the routine cost calculation process and was not intended to be
made public.
The Grush-Saunby report also estimated the cost of retaining
the original design. 8 3 According to the study, 180 burn deaths
and 180 serious burn injuries could be expected, and 2100 ve-
hicles would be damaged if no corrective action were taken.-1
Significantly, fewer than 0.2 percent of the Ford automobiles
were expected to be involved in the type of accident in which
the fuel tank would explode in this manner. Moreover, the risk
of death or serious injury was even less-on the order of 0.001
"I See Schwartz, supra note 37, at 152 (footnotes omitted).
17 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
See id.
',' See id. at 376. The cost benefit figures are reproduced in Owen, supra note 42,
at 56 n.264.
112 See Owen, supra note 42, at 56 n.264.
53 See id.
-84 See id.
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percent. The study estimated the "unit cost" of these conse-
quences at $200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, and $700 per
vehicle for a total cost of $49.5 million."' While these dollar
estimates may seem absurdly low, they were based on the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration's own cost calcu-
lations for traffic injuries and fatalities . 6 If the Grush-Saunby
report represented an apparently accurate estimate of Ford's
potential liability, the company made what it thought was an
economically rational decision. It refused to spend $137 million
to prevent $49.5 million in accident costs. This is precisely the
type of analysis that strict liability principles encourage product
manufacturers to make.
In retrospect, of course, Ford made a tragically wrong de-
cision. Even if its prediction about the number of injuries was
accurate, the company's estimate of per accident cost was far
too low. If Ford had more realistically estimated the cost of
burn injuries and deaths, these "costs" would probably have
exceeded the $137 million break-even point. For this reason, the
Pinto was probably defective and Ford could properly have been
required to pay compensatory damages to those killed or injured.
In the absence of additional aggravating circumstances, however,
the design decision alone in Grimshaw should not have been
sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages.
Punitive damages should not be awarded merely because the
product manufacturer in cost-benefit analysis underestimates the
cost or incidence of known risks. A single product design often
involves hundreds of tradeoffs between cost, performance, and
safety.3 7 Even the proponents of punitive damages caution that
exemplary awards should not be imposed in "close calls" to
give manufacturers leeway for good faith mistakes.83  Otherwise,
manufacturers will overdesign their products, forcing the public
to pay for safety features that are not cost efficient.3 9
It is not necessarily suggested that manufacturers like Ford
Motor Co. should be free to subject consumers to the risk of
" See id.
See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, SOCIETAL COSTS OF MOTOR VEHICLE AccI-
DENTS: PRELIINARY REPORT 1-5 (1972).
' Nelson, supra note 12, at 385.
Owen, supra note 42, at 28.
See generally Wheeler, supra note 373, at 307-08.
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being burned to death when the hazard can be avoided at a
small per unit cost. Society does not always have to make
economically efficient choices; it is free to require a higher degree
of safety than the market will support. However, such decisions
must be made collectively (and prospectively) in the form of
legislative or administrative safety standards. 9° But once society
elects to have safety standards set by market forces, it must
accept the market's decision.
7. Evaluation of the Deterrence Rationale
However well punitive damages may deter individual wrong-
doers, they do not appear to operate effectively as a deterrent
in the products liability area. Some product manufacturers will
escape liability altogether by shifting it onto the public, while
other companies may be overdeterred. Moreover, the social cost
of achieving this suboptimal level of deterrence is likely to be
much higher than any corresponding social benefit. A more
efficient solution would be to identify undesirable activities and
proscribe them through direct governmental regulation. 91
III. PROPOSED REFORMS
Although the use of punitive damages in products liability
actions does not promote either retributive or utilitarian goals,
many courts will apparently continue to utilize this device. Con-
sequently, one should consider whether punitive damages can be
"I A collective standard may be imposed on product manufacturers for one of two
reasons. First, moral or other noneconomic issues may be involved that outweigh any
societal concern for efficiency. G. CAABRFsI, supra note 486, at 100. Thus, if society
believes that it is immoral to subject even a small number of drivers to the risk of death
or serious injury from exploding fuel tanks, it may require automobile manufacturers
to design fuel tanks that will not explode even if doing so is not cost efficient. Second,
collective decisions are often made where society believes that market mechanisms do
not function adequately as a means of inducing manufacturers to achieve an optimal
level of product safety. This is a problem when consumers are unable to determine the
true risk posed by a particular product. Schwartz, supra note 491, at 453. For example,
Consumer Reports magazine initially failed to discover the danger associated with the
Pinto's fuel tank. Sales of Pintos declined substantially, however, once the risk became
known. Schwartz, supra note 37, at 149. This confirms our conclusion that Ford Motor
Co. underestimated the "costs" of such accidents in its cost-benefit analysis.
"9, See Note, supra note 26, at 430; Comment, supra note 45, at 374.
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changed to conform more closely to the needs of products lia-
bility litigation. Any proposed changes, however, must ensure
fairness to the defendant at trial and must also promote an
acceptable level of deterrence.
A. Changes in Trial Procedure
Commentators have suggested a number of changes in trial
procedures to give greater protection to the defendant when
victims of defective products seek punitive damages. These in-
clude requiring a higher standard of proof, allowing bifurcation
of the trial, and requiring the judge, rather than the jury, to
determine the size of the punitive award.
1. Requiring a Higher Standard of Proof
Although exemplary damages cannot be justified solely in
terms of punitive or retributive goals, 592 the consequences of a
punitive award are somewhat like those of criminal sanctions. 93
In particular, like a criminal conviction, an award of punitive
damages can have a stigmatizing effect.5 94 For this reason, it is
necessary to ensure that only the guilty are stigmatized in this
manner. One means of preventing innocent persons or business en-
tities from being unjustly punished is to require the plaintiff to meet
a higher standard of proof to recover punitive damages."'
A higher standard of proof already is mandated in some
cases where stigmatization results, such as termination of paren-
-"' See notes 245-65 supra and accompanying text.
"I See Note, supra note 285, at 1161-73.
4 See In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1322 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
976 (1980). Courts have declared that punitive damages reflect the community's condem-
nation of "reprehensible conduct" and express "social condemnation and disapproval."
Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). Arguably, therefore, punitive damages, unlike
compensatory damages, stigmatize the defendant by impugning his good name in much
the same manner as a criminal conviction. See Wheeler, supra note 373, at 282-83. Other
commentators, however, have expressed doubts that punitive damages have any stig-
matizing effect on the defendant's reputation. See Comment, supra note 29, at 410-11.
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Wheeler, supra note 373, at 296-
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tal rights, 596 deportation, 597 and civil commitment proceedings. 93
A few states also have imposed a similar requirement in cases
where punitive damages are sought. For example, Colorado pres-
ently requires that punitive damages be established by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt,5 99 while a "clear and convincing"
standard has been adopted by the drafters of the Uniform Prod-
ucts Liability Act6°° and is required by statute in Oregon, 60
Minnesota6O2 and Montana.60 3 In addition, the "clear and con-
vincing" standard has been endorsed by a federal court of
appeals in Acosta v. Honda Motor Co. ,604 by the Maine Supreme
Court in Tuttle v. Raymond,65 and by the Wisconsin court in
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.606 The Wangen court declared:
The issue of whether the defendant acted maliciously or in
willful or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights, justifying
recovery of punitive damages, falls within the "certain classes
of acts" for which stigma attaches and is a more serious
allegation than the ordinary factual issue in a personal injury
action. Therefore, for all punitive damage claims we adopt the
middle standard for the burden of proof for the issue of
whether the defendant's conduct was "outrageous." 60 7
Of course, some wrongdoers go unpunished or undeterred if a
higher standard of proof is mandated. Just as in criminal pro-
ceedings, however, a higher standard of proof may be necessary
to ensure minimum standards of fair treatment for defendants."
See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
' See, e.g., Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (deportation); Chaunt v.
United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) (denaturalization); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 129, 133 (1958) (expatriation).
See, e.g., 441 U.S. at 431.
See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1973).
6w See UNIFORMA PRODUCTS LABIrTy ACT § 120(A), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg.
62,714 (1979).
101 See OR. REv. STAT. § 30.925(1) (1979).
60 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West Supp. 1981).
60 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1985).
717 F.2d 828, 839 (3d Cir. 1983).
-o 494 A.2d 1353, 1362 (Me. 1985) (clear and convincing standard applicable to all
types of punitive damage claims).
294 N.W.2d 437, 457-58 (Wis. 1980).
Id. at 458.
See Wheeler, supra note 373, at 311-13.
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2. Bifurcation of the Trial
Another procedural reform is to permit bifurcation of the
trial so that compensatory and punitive damages issues are con-
sidered separately. Bifurcation of punitive damages cases would
allow the jury to receive all relevant evidence relating to liability
for compensatory damages in the first trial; if the jury found in
favor of the plaintiff on this issue, evidence relating to punitive
damages issues could then be considered in a subsequent pro-
ceeding. 610 Bifurcation ensures that when a jury considers liability
and compensatory damages issues, it will not have heard poten-
tially inflammatory evidence that may be relevant only to the
question of punitive damages. Moreover, if a higher standard
of proof is required on the question of punitive damages, bifur-
cation reduces confusion when the jury is required to apply two
different evidentiary standards.6 '
Bifurcation already is allowed in the federal courts6 2 and in
many states6 3 under provisions that permit the trial judge to
order separate trials of claims or issues when necessary to avoid
confusion, prejudice, or delay.6 4 A California court recently
tried compensatory and punitive damages issues separately in a
products liability case and was upheld on appeal. 61 5 Of course,
there are disadvantages to the bifurcation technique. Bifurcation,
for example, may increase the complexity and expense of the
trial. 616 For this reason, it has been suggested that bifurcation
undermines the goals of deterrence by increasing the plaintiff's
litigation expenses and discouraging plaintiffs from pursuing
valid claims. 61 7 Nevertheless, this sort of tradeoff may be necessary
6 Wheeler, supra note 373, at 320-22. See generally J. GmARni & J. KiRcHER,
supra note 21, §§ 12.01-.13; Note, The Dubious Extension of Punitive Damage Recovery
in Pennsylvania Product Liability Law, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 681, 705 (1985).
I- See Fulton, supra note 443, at 129-30.
" See Wheeler, supra note 373, at 300-02.
612 See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) [hereinafter cited as FRCP].
6" See J. GHARDi & J. KicRHER, supra note 21, § 12.05, at 15.
See FRCP 42(b).
' Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 117, 129-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
See notes 165-71 supra and accompanying text.
116 See Ghiardi & Kircher, supra note 34, at 47-50.
"17 See Wheeler, supra note 373, at 321.
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to endow the punitive damages procedure vAth an acceptable degree
of fairness.
3. Judicial Assessment of the Punitive Damage Award
A more drastic solution is to require that the judge, rather
than the jury, determine the size of the punitive award. 68 This
procedure currently is employed by statute in Connecticut 619 and
also is advocated by the Uniform Products Liability Act.62 It
would parallel the practice in criminal cases where the trial judge
determines the sentence after conviction by the jury.621
Of course, reducing the jury's role in the adjudication of
punitive damages claims is a significant departure from tradition.
According to conventional wisdom, the jury is thought to func-
tion as the community's conscience, and its reaction of shock
and outrage to the defendant's conduct when punitive damages
are awarded is presumably an accurate reflection of societal
values. Likewise, when setting the amount of the award, the
jury determines the degree of punishment that the public feels
is necessary to deter the defendant and others like him from
repeating the offense. 622 However, the rough justice of the com-
munity may be less appropriate in products liability cases than
it is in cases involving individual wrongdoing. In the former
situation, judges may be more sensitive to the economic and
social dimensions of exemplary damages. 623 Also, judges are less
likely to be unduly persuaded by counsel or influenced by pas-
sion or prejudice.6
24
B. Limits on the Size of Individual Awards
Various proposals have also been made to control the size
of individual awards to prevent both disproportionate punish-
6 See DuBois, supra note 38, at 352-53; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 47, at 663-
66; Seltzer, supra note 395, at 60-61; Wheeler, supra note 373, at 302-03; Sales & Cole,
supra note 5, at 1167.
629 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240(b) (West Supp. 1982).
620 See UNIFORM PRODUCTS LuABILITY ACT § 120(b), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714
(1979).
622 See Note, Exemplary Damages, supra note 7, at 530; Note, supra note 285, at
1171.
62 See Borowsky, supra note 7, at 152-53.
621 See Wheeler, supra note 373, at 302.
624 See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 47, at 664.
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ment and overdeterrence. One suggestion is to require a fixed
ratio between compensatory and punitive damages. 625 Another is
to impose a fixed dollar limit on individual punitive awards.
626
The first proposal requires that exemplary damages bear
some reasonable relation to the size of the compensatory award.
Many courts and juries already may apply this theory, 627 at least
implicitly, since the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
in reported cases has seldom exceeded two to one. 628 In addition,
a number of courts have endorsed the general proposition that
a punitive damages award must reasonably relate to the size of
the compensatory damages award. 629 Unfortunately, no court
ever has provided a clear standard to determine the proper
proportion between compensatory and punitive damages. 630 One
solution, of course, is to adopt a specific formula. Connecticut,
for example, now limits punitive damages in products liability
cases to twice the plaintiff's actual damages. 63' However, any
rule that ties the amount of the punitive award to the size of
the compensatory award arguably will undermine the deterrent
effect of punitive damages.
632
A second proposal imposes a flat dollar limit on the size of
any punitive award. 63 This approach is mandated by statute in
a number of areas outside of the products liability context. 63 4 A
"I See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 52-2406 (West Supp. 1981) ("If the trier of
fact determines that punitive damages should be awarded, the court shall determine the
amount of such damages not to exceed an amount equal to twice the damages awarded
to the plaintiff.").
'1' See Note, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HASTNGS L.J. 1797,
1804-05 (1978-79).
',1 See, e.g., Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 243 (1980)
("reasonable relation"); Beggs v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 409 S.W.2d 719, 724
(Mo. 1966) ("must bear some relation"); Parker v. McGinnes, 594 S.W.2d 550, 552
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980) ("reasonably proportioned"). See generally Comment, supra note
375.
's See, e.g., cases cited supra note 43.
" See cases cited supra note 375.
See Belli, supra note 2, at 11-12; Riley, supra note 417, at 216, 224.
" See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240(b) (West Supp. 1981).
(32 See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 47, at 531, 666; Note, supra note 285, at
1170-71.
"I See Note, supra note 626, at 1804-05.
1 1 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 612 (West 1956) (fraudulent disposition of dece-
dent's property-double value of property); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 735 (West 1980)
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
House Resolution proposed in 198165 adopts this approach,
limiting recovery to the lesser of twice compensatory damages
or one million dollars. 6 6 A new Montana statute limits punitive
damages in most cases to $25,000 or one percent of the defend-
ant's net worth, whichever is greater. 637 Absolute dollar limits
on recovery arguably reduce the risk that the jury will impose
excessive punitive damages. Even if the award is influenced by
improper factors, the dollar limitation ensures that the award
will not exceed a predetermined amount. 6 8 In addition, the use
of a statutory maximum may enable potential defendants to
estimate more accurately the internalized costs of their contem-
plated actions, a result that promotes deterrence. At the same
time, however, the deterrent effect of punitive damages may be
undercut if the dollar limit on punitive awards is too low.
639
C. Measures to Limit Aggregate Liability
The underlying problem with the use of punitive damages to
achieve deterrence is that the deterrent effect is based on the
cumulative cost of wrongdoing to the manufacturer, but punitive
damages must be awarded on a case by case basis. Consequently,
it is necessary to provide a mechanism for limiting aggregate
liability if punitive damages are to provide any sort of deterrent
effect. One way to limit aggregate liability is to inform the jury
of past and potential liability faced by the defendant. A more
direct response is to limit the defendant's liability to a single
punitive damage award.
1. Informing the Jury of Other Awards
One solution is to inform the jury that other compensatory
or punitive awards have been rendered against the defendant
(forcible entry of a building-three times actual damage); CAL. PROB. CODE § 792 (West
1956) (fraudulent sale-double the value of land sold); CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 732
(West 1980) (waste of property-treble damages); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 733 (West
1980) (trespass-treble damages); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 735 (West 1982) (unlawful
entry-three times actual damages).
6-5 H.R. 5214, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
616 See Note, supra note 28, at 472.
"' See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1985).
633 See Wheeler, supra note 373, at 299.
-' See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981);
Note, supra note 626, at 1804-05; Note, supra note 4, at 74-75.
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and that the jury should take this into account in determining
an appropriate damage award.64 However, the full effect of the
defendant's misconduct might be unknown when the first few
claims are litigated.64' Moreover, evidence of prior punitive
damages awards may prejudice the manufacturer's case with
respect to the contested liability issues. In fact, evidence of past
misconduct might sufficiently enrage the jury that it would feel
the defendant deserved further punishment.
6 2
2. Limitation to a Single Punitive Damage Award
A superior approach would allow assessment of only one
punitive damage award against the defendant. In this way, an
appropriate amount, sufficient to achieve deterrence, could be
determined once and for all. This not only would promote
deterrence goals, but would also do away with the problem of
multiple punishment.643 Perhaps for these reasons, this proposal
has received judicial support.644
A variation on this idea is to allow awarding of punitive
damages until some aggregate figure is reached. Professor Owen
suggests an amount equal to "the lesser of either five million
dollars or five percent of a defendant's net worth, after which
punitive awards would be limited to an amount equal to attorneys'
fees and other litigation costs. ' 65 Under an alternative scheme,
later plaintiffs would recover only that amount of their judg-
ment greater than the highest amount awarded previously. 64 6 In
this way, the defendant's total punitive damages liability would
be only as great as the largest award thought proper by the most
vindictive jury.647
, See K. REDDEN, supra note 39, at § 4.8(a); Note, supra note 26, at 419-20. See
also notes 417-18 supra and accompanying text.
"I See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1967);
Note, supra note 4, at 69-70.
'A See Seltzer, supra note 395, 58-60.
1' See Tozer, supra note 47, at 304; Note, supra note 380, at 155. See also notes
420-23 supra and accompanying text.
- See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1970);
Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285-86 (2d Cir. 1969); State ex.
reL Young v. Crookham, 618 P.2d 1268, 1274 (Or. 1980).
14 See Owen, supra note 42, at 49 n.227. See also Riley, supra note 417, at 252.
- See Note, supra note 626, at 1800-01.
-7 See Note, supra note 28, at 475.
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Each of these proposals is subject to the same criticisms. All
of them encourage early trial requests by rewarding plaintiffs
who make it to trial earliest. 648 In addition, each proposal allows
a small number of plaintiffs to recover the largest judgments,
leaving subsequent claimants with lesser or no recoveries, merely
because early plaintiffs could finance the litigation.649 Perhaps
the early plaintiffs deserve to receive greater recoveries to offset
the proportionately greater expense they bear in proving the
initial punitive damages claim, or perhaps they are being recom-
pensed for the corresponding benefit they are rendering to later
plaintiffs by laying the ground work for subsequent claims.6 0
Nevertheless, it seems inequitable to limit punitive damage awards
to a lucky few and exclude all others from an opportunity to
litigate their claims.
D. Punitive Damage Class Actions
As suggested earlier, 65' piecemeal adjudication of multiple
punitive damages claims is unlikely to achieve an acceptable level
of deterrence. On the other hand, rules that cut off liability once
some aggregate figure has been reached are unfair to late plain-
tiffs, who would be unable to recover punitive damages at all.
A better approach would adjudicate all punitive damages claims
arising from a single design defect at the same time. The most
promising method of achieving this objective is the class action
suit.
Under this proposal plaintiffs would be allowed to bring
compensatory damage claims in the forum of their choice, but
would be required to join their punitive claims in a single class
action suit.65 2 Evidence relevant to the punitive damages issues,
such as the extent of the defendant's wealth, the number, nature,
and cost of the injuries allegedly caused by the defendant's act,
and whether the defendant's act was reckless or malicious would
be presented by the named plaintiffs representing the punitive
641 See Note, supra note 649, at 75.
69 See Seltzer, supra note 395, at 55-56.
651 See Comment, supra note 7, at 679.
6I See notes 379-405 supra and accompanying text.
612 See Froud v. Celotex Corp., 437 N.E.2d 910, 913-14 (I11. App. Ct. 1982); Riley,
supra note 417, at 252. But see Comment, supra note 7, at 678.
[VOL. 74
1985-861 PuNnwE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
damages class. 6" Upon a finding by the jury that the defendant
was liable for punitive damages, the court would ask the jury
to award one sum sufficient to punish the defendant once for
all potential claimants.654 Any sum awarded would then be
allocated to class members who filed a claim within a specified
time, 615 and according to a judicially approved formula.
656
1. Advantages of the Class Action
In a class action, an invention of equity,6 " a group of
plaintiffs with similar causes of action are permitted to sue
through one or more representatives without each of the class
members having to join in the suit.65 The class action does not
necessarily have to dispose of the entire controversy. Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4)(A), class action treat-
ment can be limited to particular aspects of the dispute. 69 Ac-
cording to its supporters, a class action for punitive damages
secures the plaintiffs' interests when the defendant's ability to
pay is limited.66 It also protects the defendant, and promotes
judicial economy.
" See Note, supra note 21, at 1807.
"I See In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.,
526 F. Supp. 887, 920 (N.D. Cal.), modified, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd,
693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 917 (1983).
", See Note, supra note 21, at 1807 n.108.
666 See 526 F. Supp. at 920 n.184.
657 The modern class action evolved from the English bill of peace which allowed
members of a group to represent the group in court if the group was too large to permit
joinder, if the members of the group had a common interest in the issue in dispute,
and if the members of the group before the court could adequately represent the absent
members. See generally Chaffe, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARv. L. REv.
1297, 1303-07 (1931-32); Larimore, Exploring the Interface Between Rule 23 Class Actions
and the Anti-Injunction Act, 18 GA. L. REV. 259, 262 (1984); Stickler, Protecting the
Class: The Search for the Adequate Representative in Class Action Litigation, 34 DE
PAuL L. Ray. 73, 74-75 (1984); Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class
Action Judgments, 87 HARv. L. RV. 589, 590 (1973-74).
153 See Comment, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Litigation of Mass Air Crashes,
29 RuToERs L. Rv. 425, 427-28 (1975-76).
1 See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.01 (24 ed. 1974).
See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718, 725-28
(E.D.N.Y. 1983); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977), petition for
mandamus denied sub nom., Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. United States Dist.
Ct., 588 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979). But see Comment,
Punitive Damages, the Common Question Class Action, and the Concept of Overkill,
13 PAC. L.J. 1273 (1981-82).
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The class action suit benefits plaintiffs in three ways. First,
all plaintiffs are assured of an equal opportunity to assert their
claims for punitive damages in a class action. 6es Second, class
members pay only a prorated share of the costs of litigation,6 2
thereby enabling them to hire better and more experienced at-
torneys 63 Finally, a class action reduces potential conflicts of
interest among plaintiffs' attorneys.
A class action for punitive damages is also advantageous to
the defendant. First, a class action lessens the risk of overkill
because a single resolution of the punitive damages issue enables
the judge and jury to carefully consider the matter, and award
the total amount necessary to both punish the defendant and
deter others. 665 Second, a class action decreases the defendant's
costs to litigate the issue of punitive damages in multiple suits
in various forums.6 66 Lastly, the class action reduces the number
of lawsuits involving the same parties, issues, and facts, and
thereby promotes judicial economy. 667
' See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1185-86 (8th Cir. 1982) (Heaney,
J., dissenting); 521 F. Supp. at 1192-93.
62 See 680 F.2d at 1185. Not only are the parties able to pool their resources, but
also the court determines what hourly rate represents reasonable value for services
rendered. Class counsel do not receive a contingent fee. Gordon, The Optimum Man-
agement of the Skywalks Mass Disaster Litigation by Use of the Federal Mandatory
Class Action Device, 52 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 215, 224-25 (1984).
16 See 526 F. Supp. at 921.
See 93 F.R.D. at 425; 526 F. Supp. at 895 n.22; Note, supra note 21, at 1809.
A conflict of interest can occur "when an attorney who represents more than one client
seeks punitive damages on behalf of each" client against a defendant who may not be
able to satisfy all judgments rendered against it. Note, supra note 4, at 70-71. In this
situation, the attorney must decide which cases to proceed with first, a decision that
may require him to sacrifice the interests of one client for the benefit of another client.
Id.
6 See Putz & Astiz, supra note 36, at 23.
See Comment, supra note 658, at 451.
11 See generally Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. Cm. L.
REv. 717, 756 (1976-77). Consolidation is another device that is frequently used to
promote efficiency and reduce litigation costs. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation has transferred a number of products liability cases to a single district for
consolidation or pretrial coordination of discovery. See, e.g., In re Cutter Laboratories,
Inc. "Braunwald-Cutter Aortic Heart Valve" Prod. Liab. Litig., 465 F. Supp. 1295
(J.P.M.D.L. 1979); In re the Upjohn Co. Antibiotic "Cleocin" Prod. Liab. Litig., 450
F. Supp. 1168 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978); In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig.,
446 F. Supp. 244 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978); In re A.H. Robins Co. "Dalkon Shield" IUD
Prods. Liab. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 540 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975). Actions can also be consoi-
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2. General Requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23
At the present time, a punitive damages class may be certified
in federal court only if it meets the requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(a). These are classified as: (1) numerosity
of class members; (.2) commonality of legal and factual ques-
tions; (3) typicality of claims and defenses of the class repre-
sentative; and (4) adequacy of representation. 668 If these four
prerequisites are satisfied, the court must then determine whether
the case fits within one of the categories of class action specified
in Rule 23(b).669
First, pursuant to Rule 23(a)(1), the class must be so numer-
ous that joinder is impracticable. 670 Since the number of injured
parties is invariably quite large, in design defect litigation nu-
merosity will rarely present a difficult hurdle when using a class
action to assess punitive damages. 67'
Second, Rule 23(a)(2) requires the presence of questions of
law or fact common to the class. 672 In punitive damage class
actions, the conduct of the defendant is generally the primary
question at issue. Because this evidence is identical for all parties
seeking punitive damages, the prerequisite of commonality usually
will be satisfied.673
Third, Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the class claims be similar,
although not identical, to the claims of the representative party.
Usually all of the individual punitive damages claims are nearly
dated for trial where all of the lawsuits have been filed in the same district. FRCP 42(a).
In products liability actions, however, lawsuits will generally be filed in more than one
district, thereby almost certainly frustrating any attempt to consolidate them for trial
in a single proceeding.
6I Seltzer, supra note 395, at 65 (citing A. MILLER, AN OvERvmw OF FEDERAL
CLASS ACTIONS: PAST, PRESENT AND FTURE 22-31 (1977)).
619 Seltzer, supra note 395, at 65-67; Note, Diethystilbestol: Extension of Federal
Class Action Procedures to Generic Drug Litigation, 14 U.S.F.L. R-v. 461, 481-90 (1980).
170 Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 387 (D. Mass. 1979).
6,, Note, supra note 380, at 165 n.75. See generally 7 C. WIOT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1762 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRioHT &
MILLER].
6"2 Note, supra note 380, at 166.
673 Note. supra note 380, at 166. But see 693 F.2d at 850.
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identical. 674 As mentioned above, the primary focus in such cases
is on the defendant's conduct. Similarly, the claim of any indi-
vidual member representing the class would also center on the
defendant's conduct and thus meet the typicality requirement. 75
Finally, adequacy of representation, which must be deter-
mined in each case, 676 turns on the "availability of a represent-
ative party, the competence of the representative party's counsel,
the extent of the representative party's interest, and the absence
of any conflicting or antagonistic interests between class mem-
bers. ' 677 A representative party may be difficult to locate because
punitive damages imposed in individual cases are usually larger.
Individual plaintiffs anticipating larger individual awards are
reluctant to act as the representative party.67
In addition to satisfying the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a),
the class action must fall within one of the situations described
in Rule 23(b). 679 In punitive damage class actions, the court could
use either Rule 23(b)(l)(B) or Rule 23(b)(3).
3. Class Actions Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B)
Rule 23(b)(1) applies to situations where a class action can
prevent the prejudicial effect that otherwise occurs when a large
number of individual lawsuits are brought against a common
defendant. 60 Rule 23(b)(1) is divided into two subsections: Rule
23(b)(1)(A) authorizes class actions to protect the opposing party
against having to meet incompatible standards of conduct when
dealing with different members of the class;63' Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
674 Note, supra note 380, at 167 (citing \Vuo & MLER, supra note 671, § 1764,
at 218 n.21.4).
677 Note, supra note 380, at 167. See also 83 F.R.D. at 387-88 (typicality does not
require total identification of interests).
676 FRCP 23(a)(4); WRIGHT & MLER, supra note 671, § 1765, at 622.
67n Note, supra note 380, at 167. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417
F.2d 1122, 1124-25 (5th Cir. 1969) (evidentiary hearing can be held on this issue); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 788 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 635 F.2d
987 (2d Cir. 1980); WRuon & MIILER, supra note 671, at §§ 1765-68.
678 Note, supra note 380, at 167.
679 Seltzer, supra note 395, at 66.
6MId.
' Dale Elec., Inc. v. RCL Elec., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 537 (D.N.H. 1971).
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protects litigants when recovery by some plaintiffs impairs oth-
ers' chances, as when the defendant possesses limited resources
for satisfaction of claims.6 12 These class actions are mandatory
in the sense that, after class certification, the eventual outcome
of the suit binds all class members regardless of whether they
agree to be included in the proceeding.
6s3
Despite the apparent advantages of class actions, only one
court has ever certified a products liability class under Rule
23(b)(1)(B) for the purpose of adjudicating punitive damages
claims.ss The federal court for the Northern District of Califor-
I-" Note, supra note 21, at 1797, 1800. The Advisory Committee Comments state:
In various situations an adjudication as to one or more members of the
class will necessarily or probably have an adverse practical effect on the
interests of other members who should therefore be represented in the law
suit. This is plainly the case when claims are made by numerous persons
against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims....
Advisory Committee Comments, 39 F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966).
, Seltzer, supra note 395, at 66.
526 F. Supp. at 890. Certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) was denied in several
mass injury products liability cases. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist.
Court, 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1975) (airplane crash), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911
(1976); Marchesi v. Eastern Airlines, 68 F.R.D. 500, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (airplane
crash); Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 398 (E.D. Va. 1975) (airplane
crash); Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, 50 F.R.D. 76, 88 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (airplane
crash); Comment, The Use of Class Actions for Mass Accident Litigation, 23 Loy. L.
REv. 383, 384 (1977). However, certification was allowed in several non-products liability
cases. See 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (supper club fire); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel
Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 559-60 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd mere., 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir.
1975) (food poisoning); Gabel v. Hughes, 350 F. Supp. 624, 627-28 (C.D. Cal. 1972)
(mid-air collision; issue of liability undecided).
In general, the courts have also been reluctant to use the class action device in
any products liability cases. In Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, one of the few excep-
tions, the court certified the case under Rule 23(b)(3). 83 F.R.D. 382. Payton involved
a suit by "DES daughters" against the manufacturers of the drug DES. The plaintiffs
sought to certify a class to determine liability for both compensatory and punitive damages.
The court concluded that punitive damages were not recoverable in Massachusetts except
as authorized by statute and, therefore, refused to certify a class for this purpose. Id.
at 395. Nevertheless, the court did consider certification of a class for the purpose of
determining liability for compensatory damages. Looking at the criteria under Rule 23(a),
the court found that between 13,350 and 53,400 women were exposed to DES, making
it likely that the plaintiff class was so numerous that joinder of its members would
be impracticable. Id. at 387. As to commonality, the court noted that "answers to com-
mon questions need not guarantee a determination of liability." Id. at 387. The require-
ment was satisfied because "if the plaintiffs [won] a favorable determination on the
class issues, . . . they [would] have established the legal and factual prerequisites to
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nia certified a class consisting of all persons having potential
damage claims against the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield
IUD. 615 In this case, the court determined that individual recov-
eries of punitive damages by the early plaintiffs would either
reduce or totally eliminate the funds available for recovery of
damages by subsequent victims. 6 ' The court concluded, there-
fore, that a limited fund existed which justified certification of a
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action.
68 7
According to the court, the funds available for payment of
punitive damages claims were potentially limited in several re-
spects. First, the defendants' net worth might be inadequate to
satisfy all claims;688 second, even if the defendants' resources
were sufficient, courts might limit the extent to which a defend-
ant could be punished for the same wrongful act.68 9 In either
case, the court reasoned, only the first plaintiffs receiving favorable
verdicts would receive full payment and subsequent plaintiffs
would recover little or nothing. Consequently, the court con-
cluded that only a mandatory class action in which all plain-
[liability]." Id.
The court also concluded that the claims and defenses of the named plaintiffs were
typical of those of the class. Likewise, the court determined "plaintiffs' counsel [were] capable
of competent and vigorous prosecution of the action, that the action [was] not collusive,
... and that the interests of the named plaintiffs and the absentee class members [were]
not antagonistic.. . ." The court, however, refused to certify the class under Rule (b)(l)(B)
because the plaintiffs had not shown that the defendants were likely to be unable to pay
all claims assessed against them. The court did, however, find that "common questions
of law and fact predominate[d] over questions affecting individual members of the plain-
tiff class and that a class action [was] superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy." Id. at 389-90. The court also acknowledged that
only some of the liability issues would be resolved by the class action and that additional pro-
ceedings would have to be held on an individual basis before liability could be ultimately deter-
mined. Id. at 394. The court explained that bifurcation in this manner was acceptable and
that constitutionally separable issues could be tried under the seventh amendment by different
juries. Id.
61 526 F. Supp. at 895. At the time, 1,573 suits were pending against tile defendant
manufacturer. Id. at 893.
Id. at 898-99.
Id. at 897-98.
Id. at 893.
61 Id. at 898.
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tiffs were represented could accomplish an equitable distribution
to all deserving plaintiffs.
6 9
1
An overwhelming majority of plaintiffs in Dalkon Shield,
however, vigorously contested the certification order.6 9' They
based their opposition on the "impropriety of certification on
the court's own initiative, the lack of personal jurisdiction over
non-California plaintiffs, and the diversity of legal and factual
questions presented by the multistate claims. ' 692 The trial court,
however, appeared less concerned about the plaintiffs' objections
than about the problems involved with piecemeal assessment of
punitive damages.6 93 Accordingly, the court ruled that a nation-
wide class action would be superior to individual adjudica-
tions.
694
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
the certification order. 695 The appellate court found that the class
did not satisfy the commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation prerequisites of Rule 23(a). 696 The appellate court
held that the commonality requirement was unsatisfied because
the punitive damages issues were "not entirely common" to all
potential class members. 97 In the court's opinion, the manufac-
turer's liability for punitive damages depended on the informa-
tion it had concerning side effects, its concealment of that in-
formation, and its advertising and promotion. Since these fac-
tors varied over time, liability would not necessarily be the same
for all victims.
6 98
The appellate court also addressed the typicality issue. Ac-
cording to the court, the legal standards that controlled whether
punitive damages were applicable might differ among individual
plaintiffs. 99 Although the court conceded that the typicality
I" ld. at 897-98.
Seltzer, supra note 395, at 74.
o2 Id. at 75-76.
526 F. Supp. at 916-17.
'I Id. at 915.
' In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 917 (1983).
l-, Seltzer, supra note 395, at 79. See 693 F.2d at 851-52.
" Seltzer, supra note 395, at 79 n.202.
693 F.2d at 850.
I, d. at 848.
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problem was not insurmountable, it noted that no plaintiffs
sought or accepted the role of representative parties .7 00 The court
also expressed skepticism about the adequacy of representation.
The law firm originally appointed as lead counsel by the district
court had resigned and no other plaintiff's attorney would agree
to serve as lead counsel for the punitive damages class °.70 Al-
though the district court eventually appointed an attorney for
this purpose, 702 the appellate court doubted that the trial court
could properly manage such complex litigation when many par-
ties vehemently opposed joining the class action. 703
Finally, the appellate court disagreed with the lower court's
finding that a limited fund existed in the manner contemplated
by Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 7 4The court found that the record did not
support the existence of a limited fund.70 5 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) cert-
ification required more than a showing that subsequent recov-
eries could be diminished or eliminated by earlier recoveries. 70 6
Neither the inability of defendants to pay subsequent claims nor
the potential ceiling on punitive damages recoveries 70 7 had been
"inescapably" or "necessarily" demonstrated. 73
Arguably, Dalkon Shield was not a typical class action case.
As one commentator observed, the certification order in the
lower court "amounted to a unilateral assumption of authority
over thousands of cases pending in other jurisdictions. ' 7 9 Since
all plaintiffs opposed class certification while the defendants
favored it, a clear sense of unfairness to the plaintiffs arose. 710
In addition, since the court ordering certification had dismissed
punitive damages claims in an earlier Dalkon Shield trial, it
looked as though A.H. Robins had "forum shopped" for an
anti-punitive damages court in which to try all of the punitive
70' Id. at 850.
7' Id. at 851.
702 Seltzer, supra note 395, at 79 n.204.
701 693 F.2d at 851.
10 Id. at 851-52.
705 Id.
716 Id. at 852.
707 Seltzer, supra note 395, at 80.
71 693 F.2d at 852.
70 Seltzer, supra note 395, at 82.
710 Id. at 82-83.
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damages claims pending against it.7 ' Nevertheless, Dalkon Shield
is hardly an auspicious beginning for punitive damages class
actions, and one can anticipate that plaintiff opposition to forced
membership in the class, as well as judicial resistance to the
limited fund theory, will discourage the use of Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
class actions in the future.1 2
Not only may plaintiffs create opposition, but mandatory
class actions may violate the Anti-Injunction Act713 if members
of the plaintiff class already have filed state court suits against
the product manufacturer. 7 4 The Anti-Injunction Act was held
to apply to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions in In re Federal Sky-
walk Cases.715 Federal Skywalk arose out of the collapse of two
skywalks at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri.
The accident killed 113 persons and injured at least another 212
persons. Approximately 150 lawsuits were filed in state and
federal courts.716 One victim petitioned a federal district court
to certify as a class action the claims of business invitees of the
hotel who suffered physical, mental, or property damage as a
result of the accident.1 7 In response, the court certified a class
action under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) to determine liability for compen-
satory and punitive damages. 718 The court also certified a Rule
7,, Seltzer, supra note 395, at 83 n.220.
712 See notes 708, 710 supra and accompanying text.
7,3 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). The Anti-Injunction Act provides that "[a] court
of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court
except as expressly authorized by an Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." Id. For a general discussion
of the Anti-Injunction Act, see Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction
Statute, 78 CoL'M. L. REv. 330 (1978); Reaves & Golden, The Federal Anti-Injunction
Statute in the Aftermath of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 5 GA. L. Ray. 294 (1971);
Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceed-
ings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. REv. 591
(1975).
1" "It has been recognized that class members may not initiate state court actions
once a class action has been certified." Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident
Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARv. L. REv. 1143, 1159 (1982-83).
93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175, 1181-82 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1983).
Id. at 419.
Id. at 418.
78 The court concluded that certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) was appropriate
because "[o]ne or more of the defendants risk[ed] being faced with incompatible
standard of conduct if varying or inconsistent adjudications with respect to individual
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23(b)(1)(B) class action on the issues of liability for and the
amount of punitive damages.
719
The trial court found each of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites
were satisfied. It concluded that the class was sufficiently nu-
merous to satisfy the numerosity requirement. 72  According to
the court, the commonality requirement also was met. Since all
claims of the class members arose from the same accident, the
facts, liabilities, and defenses would be the same. Only the issue
of individual damages would differ.7 2' Similarly, the typicality
requirement was met because the legal theories utilized by the
class representatives were the same as the unnamed class mem-
bers. 72 Finally, the court determined that the class representa-
tives could adequately represent the class interests.72
Under the limited fund theory, the court believed that cert-
ification of the punitive damages claim was appropriate pursuant
to Rule 23(b)(1)(B).7 24 Not only were limited funds available to
pay for punitive damages claims, but also Missouri law was
unclear as to whether a defendant could be liable for more than
one award of punitive damages. If a defendant could be pun-
ished only once, the court reasoned, the first claimant to get an
award would deprive other claimants of any chance to obtain
punitive damages. Therefore, the court held that a single class-
wide adjudication of the punitive damages issues was necessary
to protect the interest of every victim in receiving his or her just
share of any punitive award.72
Opponents of the class action, 726 however, challenged the
certification order.727 Without deciding whether the class action
members of the class were obtained on the issues of liability for compensatory or punitive
damages." Id. at 424.
71 Id. at 424-25. Relying on Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969), the court
declared that the diversity requirement was satisfied if one member of a class is of
diverse citizenship from the class' opponent and no nondiverse members are named
parties. 93 F.R.D. at 420.
110 Id. at 421.
72 Id.
12 Id. at 421-22.
n Id. at 422.
724 Id. at 425.
7 Id. at 424-25.
7126 Gordon, supra note 662, at 218.
7v 680 F.2d at 1180.
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satisfied the requirements of Rule 23, the federal appellate court
vacated the certification order because it violated the Anti-In-
junction Act.72 The appellate court was concerned because the
trial court had allegedly prohibited class members from settling
their punitive damages claims. 729 In addition, the appellate court
declared that the certification order also effectively enjoined the
state plaintiffs from pursuing their pending state court actions
on the issues of liability for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. 710 This marked the first time any court had ruled that the
Anti-Injunction Act could prohibit a federal district court from
enjoining parallel proceedings in state courts once class certifi-
cation took place under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 7 31 As a result, it is
necessary to examine the Anti-Injunction Act in some detail to
determine what future impact it may have on punitive damages
class actions.
The Anti-Injunction Act, first enacted in 1793,72 is intended
"to forestall conflicts between federal and state courts when
both judicial systems are entertaining suits based upon the same
subject matter." 733 Although the original Anti-Injunction Act
language prohibited virtually all injunctions of state proceedings,
12 Id. at 1180, 1184.
'" Id. at 1180. The court quoted the following language from the district court's
opinion as the basis for its conclusion:
Legitimate claimants may negotiate and execute settlements with those
defendants who have vociferously urged this court to allow the settlement
process to continue. Those claimants who want to exact payment for
allegedly punishable acts must forego the settlement process and await the
trial of the punitive damages issues.
Id. (quoting 93 F.R.D. at 428). Nevertheless, other language in the order indicated that
class members could settle both their compensatory and punitive claims. Those who
released their punitive damage claims, however, would not be permitted to share in any
award obtained in the class action. 93 F.R.D. at 419, 422. See Gordon, supra note 662,
at 230 n.44.
1' 680 F.2d at 1180. This interpretation of the trial court's order is open to serious
question. See Comment, Federal Mass Tort Class Actions: A Step Toward Equity and
Efficiency, 47 Ata. L. REv. 1180, 1186 n.28 (1983).
"- Note, supra note 714, at 1159 n.69.
,, Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334-35.
" Larimore, supra note 657, at 260. For a discussion of the history of the Anti-
Injunction Act, see Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunctions Against Proceedings in State
Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 MICH. L. Rav. 1145 (1931-32); Taylor &
Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALE
L.J. 1169 (1933).
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judicial interpretation of the statute has created a number of
exceptions.7 14 These exceptions, codified when the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act was revised in 1948, 735 are the relitigation exception 7 6
the "expressly authorized" exception, 737 and the "in aid of ju-
risdiction" exception. 738 The purpose of the relitigation exception
is to prevent parties from relitigating in state court issues that a
federal court has already resolved.739 The Anti-Injunction Act
also allows injunctions against state court proceedings when
"expressly authorized by Act of Congress. ' ' 740 Finally, the "in
aid of jurisdiction" exception "authorizes injunctions against
state court proceedings when such injunctions are ancillary...
and necessary to vindicate, jurisdiction otherwise vested in the
federal courts.""
The "in aid of jurisdiction" exception is the provision most
applicable to the class action situation. 742 This exception, how-
ever, generally is used only to protect a specific piece of property
or "res," a construction which greatly restricts the exception's ap-
plication. 743 This interpretation of the "in aid of jurisdiction" ex-
ception first744 appeared in Kline v. Burke Construction Co.74s The
plaintiff in Kline brought suit in federal court seeking damages for
breach of contract. After initiation of the suit, the defendant com-
menced an action in state court against the plaintiff involving
the same issues. The original plaintiff then sought to prohibit
the defendant from continuing his suit in state court. 746 The
714 Redish, supra note 667, at 718.
735 Id.
736 Id. at 722.
7 Id. at 726.
,31 Id. at 743.
7", "The relitigation exception is intended to [avoid] the necessity of relitigating in
state court, or having to appear in state court to plead as res judicala a judgment
previously obtained in federal court .... There [must] be an existing federal court
judgment" for this exception to apply. Mayton, supra note 713, at 355. See also
Larimore, supra note 657, at 284-86.
7, Redish, supra note 667, at 726-43.
141 Mayton, supra note 713, at 356.
7,1 Larimore, supra note 657, at 288-89.
141 Mayton, supra note 713, at 357.
" Redish, supra note 667, at 745.
4 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
746 Id. at 227-28.
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United States Supreme Court, however, ruled on appeal that the
state action could not be enjoined. 747
The Supreme Court found the "in aid of jurisdiction" ex-
ception did not apply since only concurrent in personam pro-
ceedings were involved.748 The Court reasoned that when a court
takes jurisdiction over a res, the specific thing is withdrawn from
the power of the other court. 749 In contrast, however, "a con-
troversy was not a thing, and a controversy over a mere question
of personal liability ... does not tend to impair or defeat the
jurisdiction of the court in which a prior action for the same
cause is pending.
7 0
The logic behind this distinction lies in the nature of the
court's control over the subject matter in dispute. 75' A court
acquiring jurisdiction over property gains exclusive control over
it because no other court can physically possess that property at
the same time. This situation, however, does not occur in the
case of concurrent in personam jurisdiction where the only mat-
ter before the court is a "question of personal liability. ' 7 2 In
this instance, each court may proceed independently without
regard to the other proceeding. The judgment rendered first will
then be given res judicata effect by the other court.753
While this approach has a certain conceptual appeal, it does
not explain why a federal court's jurisdiction also cannot be
impaired in some cases involving concurrent in personam ac-
tions. If there is already a state court judgment on the same in
personam action, the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res
judicata will bind the federal court to the state court factual
findings and legal conclusions.
7 54
The Kline distinctions between in personam and in rem ac-
tions continue to be applied by the courts with little attention
to the underlying policies of the Anti-Injunction Act or Federal
,4, Id. at 235.
"I' Id. at 230.
74) Id.
SId.
" Id. at 235.
752 Id.
7., Mayton, supra note 713, at 359.
7 4 Redish, supra note 667, at 746.
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Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B). 71- An example of this in-
attention is seen in the Federal Skywalk court's response to
the plaintiff class' concern that the purpose of the class action
would be defeated by individual state court suits. 7 6 The court
relied on the distinction between in rem and in personam ac-
tions and declared that "simultaneous in personam state ac-
tions did not interfere with the jurisdiction of a federal court
in a suit involving the same subject matter.
757
One of the exceptions to the in rem-in personam distinc-
tion is the approach taken in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
22 interpleader cases. Federal courts frequently have used the
Rule 22 interpleader's "in aid of jurisdiction" exception 753 to
protect an individual's claim in a limited fund,759 in both in
rem and in personam actions. 760 When the critical factor in
such cases-an identifiable property or limited fund76 1-is pres-
ent, the courts seem prepared to treat the case as an in rem
action.762
The Rule 22 interpleader cases are significant because some
commentators maintain that a class action under Rule
23(b)(1)(B) promotes some of the same policies as the inter-
pleader and should therefore be treated in the same fashion.763
[Thus,] the efficiency of the ... interpleader depends upon
the ability of courts ... to protect a stakeholder from mul-
tiple claims. The effectiveness of the [R]ule 23 mandatory
class action certification ... similarly depends upon that same
ability to protect class members from being deprived of their
share of the potential, yet possibly limited, punitive damages
recovery.
764
71 Larimore, supra note 657, at 288. E.g., Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Esprit De Corp.,
682 F.2d 1267, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1330-31 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); In re Glenn W. Turner Enter. Litig., 521 F.2d
775, 780-81 (3d Cir. 1975).
680 F.2d at 1182.
Id. at 1183.
751 E.g., United States v. Major Oil Corp., 583 F.2d 1152, 1158 (10th Cir. 1978);
Emmco Ins. Co. v. Frankford Trust Co., 352 F. Supp. 130, 133 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
119 Note, supra note 21, at 1812-13.
1 Larimore, supra note 657, at 287-88.
7,I Id. at 288. E.g., Wallach v. Cannon, 357 F.2d 557, 559-60 (8th Cir. 1966).
162 Larimore, supra note 657, at 288.
76 Id.
7 Id. at 289.
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Likewise, it can be argued that class actions, like the interpleader
situation, involve a limited fund. In effect, the defendant manufac-
turer's cumulative liability for punitive damages is equivalent to
a limited fund. The plaintiff class in Federal Skywalk relied on this
analogy when claiming, as in the interpleader situation, that there
was a limited fund and a class action was necessary to protect all
claimants.76 The appellate court, however, rejected this conten-
tion and held that a claim for punitive damages, when the defend-
ants had not conceded liability, did not resemble a limited fund
in that sense: "The claim does not qualify as a limited fund which
is a jurisdictional prerequisite for federal interpleader. Without the
limited fund there is no analogy to an interpleader and no reason
to treat the class action as an interpleader for purposes of the Anti-
Injunction Act.
'766
Judge Heaney, in a dissenting opinion, strongly disagreed
with the majority's interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act.767
He contended that a class action was the most effective means
of managing litigation that would arise out of mass disasters
such as the collapse involved in Federal Skywalk.76s In addition,
he declared: "[A] single class-wide adjudication of punitive dam-
ages ensures that every victim receive a just share of the punitive
award. ' 769 With that in mind, Judge Heaney considered whether
limiting actions in state court would be necessary to effectuate
the purposes of the federal class action.770 In his view, since Rule
23(b)(1) class actions were mandatory, they must necessarily
foreclose members of the class from litigating class issues in
another forum:
A mandatory class action, of course, has a restrictive effect
on related proceedings in any other court-state or federal.
This is because, by definition, members of such a class cannot
pursue independent litigation of class claims .... In my view,
the plain meaning of a mandatory class does not change merely
"1 680 F.2d at 1182. See also Larimore, supra note 657, at 287-89 (discussing
rationale for using class action).
-, 680 F.2d at 1182.
Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1186.
WI Id.
See id. at 1191-93 (discussing why mandatory class actions do not violate Anti-
Injunction Act).
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because some members of the class have previously initiated
independent actions. If certification of a mandatory class ac-
tion is proper, as here it clearly is, then the ordinary rules of
such actions simply preclude independent litigation of class
claims in state or federal courts."'
Judge Heaney then concluded that an injunction to protect the
ordinary scope of a mandatory class action was "necessary in
aid of" the federal jurisdiction over the class .772 Otherwise, the
federal court would effectively lose its jurisdiction over the class
if individual claimants could opt out by suing in state court.
7 73
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Heaney also attacked the
majority's reliance on the in rem-in personam distinction. He
observed that the rule had always been confined to individual
claims and had never been applied to class actions. According
to Judge Heaney, extending the rule to class actions was unwar-
ranted and effectively defeated the purpose of mandatory class
action jurisdiction.
774
It is difficult to assess the probable impact of the Federal
Skywalk decision on Rule 23(b)(1) class actions. Legal scholars
generally have been critical of the Federal Skywalk majority
opinion, and have supported the dissent's interpretation of the
Anti-Injunction Act. 775 Nevertheless, until the Supreme Court
makes a definitive ruling on the matter, the Federal Sicywallc
decision is likely to discourage other courts from utilizing class
actions in any way that restricts plaintiffs from pursuing their
punitive damages claims in state court.
4. Class Actions Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), the "common ques-
tion" class action, unlike subsection (b)(1) of the Rule, does not
require that the class include everyone who will be directly
77 Id. at 1191.
7 Id. at 1192.
' Id.
"4 Id. at 1193.
' See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 662, at 229-33; Larimore, supra note 657, at 288-
89; Note, supra 714, at 1159-60; Note, supra note 21, at 1812-13.
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affected by the litigation's outcome. It is sufficient that the
defendant injure all of the class members in similar ways.
776
Another difference between Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions is that the latter are not mandatory and potential class
members may opt out if they wish.777 In addition to the prereq-
uisites of Rule 23(a), Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common ques-
tions of law or fact "predominate" over individual issues and
that a class action be the "superior" method of handling the
litigation.778 The superiority requirement deals with increased
efficiency of the class action.779 Proponents of the punitive dam-
age class action claim that it meets the superiority requirement
by reducing "discovery time, court congestion, repetitive intro-
duction of evidence, and litigation costs.
'780
Arguably, the predomination requirement is also met because
the defendant's conduct is a factual question identical for each
class member.78 ' The courts have utilized a variety of approaches
to determine satisfaction of the predomination requirement. Un-
der the "objective" approach, predomination is determined by
comparing the amount of time that is to be spent in resolving
common issues versus the time spent resolving individual issues.
If the time to litigate common issues is greater, the predomina-
tion requirement is met.782 This method, however, is not widely
accepted because it does not provide any formula for measuring
litigation time.783 Under the "outcome determinative" test, the
predomination requirement is met only if a specific issue's res-
olution will determine the case. 784 This approach has also gen-
erally been rejected because, contrary to the meaning of Rule
23(b)(3), it seemingly would require common issues to be signif-
icant rather than predominant.8 5
776 A. MLER, supra note 668, at 40.
" Note, supra note 714, at 1152-53.
Note, supra note 669, at 480, 484.
Note, supra note 380, at 171.
70 Id.
M' Id. at 171-72.
712 Comment, supra note 730, at 1210-11.
781 Id. at 1211 n.141. See Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559,
569 (D. Minn. 1968).
14 Comment, supra note 730, at 1211.
"I Id. (citing 3B J. MooRE, supra note 659, 23.4512], at 323-29).
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The most widely accepted approach in resolving the predom-
ination issue is a pragmatic balancing test. Under this approach,
the court balances whether a substantial portion of the case is
composed of "common questions of law or fact" against whether
there is a "common nucleus of operative fact" in the group's
claims. 7 6 This involves an examination of the four factors set
forth in Rule 23(b)(3): "(1) whether other litigation has already
been commenced; (2) the desirability of concentrating the action
in one forum; (3) difficulties in managing the class; and (4) the
plaintiff's individual interest in controlling the litigation.
' '7, 7
The first factor the court considers is whether members of
the potential class already have initiated litigation. If a large
number of lawsuits are pending against the defendant by class
members, it may be too late to avoid multiple litigation by
utilizing a class action. 718 In making its evaluation, the court
should "compare the number of pending lawsuits to the size of
the proposed class. ' 7 9 Thus, in products liability cases, where
thousands of persons may be injured, it is possible that a class
action would promote judicial efficiency even though some vic-
tims would elect to sue on their own.
790
The desirability of concentrating the litigation in one forum
is the next factor examined in this predomination balancing
test.79' The criteria used by the court in resolving this issue
include "the convenience to the parties and witnesses, the loca-
tion of the relevant evidence, and the court's familiarity with
the case." 792 It is not clear where the best forum would be in a
products liability case, but one possibility is the state where the
product was manufactured. 79 The court must also assess the
difficulties that might be encountered in dealing with a large
group of litigants.794 These include notification of class members
1 Id. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 565-66 (2d Cir. 1968)
(common nucleus of operative facts); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 271 F. Supp. 722, 726-
27 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (common nucleus of operative facts).
787 Comment, supra note 730, at 1212.
"'s Id.
789 Id.
790 Id.
" Id. at 1213.
792 Id.
"I Id. at 1213-14.
" WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 671, at § 1762.
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and dealing with the existence of various individual issues. 791
However, such problems are no worse in tort cases with many
plaintiffs than in other areas where the class action is used.796
Another consideration in resolving the predomination issue
is the interest of individual class members in controlling their
own separate actions.797 Severe emotional or physical injury may
produce an interest that can outweigh the benefits of the class
action device.793 A common complaint of plaintiffs who do not
wish to join the class is that the individual's interest would be
harmed by application of a particular state's law. Their interest
would be better served by bringing suit in another, more favor-
able jurisdiction.7 9 This argument against predomination, how-
ever, has seldom been persuasive.8°° As far as punitive damage
class actions are concerned, arguably, since the policies under-
lying punitive damages do not vary appreciably from state to state,
variations in punitive damage standards should not prevent the
predomination requirement from being met.801
Unfortunately, there are serious disadvantages to the use of
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions for the purpose of adjudicating pu-
nitive damages claims. t°2 Rule 23(b)(3) actions require, under
Rule 23(c)(2), "best notice"8 a0 and allow "opting out." 8°4 The
notice requirement, inapplicable to Rule 23(b)(1) class actions,
can be quite burdensome and expensive because all potential
class members must be given the best notice practicable. 05 In
addition, since this Rule allows class members to opt out, the
Id. § 1780, at 75; Comment, supra note 730, at 1214.
: Comment, supra note 730, at 1214.
77 Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1217. See also 66 F.R.D. at 399 (individual claimants have right to choose
"strategy and tactics"); Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65 F.R.D. 566, 572 (E.D. Tex 1974)
(serious personal injuries and death create high individual interest); 50 F.R.D. at 79
("claims vitally affect ... lives of claimants").
7,9 Comment, supra note 730, at 1215. For example, some states allow punitive
damages in wrongful death actions, while others do not. Id. at 1215 n.167.
c Comment, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60 CAIF. L. REv. 1615, 1623 (1972);
Comment, supra note 684, at 391-93.
526 F. Supp. at 915.
W- RIGHT & MILLER, supra note 671, § 1777, at 44-50.
' See Note, supra note 380, at 172. See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (defines "best notice").
"I Note, supra note 380, at 172.
W1 Id.
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advantages of a class action are lost because plaintiffs can pursue
their individual punitive damages claims.80 6 Some commentators
have suggested that class members who exercise their right to
opt out should forfeit their punitive damages claims. 07 While
this approach may be constitutional, 0 8 it seeems inconsistent
with the "voluntary" nature of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators alike have endorsed the practice
of awarding punitive damages in products liability litigation;
only product manufacturers and insurance companies seem to
view this new development with alarm.8°9 Nevertheless, in the
author's view, the supporters of punitive damages have yet to
make a convincing case.
By hypothesis, exemplary damages are not intended to be
compensatory. Therefore, punitive damage awards amount to
an involuntary transfer of wealth from product manufacturers
to parties who have already received full compensation for their
injuries. 810 Those who advocate such a practice must provide
compelling reasons to justify it. Although the proponents of
punitive damages have offered a number of theories to support
the application of this concept in the area of products liability,
none of them is persuasive.
The first justification for punitive damages is based on the
concept of retribution.81 Product manufacturers who engage in
certain types of undesirable conduct deserve punishment. As we
have seen, however, there are a number of problems with the
retributive rationale. First, punishment falls largely on innocent
third parties rather than on the actual wrongdoers.8 12 Second,
even visualizing the corporation itself as a legitimate target for
WId.
Putz & Astiz, supra note 36, at 23-31.
Note, supra note 380, at 172.
Robinson and Kane, supra note 15, at 140; Note, supra note 33, at 334 n.6;
Comment, supra note 33, at 771 n.3. See generally notes 33-36 supra and accompanying
text.
sIO See notes 1, 7-9, 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 238-459 supra and accompanying text.
812 See notes 266-83 supra and accompanying text.
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punishment, the liability standard for punitive damages does
a poor job of identifying the type of proscribed conduct.
813
Finally, piecemeal assessment of punitive damage liability in
individual lawsuits creates a significant risk of imposing ex-
cessive punishment on the product manufacturer. 8 4 Therefore,
we have concluded that retributive principles do not support
the assessment of exemplary damages on manufacturers.
Another rationale for punitive damages is deterrence. 15
Here again, there are serious objections to the extension of
punitive damages into products liability litigation. Certainly,
the fear of massive punitive damages liability will deter some
product manufacturers from engaging in unwanted conduct.
8 1 6
Unfortunately, some manufacturers will not be deterred be-
cause they can shift the cost of punitive damage awards onto
the public. 17 At the same time, other manufacturers will no
doubt be discouraged from applying the principles of cost-
benefit analysis to decisions a-out product safety. The result
will be a misallocation of resources toward risk-avoidance
measures.
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In the author's opinion, the rapid and almost universal
acceptance of punitive damages in products liability litigation
reflects a feeling by judges and juries that the concept of
strict liability in tort, and the theory of market deterrence
upon which it rests, does not always produce socially ac-
ceptable results.1 9 Even though manufacturers are strictly li-
able for compensatory damages, manufacturers still sometimes
produce excessively dangerous products and engage in uneth-
ical marketing practices. Punitive damages are viewed as a
way of supplementing, or even superseding, the ordinary li-
ability rules when those rules fail to fulfill their intended so-
cial function.
"I See notes 284-370 supra and accompanying text.
R14 See notes 371-418 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 486-591 supra and accompanying text.
' See notes 539-56 supra and accompanying text.
W1 See note 591 supra and accompanying text.
11R See notes 557-90 supra and accompanying text.
R11 See Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 837 (3d Cir. 1983); Grimshaw
v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Palmer v. A.H. Robins
Co., 684 P.2d 187, 218 (Colo. 1984); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 451-52
(Vis. 1980).
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The impact of damage awards in tort actions, however, is
indirect and the ultimate effect of such awards on specific cor-
porate behavior is uncertain. This is an inherent weakness of
any system of social control that relies on indirect measures to
achieve its objectives. Punitive damages suffer from the same
deficiency. Therefore, if the public wishes to prohibit certain
business practices or to mandate a particular level of product
safety it should do so directly by promulgating specific standards
of business conduct or product quality. It follows that state and
federal regulation offers a more promising approach to the
problems of product safety and unethical business practices than
does a system of random jury awards of punitive damages. 20
In fact, much of this regulatory framework is already in
place. For example, under the Consumer Product Safety Act, 21
the Consumer Product Safety Commission is empowered to es-
tablish safety standards and require suitable warnings for con-
sumer products. 822 Other federal agencies also regulate product
safety. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
52
authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to establish motor
vehicle safety standards. 824 The Act also requires manufacturers
to provide notification of defects related to motor vehicle safety
that are discovered after the product line has entered the mar-
ket.8 25 The agency can order the manufacturer to notify con-
sumers of the danger or to recall the automobiles for correction
of the defect.82 6 Finally, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act 27 empowers the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
approve any new drug before marketing8 2 and to regulate the
content of labeling and advertising in connection with such
o Note, supra note 26, at 430.
15 U.S.C.A. § 2051 (West Supp. 1982).
8 See id. § 2056(a).
- Id. § 1381.
See id. § 1392.
See id. § 1411. The notification must contain a clear description of the defect,
an evaluation of the risk to motor vehicle safety, and a statement of the measures to be
taken to remedy the defect. Id. § 1413.
M6 See id. § 1414.
21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-92 (,Vest Supp. 1972).
See id. § 355(a).
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products. 29 The Act also allows the FDA to require adequate
testing before new drugs are approved.830
Some commentators have doubted that administrative regu-
lation can ever effectively control improper behavior by product
manufacturers. 3 This author certainly does not claim that the
present fragmented system of federal regulation is adequate.
Nevertheless, these provisions can be improved and strengthened
to induce product manufacturers to meet their social responsi-
bilities to consumers. Reform in this area is more promising
than changing the rules governing assessment of punitive dam-
ages.
There may be some, however, who believe that appropriate
regulatory measures will not be forthcoming and are willing to
accept punitive damages as a temporary measure until a better
solution is found. With this in mind, it is useful to consider
whether punitive damages principles can be modified by statute to
serve some retributive or deterrent function in the products liability
area. In all probability very little can be done legislatively to im-
prove the deterrent effect of punitive damages. However, some
changes could be made at the state level by statute to make punitive
damages more acceptable from the standpoint of retributive justice.
Deterrence goals might also be taken into account, but they would
be a secondary consideration. The proposed statute should address
three problem areas: (1) the liability standard, (2) the adjudicatory
process, and (3) calculation of the punitive damage award.
For punitive damages to serve a retributive function, the
proposed statute should formulate a liability standard limiting
punishment to those who have engaged in wrongful conduct. In
addition, the liability standard must clearly identify the type of
behavior that will be sanctioned. These requirements can be met
if the proposed statute limits punitive damages to fraudulent
conduct and knowing violations of government safety regula-
tions. These regulations could include safety-related design
standards, testing procedures, disclosure requirements, warning
requirements, and provisions requiring the product manufacturer
to take remedial actions. In addition, the proposed statute should
incorporate some form of "complicity rule" so that shareholders
See id. § 352.
See id. § 3550).
" Comment, supra note 33, at 783.
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are not punished for the misconduct of lower level corporate
employees. 8
32
Because of the quasi-criminal aspects of punitive damages,
any statutory proposal must make the adjudicatory process more
fair to the defendant. Several of the reforms discussed in Part
III should be implemented. First, a clear and convincing stand-
ard should be substituted for the present standard of proof.
3
Second, the question of punitive damages should be kept sepa-
rate from compensatory damages issues to avoid confusing the
jury and possibly prejudicing the defendant's case . 4 Third, the
trial judge should set the punitive award once the jury has
determined that punitive damages are proper . 3
Calculation of the damages award would be the most diffi-
cult aspect of any statutory reform package. As mentioned ear-
lier, the purpose of the punitive damage award should be
primarily retributive. The award should be sufficient to punish
the defendant but should not be disproportionate to the degree
of wrongdoing. Obviously, it is much easier to determine the
appropriate level of punishment at one time rather than in some
incremental fashion. Consequently, the proposed statute should
limit the manufacturer's liability to a single award (at least in
that state) for injuries arising from a particular product design.
The class action appears to be the best mechanism to accom-
plish this objective while ensuring that each victim gets a share
of the award. In the alternative, the statute could provide that
the state attorney general could bring an action for punitive
damages against the manufacturer on behalf of all injured parties
within the state.
The proposed statute should also establish a maximum limit
on the size of any punitive damage award. This could be either
set like a criminal fine at a fixed amount or based on some
percentage of the company's net profits during the period when
' The vicarious liability rule adopted by the Restatement of Torts would be
appropriate. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979). See also Parlee, Vicar-
ious Liability for Punitive Damages: Suggested Change in the Law Through Policy
Analysis, 68 MARQ. L. REv. 27, 36-44 (1984).
: See notes 592-608 supra and accompanying text.
, See notes 609-17 supra and accompanying text.
"I See notes 618-24 supra and accompanying text.
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the defective product was marketed. In either case, the statute
should allow the defendant to introduce mitigating evidence
showing payment by the defendant of earlier punitive damage
awards in other states.
Finally, if the concept of a class action is rejected and
individual suits are allowed, the proposed statute should limit
individual recoveries to a maximum fixed amount, such as
$500,000. As in the case of an aggregate award, the trial judge
should be permitted to award less than the maximum amount,
and the defendant should be permitted to introduce evidence of
prior punitive damages judgments in order to reduce its liability.
Punitive damages are not likely to work very well in the
environment of products liability. The reforms suggested above
will at least alleviate the worst excesses of this device. Neverthe-
less, the concept of punitive damages, even as modified, can
never be anything more than a stopgap solution to the problem
of unethical manufacturers and unconscionably dangerous prod-
ucts.

